DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 319 670 SO 020 914

AUTHOR	Dennis, Lawrence J., Ed.
TITLE	Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society (Chicago, Illinois, November 13-14, 1987 and November 11-12, 1988).
INSTITUTION	Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, Carbondale, IL.
PUB DATE	89
NOTE	233p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Dr. David B. Owen, Secretary-Treasurer, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, College of Education, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011 ($10.00).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021) -- Viewpoints (120)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC10 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Aesthetic Education; Childrens Rights; *Educational Policy; Ethics; *General Education; *Higher Education; Social Change; Teacher Education; *Values Education; Writing (Composition)

ABSTRACT

Proceedings of two conferences of a society of specialists in the philosophy of education are contained in this document. Seven papers are included from the 1987 conference program. They are: (1) "Conversation and Character: Teachable Moments in Plato's 'Republic'" (D. B. Owen); (2) "In Praise of the Philosophy of Liberal Education" (A. M. Neiman); (3) "Philosophy of Liberal Education and Teacher Education" (A. Brown); (4) "Democratic Theory and the Educational Policy Process" (D. T. Snauwaert); (5) "Taking the Moral Point of View: An Uneven Relationship to Moral Judgment-Making" (R. P. Craig); (6) "Is There Consciousness in Writing?: A Philosophical Exploration" (G. W. Stickel); and (7) "Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay II, or The Subjective Element in Esthetic Experience" (L. J. Dennis). Nine papers from the 1988 program are presented: (1) "The Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Development: A Critique" (R. P. Craig); (2) "Child Custody, Children's Rights and Education" (J. W. Hoff); (3) "Children's Rights Revisited: A Philosophical Basis for Protective Action" (R. C. Pipan); (4) "Sorokin's Theory of Sociocultural Change, Creative Altruism, and Education" (D. T. Snauwaert); (5) "Vice and Virtue in Higher Education: A Forgotten Issue" (D. B. Annis); (6) "A Response to 'Vice and Virtue in Higher Education: A Forgotten Issue'" (A. Brown); (7) "Janusz Korczak and Self-Governing Schools in the Twentieth Century" (R. Swartz); (8) "Is There a Reasonable Alternative to Objectivist Theories of Meaning and Rationality as a Basis for Curriculum? A Work in Progress" (P. L. Smith); and (9) "The Classics, Progress, and the Future" (D. B. Owen). The 1987 and 1988 programs and the membership list from those years are included. (JB)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

MICHAEL A. OLIVER

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

SP 020 914

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY 1987-1988

Edited by

Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Copyright @ 1989 by the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, Carbondale, IL 62901. All rights are reserved. No part of this manuscript may be reproduced without permission of the Society.

Copies of the Proceedings are distributed to members of the Society. Other interested parties may obtain copies by writing the Secretary-Treasurer. The cost is $10.00 postpaid.

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Officers

President: ..... David Annis
Ball State University

Vice-President: ..... Ronald Swartz
Oakland University

Secretary-Treasurer: ..... Craig Schley
Michigan Dept. of Education

Executive Committee

Lawrence Dennis ..... Southern Illinois University

Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon ..... The University of Chicago

George Stickel ..... Northwestern College

Program Committee

Peter Collins, Chair ..... Marquette University

Robert Nordberg (1987) ..... Marquette University

Alex Makedon (1987) ..... Northeastern & Northern Universities

Marie Hungerman, IHM (1988) ..... Nazareth College

George Stickel (1988) ..... Northwestern College

Table of Contents

Preface 6

Program (1987)

Conversation and Character: Teachable Moments in Plato's Republic
by David B. Owen 9
Iowa State University

In Praise of the Philosophy of Liberal Education
by Alven M. Neiman 24
University of Notre Dame

Philosophy of Liberal Education and Teacher Education
by Arthur Brown 29
Wayne State University

Democratic Theory and the Educational Policy Process
by Dale T. Snauwaert 40
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Taking the Moral Point of View: An Uneven Relationship to Moral Judgment-Making
by Robert P. Craig 58
SCH Health Care System

Is There Consciousness in Writing?
A Philosophical Exploration
by George W. Stickel 67
Northwestern College

Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay II
or
The Subjective Element in Esthetic Experience
by Lawrence J. Dennis 84
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Program (1988)

The Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Development: A Critique
by Robert P. Craig 98
SCH Health Care System

Child Custody, Children's Rights and Education
by J. Whitman Hoff 112
Bentley College

Children's Rights Revisited: A Philosophical Basis for Protective Action
by Richard C. Pipan 126
Oakland University

Sorokin's Theory of Sociocultural Change, Creative Altruism, and Education
by Dale T. Snauwaert 136
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Vice and Virtue in Higher Education: A Forgotten Issue
by David B. Annis 160
Ball State University

A Response to "Vice and Virtue in Higher Education: A Forgotten Issue"
by Arthur Brown 176
Wayne State University

Janusz Korczak and Self-Governing Schools in the Twentieth Century
by Ronald Swartz 183
Oakland University

Is There a Reasonable Alternative to Objectivist Theories of Meaning and Rationality as a Basis for Curriculum? - A Work in Progress -
by Philip L. Smith 202
Ohio State University

The Classics, Progress, and the Future
by David B. Owen 212
Iowa State University

Membership List, 1987-1988 227

PREFACE

The 1987 and 1988 meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society were held at the Chicago-Lake Shore campus of Loyola University, and we are most grategul to Walter P. Krolokowski and the administration of the university for providing such an agreeable setting for our sessions.

I first attended the MPES in, I think, 1967. At that time, the Society was considerably larger, and I recall travelling back on the train to Carbondale in the company of George Axtelle and George Counts. In the early 1970s, the Society went through a stormy period when ideology drove people apart rather than together. Now, in the more mellow 1980s, the membership is smaller, and once again tightly knit, as we see the so-called foundational subjects being assigned relatively minor roles in many colleges of education. The annual meetings of the MPES give us the opportunity to discuss subjects of interests, and to "do" philosophy together, and support each other in professional ways.

The Society is made up of a group of people who believe that philosophy of education still has something of value to contribute to the educational community. Our membership is not confined to the midwest, and we are happy to continue our association with colleagues who have moved farther afield. We are particularly pleased to have been able to continue to present a small annual award to the best paper submitted by a graduate student, and in these Proceedings we have a two-time winner. We hope thereby to encourage graduate students to join us, just as I did in 1967 when I was myself a graduate student. We always welcome new people to the membership of the MPES, and examples of their work can also be found in these Proceedings.

The MPES is most grateful to William E. Eaton, chair of the Department of Educational Administration and Higher Education, of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, for his generous assistance in producing these Proceedings at minimal cost to our membership, and to Patty Glover for organizing these materials into their present form.

Lawrence J. Dennis
Carbondale,
August 1989

1987 Annual Meeting

November 13-14

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1987 Annual Meeting
Loyola University of Chicago-Lake Shore Campus

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13—12:00 noon to 5:00 p.m.

12:00-1:00 Registration
1:00-1:10 Welcome: David Annis, President MPES

Session I Chair: Adrian Dupuis, Marquette University
1:10-1:40 "Conversation and Character: Teachable Moments in Plato's Republic," David Owen, Iowa State University
1:40-2:00 General Discussion

Session II Chair: George Kizer, Iowa State University
2:00-3:30 Panel Discussion: "Philosophy of Liberal Education and Teacher Education."
Alven Neiman, University of Notre Dame
Arthur Brown, Wayne State University
Gerald Gutek, Loyola University of Chicago
General Discussion

Session III Chair: Byron Radebaugh, Northern Illinois University
4:00-4:20 Graduate Student Competition Paper
"Democratic Theory and The Educational Policy Process"
Dale Snauwaert, University of Illinois at Urbana
4:20-4:30 General Discussion

Business
4:30-5:00 Business Meeting

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 14—9:00 to 11:50 a.m.

Session I Chair: Robert Craig, SCH Corporate Offices
9:00-9:30 "Taking the Moral Point of View: An Uneven Relationship to Moral Judgment-Making," John Wozniak, Loyola University of Chicago
9:30-9:50 General Discussion

Session II Chair: Joe Burnett, University of Illinois at Urbana
"Is There a Consciousness in Writing? An Exploration," George Stickel, Northwestern College
10:20-10:40 General Discussion

Session III Chair: Philip Smith, The Ohio State University
11:00-11:30 "Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay II or The Subjective Element in Esthetic Experience," Lawrence Dennis, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
11:30-11:50 General Discussion

Conversation And Character:
Teachable Moments in Plato's Republic

David B. Owen
Iowa State University

A PROLOGUE

I have chosen my topic and its method of presentation with two thoughts in mind. First, with regard to method, a verbal presentation such as this among colleagues suggests that a more informal touch is appropriate; thus, I will permit myself some personal remarks and will abbreviate some of the interpretive machinery at the heart of my paper. Second, my topic reflects a deep concern that I, as well as many of you, of course, have in the apparently tangential relation philosophy of education bears to most of the current discussions of educational reform; so I want to explore in front of you, and maybe with you, one of a number of ways that philosophy of education might be woven back into the fabric both of teacher preparation and of general reflection on the purposes of education in America today.

SETTING THE SCENE

I recently attended an exciting (for Iowa!) event, a two-day University seminar which included a panel presentation by three individuals recently selected by their states--Ohio, Iowa, and Oregon--as "Teachers of the Year." The Governor of Iowa had been invited and had promised to attend; in the event, however, more pressing business (he had to accept a "prestigious" award in North Carolina!) kept him away. But he was with us, nevertheless, in video tape if not spirit. Now, Iowa is, hopefully, coming to the end of a period of economic decline which by many indicators--for instance, the loss in land value: 62% from 1981-1986--is worse than the Great Depression; and whenever the Governor speaks of education it is in an economic context. So last

Thursday night, we in the audience watched a videotaped presentation of the usual pitch: education will help us restore economic prosperity, beat those Japanese, and rebuild the agricultural foundation of American life, family values, and rugged independence. Well, having heard all this once or twice before, I withdrew into meditation. I reflected first on my own limited competence in the face of the three extraordinary teachers on the podium, one of whom had spoken to one of my undergraduate classes and was, without question, truly a master of teaching. From there my associations led me to my marginal value, at least as perceived by many of my University colleagues, as someone who takes philosophy of education seriously and I began asking myself: What do I have to offer these three extraordinary teachers? or my fellow teachers of teachers? or even my students, teachers-to-be?

All of a sudden I became aware that the Governor's talking head--or rather, I presume, his speech-writer--had made a striking play on words. From out of the distant buzzing in my consciousness of the by-now platitudinous goal of "educational excellence"--and I think we all have our suspicions about what <u>that</u> means--I realized that we in the audience had also been exhorted to "share the excellence" so that we could all become "shareholders" in that excellence, if only we worked hard enough. Now, having flirted with bankruptcy for the last several years, I am not one to discount the benefits of economic stability; and the possibility of owning some shares of stock is, quite frankly, not without attraction. Then I clicked on the context in which this entrepreneurial opportunity was being offered, and I found myself becoming disturbed. Subsequently, not only was this idea of "shareholding" picked up in the panel's discussion, but in the crowd leaving the auditorium afterwards I could hear a number of individuals buzzing about capitalizing on this idea and its profit potential. Since that night a week ago, I have become

more disturbed by the responses of my colleagues when I have solicited their reaction to this choice of metaphor. Either they think there's no problem with it; or else they say, "Oh, that's just a casual remark. It doesn't mean anything." If I wasn't disturbed before, by now I certainly am.

A disclaimer: I am not inveterately hostile to capitalism. Like Dewey, I am suspicious of all "-ists" and "-isms." But I am greatly disturbed--no, I am angry--by what strikes me as a rapidly increasing reduction of education to material circumstances and purposes; and now my motivation--that is, my Governor tells me, if I am to be in favor of "excellence"--is being reduced metaphorically to an economic profit motive. Of course, as far back as Aristotle and even farther, we have generally recognized, and I would readily agree, that some economic stability is a necessary condition for a full human life--but not a sufficient one. Much exists to life beyond food, shelter, clothing, and even earning a living. And that "much" is an essential part of education, whether in pre-school or graduate school. Reducing my involvement in education to a profit-motive, to what I can earn off of someone else from an investment of time, energy, and spirit, to the idea, quite simply, of "What's in it for me?", offends me both professionally and personally.

And then I remembered the draft of the paper I prepared for our meeting here. I was reminded once again of why I pursue philosophy of education, of why Plato is important in so many ways not just for me but for all those teachers in that audience last Thursday night, for all teachers everywhere, I would argue. So let me turn our attention yet once again to Plato and to one of what are innumerable arguments for his importance in philosophy of education and in the education of teachers.

CONVERSATION, CHARACTER, AND TEACHABLE MOMENTS

In the current atmosphere of indifference, even hostility, to the value

of the disciplines known as educational "foundations," teachers frequently ask this question, often with the rhetorical presumption that no adequate answer is possible: "What help is philosophy for education?" or, in its more blunt form, "What can philosophy tell me about what to do Monday morning?" One of many potential answers to this question is supplied by Plato in his artful representations of intellectual conversation. The give and take between Socrates and his various partners provides a unique resource. Here we can see a whole world of individuals discovering, reacting to, and using ideas. One of the many features of the dialogues is that the conversations are, as in our everyday experience, so bound up with the speakers' characters as to be inextricable. Here there is no disembodied reason, no logic independent of the individuals engaging in it, no truths stated and received without extensive exploration by and of the individuals stating and receiving them. Here, what one says <u>is</u> what one is. Thought and character are one.

Now, this observation is not without import for education. If education is viewed as virtually anything beyond the mere conveying of information from one who knows to one who doesn't, then it is composed of what I would call "teachable moments," those points in the educational process when routine forward motion is interrupted and the individuals involved have an opportunity to reflect on what they are doing, even on the assumptions they are making about the entire process. These moments reveal whether the potential exists both for the "student" to gain insight into what she or he is engaged in as well as for the "teacher" to respond to the opportunity thereby presented. Failure to take advantage of such teachable moments may be attributed to either student or teacher, for both are necessary to make the moment bear fruit.

I want to take a look at Plato's <u>Republic</u>--of course, many other dialogues could be chosen to explore this idea, for instance, the <u>Apology</u>,

Meno, Protagoras, and so on--to give some specificity to what is involved here. We will view Plato's text not as a source of a particular philosophic doctrine but as a set of such teachable moments, in a double sense. On the one hand, it is the embodiment of a number of moments for both Socrates and his interlocutors wherein they can, or cannot, come to know what they didn't understand before; it reveals who they are. On the other hand, the Republic as a whole is itself a teachable moment for us as active readers: it reveals what we are capable of learning from a great teacher and, in so doing, reveals who we are. I want, therefore, to examine a number of moments when the intellectual structure of the conversation is such that we can discover assumptions guiding Socrates, his conversants, even ourselves. Afterwards, I will suggest a few "lessons" Plato teaches us about the pedagogic problems of generating intellectual motion.

THE REPUBLIC[1]

As you remember, the Republic begins with Socrates returning from the Piraeus with Glaucon when he is stopped by Polemarchus' slave, who orders him to wait for his master and his friends to come up. When they do, Polemarchus bids him stay with them, issuing a mock threat:

> "Well, then, either prove stronger than these men or stay here."
> Socrates: "Isn't there still one other possibility, our persuading you that you must let us go?"
> Polemarchus: "Could you really persuade if we don't listen?" (327c)

In such an off-hand manner does the central theme of the Republic announce itself: the relation of persuasion and force, of reason and power, conversation and action, word and deed, philosopher and king. The moment is not ripe for education, however, though Socrates has gently raised this profound question, for everyone is too busy to listen: Polemarchus is anxious to get Socrates back to his house, and Adeimantus, who chimes in now, wants

Socrates to come see the "torch race on horseback for the goddess" (328a). Those in the midst of action are reluctant to reflect on their purposes. Enter Cephalus, Polemarchus' father.

A very old man on "the threshold of old age," Cephalus does have time to reflect, and when Socrates asks him about the "road that perhaps we too will have to take" in order "to learn . . . what sort of road it is" (328e), he turns quite garrulous. He reports that the desires of younger men, those "many mad masters" (329d), now leave him alone. When Socrates asks if it isn't rather his wealth which makes his life easy, Cephalus replies that, indeed, a decent living is necessary in old age, but beyond that, the chief good of money is in assuaging one's fears of punishment in the next life for having committed "unjust deeds" (330d) in this.

> The possession of money contributes a great deal to not having to cheat or lie to any man against one's will, and, moreover, to not having to depart for that other place frightened because one owes some sacrifices to a god or money to a human being. It also has many other uses (331b).

Socrates, ears filled with this overflow of elderly advice, reaches into the mass of ideas and extracts what Cephalus appears to mean by justice: it is "the truth and giving back what a man has taken from another" (331c). He poses a counter-example: Should you return a sword given you by a friend when he returns to you in a state of madness? Cephalus agrees that, of course, you shouldn't give the sword back. When his son interrupts, saying that the definition is still correct, at least according to Simonides, Cephalus withdraws from the conversation: "Well, then, I hand down the argument to you, for it's already time for me to look after the sacrifices" (331d).

I want to draw your attention to three things here. First, Socrates' art in reaching into that massive response of Cephalus' and distilling the principle on which Cephalus bases his words is the envy of any teacher who has

ever led a discussion. Second, why does Socrates choose to use an example to test Cephalus' position? Well, Cephalus has shown himself to be a "practical" man, one who has successfully kept his economic books in order and who, when he speaks of justice, does so in terms of antecedent act and consequent penalty, of someone who "reckons up his accounts" (330e). So Socrates approaches him in a double fashion: on the one hand, he fixes the act--the giving of a sword for safe-keeping--and varies the agent's circumstances--soundness of mind becomes madness--and sees if the same result follows. And Cephalus states that it doesn't. On the other hand, rather than arguing from an abstract position, Socrates chooses to use an example, a mode of thinking which Cephalus himself has used from the beginning, for instance, treating the passions in old age through the story of Sophocles' sex life! Third, Cephalus reveals himself to be almost entirely a man of action, however good the actions--he goes off to the sacrifices and he expresses himself in favor of honest dealing with others--and when Socrates presents a serious challenge to the expression of his ideas, he leaves the conversation. A teachable moment has appeared briefly, but the "student," because of the intellectual state of his character at the time, is unable to take advantage of it. He may or may not have the potential to investigate his thinking sometime in the future--which is doubtful in this particular case, given his age--but not now. So Polemarchus, his son, rightly inherits the argument.

Polemarchus is the "good" student sitting in the front row making extensive notes and asking his teacher to "please clarify a small point in your lecture I didn't understand." Polemarchus respects authorities: I can hear him saying, "Well, Piaget says . . . !" Not being fluent in modern French, however, he cites Simonides, who says "[T]hat it is just to give to each what is owed" (331e). When Socrates observes that it is not clear "what

on earth he means" (331e) by that aphorism, Polemarchus responds with his definition: "friends owe it to friends to do some good and nothing bad" and "an enemy owes his enemy the very thing which is also fitting: some harm" (332a-b). Unlike his father, Polemarchus is not only willing to try to give a definition, not just a series of examples, but also willing to engage in the intellectual inquiry as Socrates explores his position logically by shifting the circumstances in which friends help friends, Nevertheless, after he agrees that the argument has shown "a clever guardian . . . is also a clever thief" (334a), Polemarchus reveals something about himself. He comments, "I no longer know what I did mean. However, it is still my opinion that justice is helping friends and injuring enemies (334b). He assumes what I take to be an honest position, one I see frequently in class and outside of class. He accepts the logic of an argument, even to the point of coming to recognize that he himself cannot express in a coherently meaningful fashion what it is that he thinks; nevertheless, he still insists that he knows what justice is. Apparently, this insistence turns on a deeply held feeling of comradeship with those "on my side" and an equally deeply held antipathy to those "who are against me"--certainly one of the most basic of human emotions.

What can one do with such a student? Well, Socrates turns to the issue of seeming versus real friends, and Polemarchus recasts his definition so that one helps and harms only those who are truly friends and enemies, respectively. Next, Socrates explores the issue of whether a good man ever injures another, that is, makes him less good. Slowly, Polemarchus comes to the recognition that, as Socrates says, "it is never just to injure anyone" (335e). This recognition is not only verbal, however; Polemarchus is willing to do battle over the issue now: "I, for one, am ready to be your partner in the battle" against those who say wise men like Simonides or Bias or Pittacus

argue tha t it is just to help friends and injure enemies (335e).

Several teachable moments have appeared here and been taken advantage of by both teacher and student. Socrates has first explored the logical structure of Polemarchus' definition, once it has been made clear. But that only revealed an underlying, bone-deep stance regarding friend and foe. Significantly, when Socrates explores this deeply held attitude, Polemarchus, reflecting the courage that his definition and his concluding remarks embody, has the intellectual courage to consider his own assumptions, even coming to a conclusion counter to an initially held position. I would argue that this is a remarkable instance of both teaching and learning. Socrates has found a way to enter Polemarchus's world, reveal some of its shortcomings to its inhabitant, and encourage him to explore some of the terra incognita on his map of human relations. The student, on the other hand, has shown himself to be courageous enough to explore what was previously thought to be known but now has become the unknown. The fact that it is at this point that Thrasymachus bursts in "like a wild beast" (336b), however, suggests that this is as far as Polemarchus can go, at least at this point in his life. Given his exhibition of verbal and intellectual courage in this passage, notice that at the beginning of Book II it is not he but Glaucon who will not permit the argument, apparently at the point of failure, to be dropped but insists on following it through to its proper conclusion. Nevertheless, I think as teachers and students we have much to appreciate and to gain from Polemarchus' comments.

A number of similar situations exist in Book I, though I lack the time to examine them here today. For instance, here are several passages in the conversation with Thrasymachus which are worth reflecting on in this light.

336c-337c:- Thrasymachus: "If you truly want to know what the just is, don't only ask and gratify your love of honor by refuting

whatever someone answers--you know that it is easier to ask than to answer--but answer yourself and say what you assert the just to be. And see to it you don't tell me that it is the needful, or the helpful, or the profitable, or the gainful, or the advantageous; but tell me clearly and precisely what you mean, for I won't accept it if you say such inanities."

Socrates: ". . . Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Shall I [make no answers like] those you mentioned before? Even if it happens to be one of these, shall I say something other than the truth?"

343a:- Socrates: "When we came to this point in the argument and it was evident to everyone that the argument about the just had turned around in the opposite direction, Thrasymachus, instead of answering, said, 'Tell me, Socrates, do you have a wet nurse?'

'Why this?' I said. 'Shouldn't you answer instead of asking such things?'

'Because,' he said, 'you know she neglects your sniveling nose and doesn't give it the wiping you need, . . .'"

348a-b:- Socrates to Glaucon, regarding Thrasymachus: " Now, if we should speak at length against him, setting speech against speech, telling how many good things belong to being just, and then he should speak in return, and we again, there'll be need of counting the good things and measuring how many each of us has in each speech, and then we'll be in need of some sort of judges who will decide. But if we consider just as we did a moment ago, coming to agreement with one another, we'll ourselves be both judges and pleaders at once."

354b:- "I have not had a fine banquet, but it's my own fault, not yours. For in my opinion, I am just like the gluttons who grab at whatever is set before them to get a taste of it, before they have in proper measure enjoyed what went before. Before finding out what we were considering first--what the just is--I let go of that and pursued the consideration of whether it is vice and lack of learning, or wisdom and virtue. And later, when in its turn an argument that injustice is more profitable than justice fell in my way, I could not restrain myself from leaving the other one and going after this one, so that now as a result of the discussion I know nothing. So long as I do not know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not and whether the one who has it is unhappy or happy."

Here, too, are a few key passages after Book I where what I am calling teachable moments appear. For instance, when the dialogue is reinitiated:-

357a-b:- Socrates: "Glaucon is always most courageous in everything, and so now he wouldn't accept Thrasymachus' giving up but said, 'Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or truly to persuade us, that it is in every way better to be just than unjust?'"

362d-e:- Adeimantus: "You surely don't believe, Socrates, that the argument has been adequately stated? . . . What most needed to be said has not been said. . . . We must also go through the arguments opposed to those of which [Glaucon] spoke, those that praise justice and

blame injustice, so that what Glaucon in my opinion wants will be clearer."

369a-b:- Socrates: "If we should watch a city coming into being in speech, we [would] also see its justice coming into being, and its injustice. . . . Well, then, a city, as I believe, comes into being because each of us isn't self-sufficient but is in need of much."

Or again, when they are creating the city of luxury:-

372c-d:- Glaucon: "You seem to make these men have their feast without relishes. . . . I suppose men who aren't going to be wretched recline on couches and eat from tables and have relishes and desserts just like men have nowadays."

Socrates: "All right. I understand. We are, as it seems, considering not only how a city, but also a luxurious city, comes into being."

Or when Socrates is accused of glossing over a key portion of argument:-

449c:- Adeimantus: "In our opinion you're taking it easy, and robbing us of a whole section of the argument, and that not the least, so you won't have to go through it. And you supposed you'd get away with it by saying, as though it were something quite ordinary, that after all it's plain to everyone that, as for women and children, the things of friends will be in common."

Finally, let me explore one more of these fascinating teachable moments. It occurs in Book VI after Socrates has described to Glaucon who the true philosophers are, has exposed the central problem of how can they be outstanding both in action and in knowledge, and has sketched their chief faculties. Adeimantus can restrain himself no longer and breaks in:

Socrates, no one could contradict you in this. But here is how those who hear what you now say are affected on each occasion. They believe that because of inexperience at questioning and answering, they are at each question misled a little by the argument; and when the littles are collected at the end of the arguments, the slip turns out to be great and contrary to the first assertions. And just as those who aren't clever at playing draughts [checkers] are finally checked by those who are and don't know where to move, so they too are finally checked by this other kind of draughts, played not with counters but speeches, and don't know what to say. However, the truth isn't in any way affected by this. . . . Now someone might say that in speech he can't contradict you at each particular thing asked, but in deed he sees that of all those who start out on philosophy . . . most become quite queer, not to say completely vicious; while the ones who seem perfectly decent . . . become useless to the cities (487b-d--italics added).

Surprisingly, Socrates agrees that those who say this are telling the truth, and in reply to their criticism he comments, "The question you are asking needs an answer given through an image" (487e).

Now, what's the necessity involved here that requires the use of imagery to address critics of the argument? Well, the objection itself <u>in its very character</u> demands an answer in kind. Since Adeimantus has raised similar objections previously, as at the beginning of Book V where he insists on further elaboration of Socrates' assertion that the guardians are to have all things in common, including women and children, I think we are safe in seeing this objection is not only that of many people who have listened to Socrates' conversation but also that of Adeimantus himself. Socrates reaches into his follower's objection and focuses on its central issue: the distinction between word and deed (we might be more comfortable characterizing the distinction as that between theory and practice). Sure, Adeimantus is saying, Socrates, like the other philosophers, can play word games and always win, but when one looks at the deeds of philosophers, they appear to be either vicious or useless. Adeimantus is most convinced by what he sees happen in the "real" world, and when the arguments of intellectuals strays too far from that world he grows skeptical. The best way for him to "see" what really happens with philosophers, then, is for him to observe an image of philosophers in action. In the metaphor of the Ship of State (488a-489a), which follows immediately, Socrates <u>shows</u> him the philosopher in action, notably the "decent" one who is apparently useless to the state. In the allegory, this "true pilot" is a "stargazer," one who desires neither to persuade nor to force the other sailors to let him guide the ship/state. His is not the power of getting rule but the power of knowing how to rule. This, then, is the best way to approach the way Adeimantus thinks, and he at least verbally agrees with Socrates'

reply to his objection. How convinced he is we may leave open to some question. Yet Socrates has maximized, within Adeimantus' own world, the possibility for the latter to see what he has heretofore not seen and to understand something about philosophy's value previously unrecognized. I think this is an extraordinary teachable moment, at least in its potential.

LESSONS

I want to sketch briefly four "lessons" we might derive from the analysis of teachable moments in passages like those above.

One, the Republic can be read not only as a source of Platonic doctrine--an enterprise of some difficulty, as over two millennia of controversy can attest to--but also as an example of the act of intellectual inquiry. Now, since education necessarily involves action, Plato's work has relevance for that practical question of teachers, "What do I do Monday morning?" One of the chief activities of the classroom should be that of intellectual inquiry, and if so, Plato's works--and by extension, educational philosophy--are relevant for the act of teaching.

Two, students differ radically in their intellectual character. This difference is not one of degree--some are quicker than others--but of kind. That difference in kind, I must add, the common interpretation of Plato notwithstanding, does not entail necessarily characterizing differences as ones of degree, of better and worse. Rather, I would suggest that in any particular educational situation, a student does indeed bring an intellectual character with which one must deal. That character, however, is subject to change, whether in growth or degradation, depending on how the situation develops. This view of radical student differences does not require us, then, to believe in a "Phoenician myth," that individuals are born gold, silver, or bronze and must remain such.

Three, given that students differ radically in their intellectual character, teachers should possess an intellectual flexibility to make the most of the teachable moments when they arise. To be successful, they need to recognize the diversity of intellectual worlds that differing individuals inhabit and possess the imaginative power to enter those worlds in order to convey to the individuals involved what they, the teachers, have to offer which will allow the students either to act more productively within their own world or, hopefully, to recognize that worlds exist beyond their own from which they might benefit by exploration.

Four, if teachable moments are at the heart of education, if students posses radically different (though malleable) intellectual characters, and if teachers need to possess an intellectual flexibility to respond to the diversity in their students, then teacher education must be expanded beyond present pedagogic practices. Quite frankly, it must become a liberal education, not in the current senses of distribution requirements--a little of this and a little of that--or of preprofessional training in disguise, but more along the lines suggested by Charles Wegener: "At its best a liberal education ought to be a moment of transformation in the life of a growing mind--a moment in which it becomes conscious of itself and its powers as such and of the problems of assessing their fruitfulness and their limits, as well as their relation to the human enterprises they both constitute and serve."[3] For such an education of educators, few, if any, equals of Plato's dialogues exist.

EPILOGUE

To return to where I began: Am I a "shareholder" in educational excellence? Not in any sense where I would accept that underlying economic metaphor. And that is what I as an educational philosopher have to offer my colleagues, my students, teachers at large. Our discipline is one which ques-

tions just such easy and unreflective use of language; even more, it questions the stance taken with regard to the world as a whole and requires of me and those who treat it seriously an account of why one thinks as one does. What we say and how we say it are important. Our conversation is our character. The classroom of Plato's dialogues has endured for 2 1/2 millennia. It teaches both listening and speaking, not as "skills" but as the motion of ideas. Plato helps me listen, think, and speak far better than if we had never met; he teaches me how to teach. He can do the same for the teachers of today, and that is part of my professional obligation, the sharing of Plato both as means and end with those who take teaching seriously, that is, as the sharing of ideas. It is in this sense that from him we all may truly profit.

ENDNOTES

[1] The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

[2] Liberal Education and the Modern University (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 94.

In Praise of the Philosophy of Liberal Education

Alven M. Neiman
University of Notre Dame

While the field of philosophy of education has been thriving, philosophy of liberal education, the study of education in colleges and universities, has not. Perhaps this is because questions concerning the nature and goal of post high school education are so difficult, so politically tinged and morally relevant. Such questions cannot, I believe, be treated as "merely" conceptual; they involve real choices, decisions as to how we ought to view the human person and his/her development. They demand a standing up for what we believe. Answering them requires us to open ourselves up not only to questions about our ability to reason but also about our moral clarity and vision of the future for human beings. Thus, in philosophizing about higher education we cannot hide behind some imagined Cartesian objectivity; because this sort of thinking requires an openness and truthfulness concerning our most cherished dreams we seek to avoid it. Yet our avoidance is nothing less than a moral failure of great proportion.

In the past year the philosophy of liberal education has received a boost from the publication of two books in the field, Alan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind and Ernest Boyer's College: The Undergraduate Experience in America.[1] The reception of these books by the reading public indicates that there is a rising demand for discussion and decision concerning the structure of post high school education. It indicates that it is time for philosophers of education to return from their various specialized pursuits to a grappling with issues that have to do with ourselves as we wish to become as human beings. Bloom and Boyer are to be praised for bringing philosophy of liberal education back into view, for forcing its issues onto our agendas as philosophers of education.

Perhaps the specific answers Bloom and Boyer provide us concerning liberal education are not as important as the impetus for further discussion that they provide. Still, their answers reveal at least some important conclusions. First of all, these authors both help us see that we ignore the philosophy of liberal education only at the risk of our own moral disintegration. A society that does not constantly reflect on its own ideals, codified in its views of higher education, simply closes upon itself in confusion and ossification. Secondly, Bloom in his stress on truth and Boyer in his stress on connectedness both suggest that the major goal of higher education ought not to be merely vocational. Higher education must, both authors rightly argue, aim at the development of human potential in the most fundamental ways. This is true whether we are Platonists, with a fixed view of human nature, Existentialists, viewing human nature as inexorably tied to human decisions or whether we place ourselves somewhere in between these two positions. Finally, both Bloom and Boyer remind us that in our development we are deeply committed to the idea of democratic community, even while the nature of that community is open to debate within the philosophy of liberal education.

Reading Bloom and Boyer reminds us that our choices concerning the shape of liberal education are in the end concerned with nothing less than the forms of life in which thinking and acting have a ground. In discerning a shape for higher education we reveal our images of the ways in which we desire human potential to become actual. We are, in this inquiry, seeking something beyond conceptual or factual truths with which our assertions might correspond. We aim instead at providing a basis for the day to day lives for those in our community in stories that provide direction and meaning. In these stories we <u>seek</u> community, a <u>shared</u> sense of direction. We aim not at a foundation of knowledge but a shared field of imagination, parameters in which our lives may have depth and breadth in space and time.[2]

Besides questions of the shape (i.e. the structure and content) of higher education, the philosophy of liberal education must obviously be concerned with the form of such education. It must ask questions concerning how teachers of liberal education ought to teach, and more basically, how these teachers ought to be trained. One of the tragedies of contemporary higher education is the failure of universities to see the need to properly train future college teachers to teach. While teaching and research may, as has been argued, go hand in hand, there is no good reason to believe that being trained to research well in itself makes one good at making students liberally educated. Too often graduate students simply are not educated in teaching methodology; they are too often left to fend for themselves in this regard.

Often future teachers of higher education receive no substantial training in teaching because their own teachers are too myopic, research oriented and specialized to either see the need or know how to begin to meet it. Boyer does well in this regard to suggest that a fruitful step here could be to begin to bring general education back into the college and university curriculum and ask our professors to participate. We ought, that is, to ask our researchers to teach classes in which the methodologies of all the disciplines are brought to bear on perennial human issues of fact and value. In this way we can enrich the lives of our professors by bringing them into a wider community of concern than that of the department. We can help them see the value of interdisciplinary thought and interaction so that the joy of liberal learning can be exemplified for students who otherwise are placed in danger of making their own major methodology into an idolatrous "one and only way of seeing reality as it is." While present demands for specialized research are, to some extent, overwhelming, we have the choice of demanding that our teachers of higher education become models of liberal learning for both their undergraduate and graduate students. Properly understood, this demand only increases the chances that specialized

research will improve as its practitioners become devotees of wisdom.

Here we ought to remember that higher education is inevitably rooted in spiritual concerns. This is not, of course, to say that the educator must be tied to some set of sectarian religious concerns; higher education in its concern for the point of human life, truth, the connections between those disciplines in which truth is sought and the higher aspirations of the human search for meaning is necessarily related to questions traditionally seen as having to do with God and the soul. The study of liberal education cannot help but bring us to see the limitations of human beings in their search for ways to manage their own lives and the lives of others. This study indicates that wisdom requires humility, which, in turn, requires us to acknowledge our place within and reliance upon community both for the attainment of truth and the practical achievement of human betterment. Here, in part, is why our aim in the philosophy of liberal education must be consensus, and why democracy is such an important part of this higher learning.

If the end of liberal education is wisdom then philosophers, lovers of wisdom, who concentrate on educational matters have a special concern with the philosophy of liberal education. They must orient all their studies towards this final end of the educational process. Just as no entity can, in Aristotelian terminology, be clearly understood without an understanding of its final cause, philosophy of education is fruitful and intelligible only when its practitioners keep the philosophy of liberal education in view. Educators teach well only when they are liberally educated. Societies prosper only when the state of our institutions of higher learning is a constant and overriding concern. Plato in The Republic correctly notes that a proper concern for justice and every sort of virtue forces us to wonder over the questions of the philosophy of education.

If all this is so, we philosophers of education owe a special debt of gratitude to Alan Bloom and Ernest Boyer for forcing questions of the nature of

liberal education and its preconditions back upon us. May the furor over these books lead us not into frenzy or scepticism, but into a sincere and sustained relationship with the matters inherent in this philosophical inquiry into the higher education of the human person, philosophy of liberal education.

---

[1] Alan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (Simon and Schuster, New York; 1987); Ernest Boyer, College: The Undergraduate Experience in America (Harper and Row, New York; 1987).

[2] James Hillman, "A Note on Story," Parabola, IV, 4, pp. 43-47.

PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERAL EDUCATION AND TEACHER EDUCATION

by Arthur Brown
Wayne State University

The sentiments expressed here are similar to those of two quite different yet similar people, Robert Frost and La Donna Harris. As I was rummaging around in this cranial cavity, Frost's words cropped up, here, there, everywhere: "Something there is that doesn't love a wall." And recently at the meeting of the American Educational Studies Association, I was in the presence of La Donna Harris, President of Americans for Indian Opportunity, who spoke on the subject, "Maintaining Traditional Values in Contemporary Society." Her traditional values are not the traditional values of which many in the present administration are so fond. Hers are values she learned as an American Indian: equality, respect, discussion, consensus, community, etc. In accordance with custom, Ms. Harris stepped down from the podium and sat at the level of the audience which gathered around in a fairly close semi-circle. During her talk, La Donna Harris advocated a respect for different values of different peoples. Her cultural relativism was, of course, an easy mark for some philosophic types, including myself, who asked her the usual questions about the objectivity of values and whether she could justify, say, the practice of some tribe (the name of which escapes me) eating

some of its children. Yet one could not help but feel La Donna Harris' presence -- and long after the session was over. She exhibited that generosity of spirit which characterizes people whose education has been truly liberal. I spoke with her immediately after the session, when she was still suffering from the attacks of us little people, and I told her that she was a beautiful person and that in her own way she had arrived at a depth of human understanding which eludes so many who are said to have received a liberal education, including some whose professional concern is with distinctions, clarifications, and justifications. She thanked me with a hug and a kiss. A happy ending. I shall return to Frost and Harris, but first I must get to some distinctions, clarifications, and justifications. All necessarily in a sketchy manner.

I shall accept the literal definition of liberal education as one which liberates, that is, one which provides an opportunity to a student to learn how to function effectively as a citizen in a democratic society. I shall think of a liberal teacher education as one which enables a teacher to operate effectively not only as a citizen but also as a professional. I shall define a professional as one capable of exercizing independent judgment in the performance of a particular social service. Therefore: (1) a teacher is not a professional merely by virtue of the possession of knowledge or analytic power (though such qualities are necessary); (2) when a teacher is engaged in carrying out mandates issued by others, that teacher

is not a professional, but a functionary; and (3) a teacher does not act as a professional if motivated primarily by personal gain rather than the social good. The terms"professional" and "liberal education," then, include moral components.

I shall consider four aspects of the education of teachers: (1) instruction in methods; (2) the subject matter of the educational programs of teachers; (3) the ethos in which academic instruction goes on; and (4) the culture of the school in which teachers practice their profession. In considering these aspects of the education of teachers I shall make mention of those features which I would call liberal and those which I would call illiberal.

Instruction in Methods

Probably the most common criticism made of teacher education is the claim that teacher education programs contain too little academic substance and too much by way of instruction in methods. As a consequence, it is said, teachers provide "content-free" education and their students, therefore, are not only deficient in so-called basic skills but also are ignorant of history, literature, geography, etc.

I offer no apologia for methods courses as many are now presented. No doubt there is ample room for criticism. But some method of instruction is obviously unavoidable. It is impossible to apply a method in the abstract,

free of content, just as it is impossible to think without thinking about something. The question is not whether to be concerned with methods. The question that must be asked is which methods are most effective in producing desired results.

Hence, when critics bemoan instruction in methods in teacher education, they no doubt are referring to certain methods and, at the same time, implying, if not stating explicitly, that other methods of instruction are preferable. The kinds they generally prefer, I think we can safely say, are didactic methods with which we are all familiar and which include lecturing, book learning, and testing.

The question then arises as to whether lecturing, book learning, testing, etc., as methods of teaching are superior to other possible methods in producing desired characteristics in students. And in all circumstances, and with all students. This is a problem, of course, for educational researchers, including perceptive observers. But one can hardly avoid a further question: Even if those desired characteristics are realized by using some particular method, at what price?

In this regard I am reminded of Dewey's lament in one of his more lyrical statements:

> What avail is it to win prescribed amounts of information about geography and history, to win ability to read and write, if in the process the individual loses his own soul; loses his appreciation of things worthwhile, of the values to which these things are relative; if he loses desire to apply what he has learned, and, above all, loses the ability to extract meaning from his future experiences as they occur? [1]

We can learn much from Dewey's lament. When the acquisition of prescribed amounts of information becomes the central, if not exclusive, focus of education, as has become increasingly the case in recent years, we will suffer the educational equivalent of Gresham's law: bad (illiberal) education will drive out good (liberal) education. The current obsession with uniform and measurable academic achievement at almost all levels of education, including teacher education, threatens liberal education because of its restrictiveness not only on goals but also on methods. This contradicts conventional wisdom which holds that any number of methods may be used to realize particular goals. But the fact is that those methods will be used which most efficaciously produce the particular goals desired regardless of their impact on good education. That is the inevitable consequence of an accountability system which demands measurable results. <u>It is the method of education, then, that determines its liberal quality; goal-driven education is by its very nature illiberal</u>. That fact, I am afraid, escapes the attention of many who are genuinely serious about liberalizing education and making professionals out of teachers.

Subject Matter

Moving from a consideration of instruction in methods to a consideration of content or subject matter in the education of teachers, it occurs to me that nothing dies harder than the identification of education with information. This is a puzzlement in light of the fact that we all know how perishable information is, and we all know about the deluge of new information in the modern world. Surely Whitehead had it right when he said that education is what remains after everything else has been forgotten.

Nevertheless, the popularity of books like Hirsch's Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know, with its long list of items to be memorized, and that by Finn and Ravitch, What Do Our 17 year-olds Know: A Report on the First National Assessment of History and Literature, illustrates how we continue to identify education with information.

This is not to say subject matter is unimportant for teachers or anyone else. But subject matter, whether it be in the courses taken in a college of liberal arts or in a school of education, should be viewed not simply as information, but also as the stuff with which we create moving ideas; which enables us to comprehend relationships heretofore unrecognized; and which is put to use in acquiring those larger understandings necessary to make some sense out of the world and to improve it.

It is toward such ends that education should be directed if it is to be regarded as liberal. This is true whether the process of education is carried on in schools, in colleges of liberal arts, in colleges of engineering, or in colleges of education. Hence the distinction quite often made between liberal education and professional education is, in my judgment, false. Broadly conceived and properly taught, engineering and education are liberal arts.

The Ethos in Which Academic Instruction Goes On

There is much talk these days, particularly since the Holmes Group and the Carnegie recommendations were issued, about the desirability of a teacher education program consisting of a degree in some academic discipline plus a fifth year of professional training (and I use that word advisedly). I think it an illiberal idea that all that is required in a program of education for teachers are a few education courses along with some practice teaching laid thinly on top of a liberal arts base.

I do not claim, of course, that the traditional academic disciplines are of little value. What I do claim is that the preparation of teachers, if it is to result in the acquisition of a professional ethos and in the development of professional intelligence, requires time -- a great deal of time. One year will not suffice. And an education program for teachers that is segmented, divided in time and in orientation between the liberal

arts on one hand and the professional courses on the other, will diminish and delay professional development.

Further, whereas other professional schools -- law, medicine, engineering, for example -- are attempting (however weakly) to reverse the tide of specialization and to provide students with more opportunity to study the ethical, the social, the historical, and the psychological dimensions of their professiona, the education profession is proceeding in the opposite direction. Practically every year demands are made for including new, specialized elements in the education programs of teachers, e.g., career education, multicultural education, bilingual education, early childhood education, secondary reading, reading in the content area, education for the gifted, and mainstreaming. To make room, courses in the foundations of education are cut down or cut out -- if they were included in the first place. Colleges and schools of education should, of course, assume responsibility for specialized courses and programs if the market demands them and if they are sufficiently distinct as disciplines to warrant their existence. But such courses and programs raise questions of a fundamental kind, and they must be dealt with somehow. Practitioners or other specialists unsophisticated about the historical, philosophic, social, or economic aspects of their specialties will be seriously handicapped.

I cannot overemphasize this matter. Notwithstanding Skinner and the newer breeds of mechanists, teaching is not simply a technology; it is a profound moral enterprise. If the great bulk of the professional education of teachers is to be practice teaching, as some people suggest, we do not need colleges of education; the schools can do the job. And if all that is required, in addition, are narrowly technical methods courses, a teacher center or a trade school can do the job. Only a college or university can deal systematically and in depth with certain kinds of professional questions, such as:

How do we justify -- philosophically or economically -- the extra expense for educating the gifted? or the disabled?

How can multicultural education harmonize the claims of those who support diversity and the claims of those who support unity?

Yet how can all this be done in four, five, or even six years as specialties accumulate and as specialized faculty and students move increasingly distant from one another? A large question, but I do have one modest proposal.

When students enter their teacher education programs they should be asked to subscribe to a few educational journals and buy a few books, both of a general nature, which would constitute the basis of a weekly faculty-student seminar. Such a seminar would offer an opportunity for faculty and students alike to read, reflect on, and discuss educational

issues, and, in so doing, provide a common ground for discourse which, by virtue of its integrating character, would create to some degree a professional ethos so often missing in colleges of education.

Culture of the School in Which Teachers Practice Their Profession

I turn to the fourth and final consideration of liberal education for teachers: The culture of the school in which they practice their profession.

There is no point in developing highly professional educational programs if the circumstances under which teachers work militate against professional performance. Whatever their training and whatever intellectuality and commitment they may bring to their work, it is virtually impossible for teachers to act as professionals if they are constantly frustrated by role conflicts, mindless public criticism, violence, frightened, hence ineffective school administrators, a thick bureaucracy, and the like, all of which deprive teachers of their professional freedom.

There are no more powerful educative agents than the institutions in which we live, be they the family, the work place, or the larger society. Institutions can be so constructed that they either consist of walls of which Frost wrote, which separate and make for alienation, narcissism, and cynicism -- which I am afraid are so prevalent in

contemporary schools. Or they can lead to that sense of community of which La Donna Harris spoke.

Much of what is recommended or is occurring in the current reform movement in education constructs walls which divide and separate. I am thinking of such policies as merit pay, mandated goals and objectives, career ladders, accountability systems, and centralization of authority, especially state authority. If I were to recommend some harmonizing, communitarian policies (liberalizing features, if you will), they would be increased teacher authority in school policy and curriculum development, greater parental involvement, extension of student responsibility and freedom, radical decentralization of school systems, and significant reduction in school and class size.

To conclude, I am sure that all reasonable people, whatever methods or policies they recommend, support the concept of liberal education. But how to attain it is a problem more crucial than commonly recognized. As R.S. Peters pointed out:

> The Puritan and the Catholic both thought that they were promoting God's Kingdom, but they thought it had to be promoted in a different manner. And the different manner made it quite a different Kingdom. [2]

---

1. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 49.

2. R.S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and Education (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 95.

Democractic Theory and the Educational Policy Process

Dale T. Snauwaert
Department of Educational Policy Studies
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

At the heart of our public philosophy is the notion that public education is the foundation of democracy. In several of its cases the Supreme Court has emphasized that public education "is a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government (Abingdon School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 230, 1963)." The Court posits that education has a "fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society (Plyer v. Doe, 1201 S.C.P. 2382, 2397, 1982)," and a "pivitol role" in "sustaining our political and cultural heritage." The Court maintains that education is "the very foundation of good citizenship....a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values (Brown v. The Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 1954)."

If public education is vital for the health and preservation of our democratic system of government, should decisions about the proper conduct and substance of education be made democratically, or should decision-making power be vested in the hands of a few professionals? Before we can answer this question we need to answer the metaquestion: What is democracy?

Democracy can be broadly defined as "a system of decision-making in which leaders are more or less responsive to the preferences of non-leaders (Dahl, cited in Krouse, 1982, p. 443)." In other words, democracy is a system of government where those individuals who are going to be affected by a government policy have a prime facie right to have their preferences accounted for in the decision making process that gives

rise to that policy. In the case of education, where decisions will not only have a profound effect on the future of one's society, but will also have a profound effect on the future well-being of one's children, it would be a violation of the democratic right above to vest total decision making power in the hands of a few professionals. Therefore, we can conclude that, given this broad definition of democracy, educational policy should be made democratically.

However, this broad definition provides little guidance in the way of specifying the particular form that democracy should take. What is the best way to account for the preferences of the citizenry? The purpose of this paper is to survey democratic theory in search of the most viable form of democracy, and to answer the question: What form of democarcy should the policy making process in education employ? Admittedly, this question is problematic; although there are a few clear cut favorites, no definitive conclusion has been reached. However, in the first part of this paper I will argue that Theodore Lowi's (1979) concept of "juridical democracy" is the most viable at present. We will begin with a survey of democratic theory leading to Lowi's juridical democracy. Next the educational policy making process will be assessed in light of this survey, and finally, I will argue for the application of juridical democracy to the educational policy process.

Democratic Theory

The English word "democracy" is a transliteration of the Greek δημοκρατία meaning government by the people (Graubard, 1973). Running throughout the history of democratic theory is the

identification of democracy with political equality, popular sovereignty, and rule by majorities (Dahl, 1956). In his Politics Aristotle wrote:

> The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state; this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just ... the will of the majority is supreme (cited in Sommerville and Santoni, 1963, p. 87).

And Locke wrote in his Second Treatise on Civil Government:

> For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority (cited in Dahl, 1956, p. 34).

Numerous other citations could be presented, however, suffice it to say that the conception of democracy as majority rule has formed the core of democratic theory.

Dahl (1956) provides us with a succinct articulation of the principle of majority rule. He writes:

> The principle of majority rule prescribes that in choosing among alternatives, the alternative preferred by the greater number is selected. That is, given two or more alternatives x, y, etc., in order for x to be government policy it is a necessary and sufficient condition that the number who prefer x to any alternative is greater than the number who prefer any single alternative to x (p. 37-38).

This rule may be thought of as the essence of populist democracy, however, there is a fundamental problem with the principle in theory, and in spite of its prominence in Western political thought, there exists an historical distrust of any system that would give sole power to the majority. Let us first consider the theoretical problem.

The central problem with populist democracy is that it ignores

differences in the intensity of preferences (Dahl, 1956). For example, let us say that a particular policy is only slightly preferred by a narrow majority and its alternative is strongly preferred by the minority. Under the majority principle the policy preferred by the majority would be enacted even though the majority was indifferent to it. In this case an indifferent majority would rule over the demands of an intense minority. The question arises whether such a system is just. The fact that a significant portion of the polity can be overruled by a narrow majority which is indifferent runs counter to our basic sense of fairness. In a very significant way the liberties of the minority are violated. Populist democracy seems open to the possiblity of tyranny in the form of oppression by a majority over significant portions of the citizenry. This possibility was foreseen by James Madison and the other Founding Fathers and led them to frame a "balanced government" (Hofstadter, 1954; Dahl, 1956), a political system that would provide checks and balances which would prevent majority tyranny or other forms of factionalism.

On the historical side, many of the members of the Constitutional Convention exhibited distrust of the common man's ability to decide on government policy. Hamilton charged that the "turbulent and changing" masses "seldom judge or determine right," and he advised that a government body be established to "check the imprudence of democracy (Hofstadter, 1954, p. 4)." William Livingston held that "the people have ever been and ever will be unfit to retain the exercise of power in their own hands (Hofstadter, 1954, p. 4)" And Edmund Randolph warned the members of the Convention that the greatest danger of tyranny lay in "the democratic parts of our constitutions (Hofstadter, 1954, p. 4)."

Despite the Founding Fathers' distrust of populist democracy, they intuitively and morally could not reject the principle of majority rule (Hofstadter, 1954), what Madison called the "republican principle." Instead they adopted a system which would retain the republican principle, but with the addition of a system of checks and balances that would constitutionally inhibit the majority. Thus, a majority remained a necessary condition for the adoption of a government policy but it no longer was a sufficient condition.

The main feature of Madisonian Democracy is that it demands the concurrence of independent authorities in the policy making process, thereby balancing diverse interests against each other, so that no interest could become a dominant and entrenched majority (Benn, 1987). However, the balancing mechanism of Madisonian Democracy is solely contained within the machinery of government, via the provision of checks and balances. Implicit in the Madisonian argument is the proposition that any group or individual will tyrannize over others unless restrained by external checks, and that external checks are best provided by the "constitutionally prescribed machinery" of government (Dahl, 1956).

However, Dahl (1956) argues that Madisonian Democracy exaggerates the importance of governmental checks and underestimates the importance of the "inherent social checks and balances existing in a pluralistic society (p. 22)." He argues that without social checks and balances it is doubtful whether intragovernmental checks on officials would be enough to prevent tyranny. Social checks and balances arise from the fact that American society is a collection of various groups and interests. What checks the majority is the social and political reality that policy is determined by

the efforts of small but active minorities. According to this view, to be democratic, government agencies must be sensitive to a wide range of interests, so that any group significantly affected by a policy will have their preference taken into consideration. Therefore, rather than being a system where majority rules with the addition of constitutional inhibitions, democracy is a "polyarchal" system where minorities rule (Dahl, 1956).

Underlying this pluralistic account is a view of human nature that sees people as basically concerned with their own private interest and generally apathetic toward the public interest. That is, most individuals most of the time seek fulfillment in the activities of private life and only engage in political activity when the action or inaction of government impinge upon their private goals (Krouse, 1982; Dahl, 1963). Thus, democracy and polyarchy become purely instrumental devices for maximizing the fulfillment of private interest (Krouse, 1982). However, it is argued that through the competition of interests pursuing their own private goals somehow, via an invisible hand, a general public interest emerges (Lowi, 1979). Therefore, the competition between these multiple interests provides reasonable assurance that important social problems will be identified, acted upon, and resolved (Keehn, 1976). In other words, there is assurance that the public interest will be served. If this is the case, then polyarchy is an adequate account of democracy, for it is (1) a system of governmental decision-making which takes into account the preferences of the polity, and (2) it is sensitive to social justice. However, it can be argued that polyarchy is defficient on both of these counts.

In reality the groups that are the most organized and have the greatest resources are those that influence government decision making. Policy that emerges from government is composed of elite interest, excluding the interests of less powerful, articulate, and organized groups (Keehn, 1976; Lowi, 1979). In the words of Lowi (1979):

> Congressmen are guided in their votes, presidents in their programs, and administrators in their discretion by whatever organized interests they have taken for themselves as the most legitimate; and that is the measure of the legitimacy of demands and the necessary guidelines for the framing of the laws (p. 51).

What policy makers see as the most legitimate interests are, not the interests of individuals or the interests of unorganized groups, but the interests of elite corporate groups who posses the resources, power and organization to lobby political actors (Keehn, 1976; Lowi, 1979). From this perspective, we have a political system where a minority rules rather than a system where minorities rule.

Given the underlying social-psychological assumption of polyarchy, that individuals are self-interested and are only concerned with politics when it can serve their own interests, the ruling minority will tend to shape policy to favor itself rather than the public interest. A number of scholars (e.g. Lowi, 1979; Keehn, 1976; McConnell, 1976) have argued that this type of policy making process has been institutionalized in the United States. Lowi (1979) refers to this state of government as "interest-group-liberalism," and he argues that it is so ingrained in our political structure that it constitutes a Second Republic.

The main effect of interest-group-liberalism has been the erosion of the government's capacity to plan and thereby to govern. Due to the lack of clear, precise legislation, which details standards and procedures for

implementation, government planning has been delegated to the executive branch and to powerful interests, which has in effect resulted in the "parceling out to private parties the power to make public policy (Lowi, 1979, p. 44)." Lowi (1979) argues that public policy of this sort is "policy-without-law." The delegation of policy making from Congress to private interest has shifted the policy making process from a public debate to a private negotiation between dominant interests and the members of government. It seems that Democracy cannot be left to the invisible hand of group competition; it demands a visible hand.

Lowi's prescription is a return to constitutionalism in the form of what he calls "juridical democracy." The most outstanding feature of juridical democracy is "rule of law operating in institutions (Lowi, 1979, p. 298)," which contrasts with the pluralist practice of policy-without-law (Grady, 1980). Rule-of-law incorporates three standards: (1) the articulation of public policy in statutory law by the legislature; (2) specification of implementation and enforcement procedures within the statue; and (3) statutory language enabling the law to be understood by anyone affected by it (Grady, 1980). These juridical standards restrict discretion and provide specification, thereby reinstating legislative authority.

Lowi's prescription is not only juridical, it is also democratic in that legislative action under juridical democracy is based upon popular representation rather than clientele (special interest) representation. It necessitates deliberation about public purposes, rather than private purposes, in a public arena. In doing this it sustains a form of public policy making that is sensitive to the preferences of the citizenry.

The pluralist account is correct in the sense that the social fabric of the United States is pluralistic. However, as we have discussed above, it is incorrect in the sense that minorities will check themselves. Lowi maintains that constitutional checks are needed. However, juridical democracy provides constitutional checks, not on the majority as in Madisonian democracy, but on the minority. It does this by reinstating legislative authority, and by reinstating public rather than private criteria of legitimacy. Juridical democracy is essentially a constitutinal mechanism for providing equal representation of all interests via a legislative body, thereby preventing minority rule. Under interest-group-liberalism, due to the lack of specification in legislation and its resultant delegation of authority to the executive branch, organized interests have wide access to policy formulation. Under juridical democracy the points of access to the policy process would be centralized within representative bodies. This centralization would make it more difficult for organized interests to gain control of policy (Grady, 1980). The inevitable competition between special interests would move from a private arena to a public forum where the claims of various interests would be debated on the basis of public, rather than private, standards. The consequences of policy would then be "measured in terms of the state's interest, as the democratic representative of its citizenry" rather than in terms of elite interests (Grady, 1980, p. 420).

In answer to the criticisms of pluralism Dahl (1970) has revised his polyarchal theory of democracy to include a more participatory component. His solution is that by increasing prticipation, balance can be restored to the political system, in that a dominant minority will be checked by a more active, and thereby, more influential polity.

Dahl (1970) begins by asserting three basic criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of a decision-making process. These three criteria are: (1) the criterion of Personal Choice, (2) the criterion of Competence, and (30 the criterion of Economy. The criterion of Personal Choice asserts that everyone who is affected by a government policy has a prime facie right to equal participation in the decision making process that gives rise to the policy (Krouse, 1982). However, this criterion must be balanced against both the criterion of Competence and the criterion of Economy. The criterion of Competence posits that decisions be informed by expertise. That is, the extent to which a decision is informed by a special competence is the extent to which it is valid. When this criterion is balanced with Personal Choice, a situation may require that participation is sacrificed in favor of the need for expert authority. In addition, participation must also be balanced with the criterion of Economy. This criterion asserts that a decision is valid to the extent that it economizes the time and energy expended in the process. Since prticipation requires both time and energy, a rational person will only participate in the political process when the benefits outweigh the costs (Krouse, 1982, p. 451). These three criteria form a system of authority where participation defers to competence whenever the latter will increase efficiency, and where time and energy should be economized whenever possible (Krouse, 1982).

Given the underlying assumption of pluralism that human beings are primarily concerned with their own interest, increased participation in the political process will only occur if citizens view participation as a

means to maximize their benefits. However, given the fact that policy in modern government deals with very complex issues which call for special competence and which would take considerable time and energy to become knowledgeable about, competence and economy would seem to necessitate, not the extension, but the reduction of direct participation (Krouse, 1982). Even though Dahl would like to balance the pluralistic system by increasing participation, his own assumptions and criteria seem to negate that possibility from occurring. It seems that the attempt to socially check the minority through increased participation is untenable. The criteria of Competence and Economy seem to demand the need for a representative democracy, the delegation of decision-making power to elected representatives who possess special competence and who's professional responsibility is the formulation of public policy. The best alternative seems to be the constitutional checks provided by Lowi's juridical democracy.

It is important to note that underlying a viable system based upon juridical democracy is also the condition of participation. To some degree the public has to be aware of the issues in front of the representative body in order for that body to be responsive to the public interest. That is, public scrutiny can only check the representative body if there is public awareness. However, this form of participation is far less demanding than the participation Dahl calls for. In fact, the apathy of the polity may have an institutional cause. That is, the shift from a public to a private policy making arena may have disallowed the public from having the chance to be aware of real issues and real stakes. By moving policy deliberation back to a public arena, the chances for public awareness are greatly increased, and it is possible that the public would respond positively.

In summary, we have traced the development of democratic theory from a populist conception, which we concluded was susceptible to majority tyranny, to Madisonian democracy which accepted majority rule but provided constitutional mechanisms to check the majority. Madisonian democracy was rejected on the grounds that its constitutional checks were ineffective because a majority does not rule, but policy eminates from a competition between minority groups, minorities rule. In turn, this pluralistic account was rejected on the grounds that pluralism leads to interest-group-liberalism where powerful, elite interests capture policy, and thereby, shape policy in favor of their own interest rather than the public's interest. In reality, an elite minority rules. A social check on the minority in the form of increased citizen participation was entertained, but it was also rejected on the basis of the underlying assumption of pluralism that the polity is generally self-interested and apathetic. In the end, a representative democracy in the form of juridical democracy was accepted as the most viable democratic form of public policy making, on the grounds that it checks the minority by returning the policy process to a public arena where the general public interest can be accounted for.

In what follows, the policy making process in education will be assessed in light of the above conclusions. It will be argued that interest-group liberalism also exists in education. Following this discussion, an attempt will be made to apply juridical democracy to the educational policy process as a way to restore a democratic form of policy making in education.

Interest-Group-Liberalism In Education

The development of interest-group-liberalism is clearly reflected within the education community. Throughout our history the federal government has delegated authority concerning educational policy to the states, which in turn have, for the most part, delegated authority to local school boards. However, in the past twenty years there has been a proliferation of various special interests who have lobbied the federal and state governments, and have used the courts as instruments in order to further their own interests. As a result, a proliferation of federal and state legislation has eroded local authority.

As a consequence of interest-group-liberalism local access to the policy process has been severely limited, with negative ramifications on every level of the local educational establishment, where in fact the process of education occurs. Local school boards have lost most of their decision making power. They have been turned into legitimating agencies rather than policy making bodies. Educational administrators have been turned into monitors of legislation rather than educational leaders. And teachers have been systematically deskilled; they have been turned into implementors of curriculum policy rather than educational professionals. This collective loss of authority is a loss of the "means of coordination" of the educational enterprise, which has produced incoherent policy and an erosion of the intellectual and moral character of the school (Grant, 1918; Atkin, 1980)

Goodlad (1982) maintains that parents have recognized this loss of local authority and would prefer its reinstatement. He writes: "Most of the parents we surveyed would take power from the more remote, less

visible, more impersonal authorities heading the system and place it in the hands of the more visible, more personal, known, close-at-hand staff of the school and parent groups close to the school (p. 274)." According to Goodlad (1983) the reinstatement of local authority is the most important principle of effective schooling: ".... the school must become self-directing. The people connected with it must develop a capacity for effecting renewal and establish mechanisms for doing this (p. 276)." However, self-direction is difficult at best in a system dominated by interest-group-liberalism. The restructuring of the educational policy process in the direction of a viable form of democracy is essential for effective education.

Juridical Democracy In Education

As discussed above, the essential purpose of juridical democracy is the reestablishment of authority within the central representative body of our government, the Congress. The means to this end is the juridical principle which mandates that public policy be articulated in statutory law that is expressed in precise language and provides specific implementation and enforcement procedures. The effect of this mandate is to shift the policy process from a private arena back to a public arena. The combination of specific statutory law and the shift back to a public arena reestablishes authority in our representative government, and in turn, restores the ideals of democracy (i.e., equal representation and concern for the public interest) to the policy process.

The question that confronts us now is, how can the concept of juridical democracy be applied to the educational policy process? There are three possible levels of application of juridical democracy to the

policy process in education: federal, state and local. The application of juridical democracy on the federal level would require legislating precise, yet comprehensive educational policy. However, such policy would most certainly be insensitive to the huge variety of concerns inherent in a country as large and diverse as ours. Juridical democracy on the state level would be more sensitive to local needs and provide a democratic forum, but the precise legislation demanded by the juridical principle would still usurp local authority. In effect, this standardization of educational policy would have the same erosive effect on the local educational enterprise that interest-group-liberalism has had.

However, the application of juridical democracy on the local level may provide coherent policy and democratic representation without undermining local authority. The essence of the juridical principle is specification of public policy and a shift to a public policy arena in the form of a representative body. Thus, the application of juridical democracy at the local level would mandate that the school board be reinstated as the central decision-making body for not only fiscal matters concerning the schools, but all educational policy, including curriculum. The boards would then truly constitute local forums for deliberation about policy, wherein citizens, teachers and administrators would all have significant voices in the educational policy process.

This democratization through the application of juridical democracy on the local level has a strong chance of (1) reestablishing the professionalism of teaching by giving teachers a voice in the policies they will eventually implement, (2) create greater interest among parents and concerned citizens about educational policy by giving them legitimate

access to educational decision-making, (3) reestablish administrators as educational leaders rather than school managers by providing them with a means to speak out on policy issues rather than forcing them to monitor legislative mandate, (4) create greater accountability by making policy and policy-makers susceptible to public opinion, (5) create enriched intellectual and moral climates of schools through the reestablishment of authority, and (6) create coherent policy which serves the interest of the entire school system rather private interests by providing equal representation.

In conclusion, we have surveyed democratic theory and concluded that juridical democracy is the most theoretically viable democratic form of public policy making. We then concluded that a democratic policy process can be instituted through the application of juridical democracy to the educational policy process, and that this application would call for reestablishment of policy-making authority on the local level. It seems that only through the establishment of a true representative body on the local level can the educational policy process be truly democratic.

References

Atkin, J.M. (1980). The government in the classroom. Daedualus, Summer, 85-97.

Benn, S.I. (1967). Democracy. In: Edwards, P. (Ed.), The encyclopedia of philosophy. New York: Macmillan.

Dahl, R.A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Dahl, R.A. (1963). Who governs? Democracy and power in an american city. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R.A. (1970). After the revolution? Authority in a good society. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Goodlad, J. (1983). A place called school: Prospects for the future. New York: McGraw Hill.

Grady, R.C. (1984). Juridical democracy and democratic values: An evaluation of Lowi's alternative to interest group liberalism. Polity, 16, 3, 404-422.

Grant, G. (1981). The character of education and the education of character. Daedualus, Summer, 135-150.

Graubard, S.R. (1973). Democracy. In: Wiener, P.P. (Ed.), Dictionary of the history of ideas. New York: Schribner.

Hochschild, J. (1985). 30 years after Brown. Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies.

Hofstadter, R. (1954). The american political tradition. New York: Vintage.

Keehn, N.H. (1976). A world of becoming: From pluralism to corporatism. Polity, 9, 1, 19-39.

Krouse, R.W. (1982). Polyarchy and participation: The changing democratic theory of Robert Dahl. Polity, Spring, 441-463.

Lowi, T.J. (1979). The end of liberalism: The second republic of the United States. New York: Norton.

McConnell, (1976). Private power and american democracy. New York: Knopf. Sommerville, J., & Santoni, R.E. (Eds.) (1963). Social and political philosphy. New York: Doubleday.

Truman, D.B. (1951). The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion. New York: Knopf.

TAKING THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: AN UNEVEN RELATIONSHIP TO MORAL JUDGMENT-MAKING

Robert P. Craig, Ed.D., Ph.D.
Corporate Manager of Values and Ethics
SCH Health Care System

As Thomas Lickona has pointed out, some theorists in moral development contend that a primary candidate for indicating if a student is developing morally is if her moral judgments are imbedded in "the moral point of view."[1] A different, although related, contention is that "the moral point of view" is THE characteristic upon which viable moral judgment-making is based. The task in this reflection is to philosophically critique the above. This will be done by examining the work of Kurt Baier.

Although Baier desires to contrast his position to a moral point of view based on the legitimacy of acting on self-interest, he winds up defending what he has labored to argue against, that is, Baier accepts that moral rules, of a fully enlightened sort anyway, are justifiable because they are in a person's self-interest.[2]

Baier offers a rather Hobbesian argument that without morality human life would degenerate into a kind of savagery in which human wants could not be satisfied. At the very least, his argument does not establish what he wants it to, namely it does not show that a person can realize her wants (or interests) fully only if she accepts and adopts morality as Baier describes "the moral point of view." It is vacuous to say that living in human society, because it presupposes a type of morality -- a contention Baier assumes and does not argue for -- is preferable to living as a beast. At most Baier can argue that it is in a person's self-interest to accept a particular social

moral code, which may, incidentally, differ from a moral code accepted through a laborious process of conscientious decision-making,[3] and abide by social rules. As was suggested, here Baier is confusing personal morality with social sanctions and rules.

Put another way, the most Baier has shown is that it is to a person's advantage to use morality, a particular social moral system. He has not supplied arguments why one should be moral, why it is to one's advantage to be moral. There are obviously occasions, though, when it is not to one's advantage to follow a particular social morality. To suggest that it is in the interest of the black individual living in South Africa to follow the country's system of apartheid is silly. It would be facetious to maintain that acting morally in such a social situation promoted the black person's self-interest.

Put more strongly, if acting morally were to be justified ultimately as a matter of self-interest, even though self-interest adds content to the notion of moral judgments, it has no justification in the kind of case that was just mentioned. Even if Bier were to argue that the previous example of South Africa is an extreme, borderline case, it still does not follow that a rational and thoroughly self-interested person will always act on the principle that what she is doing is to be in her best interest. If a person recognizes that she will benefit from acting in accord with a repressive system of morality, this will be one factor in the moral decision-making process. But it need not be the decisive factor. An individual can conclude, quite rationally, that she can promote her self-interest by acting immorally, acting against a particular system of morality, that is.

The above argument can be put another way. One can come to a point as to have no reason to believe that her judicious violation of moral rules will undermine the whole institution of morality whereby she loses the general advantage it gives her. At any rate, even if an individual always did what was morally required because she had been convinced that acting morally was the best policy for getting what she wanted, we can think of many situations where such activity would not be praiseworthy. Self-interest, then, is hardly a characteristic which separates the moral from the non-moral.

Let us, though, take a deeper look at Baier's position. According to Baier, moral judgments provide information. Baier notes that philosophers who are prone to argue that moral judgments are nonfactual do so because they have a rather limited notion of what verification involves. Baier says:

> Philosophers rely on a highly specialized model of empirical verification. They think of it as verification by looking, listening, touching, or sniffing. It should have occurred to philosophers that often a good deal more is involved than that. Thus, I may claim that the Union Theatre has 500 seats. But I cannot verify this by looking, listening, touching, tasting or sniffing. It should, therefore, be declared not to be empirically verifiable. No one has ever objected to counting as a nonempirical way of verifying propositions. Nor, strangely enough, to measuring or weighing. Yet these latter methods involve arbitrary standards and often criteria. But when value judgments are made, people claim that they are not verifiable because they involve criteria and standards.[4]

Many value judgments can be verified quite easily. If one says, "This is a good car," the assertion can be verified by going for a ride. Even in this seemingly trivial case, though, one may argue that the car is not "good" because it does not have electric windows. In other words, the argument often seems to hinge on the criteria for applying the term "good," even to a car -- a non-ethical sense of "good."

It is easy to notice that there is a difference between saying "This is a good car" and "This is good for me to do." There may be more agreement about the characteristics by which to measure the good car than the good act. Even though an enlightened philosopher notes that different criteria are used in legitimizing one assertion ("The good car" is "good" due to factual characteristics -- it runs smoothly, starts without difficulty, etc.) than another (the characteristics for saying "X is a good act" are not as straightforward), the issue does not end here. The distinction between types of assertions and types of characteristics for legitimizing the "goodness" or "properness" of them is a real distinction, but if left without further comment, the distinction is not very helpful.

One way of elucidating the difference between the above two assertions is to suggest that "This is a good car" is a factual claim, while "X is good" is, at least, more than a factual claim: it is evaluative in Hare's sense of making a statement regarding the appropriateness of a behavior in relationship to the behavior's properties.

Getting back to Baier's analysis, a value judgment cannot be confirmed by a process of verification, unlike many factual judgments. Value judgments, according to Baier, must also go through a process of "validation," that is, the characteristic of goodness need to be shown to be the right or correct criteria. Baier is saying, then, that both verification and validation are two processes necessary in confirming that "X" judgment is a moral judgment. But Baier is involved in an infinite regress, at least as regards his "validation" hypothesis. The judgment that "X, Y and Z" are the proper

criteria to make "M" a moral judgment are themselves derived at through a value judgment which needs to be validated -- as with any criteria validation one can dream up. Baier is aware of the problem when he notes:

> . . . the proper criteria for evaluating cars, fountain pens, pliers and so on are determined by the purpose of the thing, activity or enterprise in question.[5]

For Baier, then, the question "What should I do?" is equivalent to "What is the best thing to do?" This must be the case, he argues, because it would be contradictory to say " I know X is the best thing to do" and still ask "What should I do?" The best action, then, is that action which is supported by the best reasons, what Baier refers to as "consideration-making beliefs." He writes:

> The fact that I have a reason for or against entering on the proposed line of action does not entail that I ought or ought not to enter on it -- it merely presumptively implies it. That is to say, it might be taken to imply that I ought or ought not to enter on it unless, later on, in the weighing of considerations, I find some that are weightier than this one.[6] In that case, the original presumptive implication has been rebutted.

For Baier, the "consideration-making belief" has a certain universality -- for instance, if one performs X and finds it good, one has good reasons for doing X. These good reasons would be equally true for everyone in this particular situation. Baier tries to avoid ethical relativism by this move. A "consideration-making belief," then, is not synonymous with one's consideration. This is not a matter of the agent liking a particular consideration, nor a "consideration-making belief" being so because one likes it.

Although Baier elaborates three different kinds of "consideration-making beliefs," individual rules, social rules and moral rules, his arguments need not detain us here. To develop the logic of Baier's position, it is

preferable to describe what he means by "the moral point of view," then to analyze and critique his position. It is at this point that it becomes obvious that Baier rejects a pure formalist approach and argues that judgments are moral due to a consideration of content. Indeed the above discussion of "consideration-making beliefs" brings this out. Now, though, "consideration-making beliefs" need to be discussed within the context of "the moral point of view."

For Baier, it is "the moral point of view" which determines whether a moral judgment is true or false; and it is a "consideration-making belief" which designates a judgment as moral, as opposed to, say, an aesthetic judgment. "The moral point of view," then, is that of "an independent, unbiased, impartial, objective, dispassionate, disinterested observer . . . a God's-eye point of view."[7] A judgment is moral, therefore, if it is based upon "the moral point of view," that is if "the moral point of view" overrides all other considerations.

At this point, though, Baier has not been very descriptive in analyzing "the moral point of view." He does claim that it has two essential features: 1) To adopt "the moral point of view" is to adopt moral principles. Such principles as respect for life, say, are not merely individual rules. Rather, a moral principle, for Baier, does not admit of exceptions and it is considered to be universally binding. 2) The second feature of "the moral point of view" is that the principles it sanctions are for the good of everyone. When it comes to a social situation, the, Baier enumerates three conditions which, if enacted, demonstrate that a particular action is immoral: if the consequences of "X" would be harmful if everyone did it; each member of

the society is entitled to engage in it; and to engage in "X" is a indulgence, never an altruistic act.

What is confusing at this point is that the above three conditions are only valid, Baier seems to say, if society "Y" considers act "X" to be immoral. Clearly, if this analysis of Baier's position is correct, one could always ask, "Why adopt the "moral point of view" when it is against my self-interest to do so?" The only defense Baier seems to have for adopting a moral point of view which, often, is in violation of one's self-interest is that if such a moral point of view is not adopted self-interest becomes the guiding ethical influence. And Baier, with his universalistic ethical tendencies, describes such a state of affairs.

> The very raison d'etre of a morality is to yield reasons which overrule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone's following self interest would be harmful to everyone. Hence moral reasons are superior to all others.[8]

Although it is reasonable to say an action ought to be done because there are reasons for doing it, if the reasons for doing "X" outweigh the reasons against doing "X," Baier still hasn't argued why certain facts are reasons and other facts are not. Rather than clarifying this situation, Baier's analysis of "consideration-making beliefs" only adds another category for clarification. This means that Baier must use another category, "the moral point of view," to account for the fact that moral judgments can be either true or false. He is, perhaps, like a painter who has painted herself into a corner: every possible way out becomes constricted by adding paint. Maybe due to the fact that Baier cannot (or has not) supply reasons why certain facts are reasons and other facts are not reasons, he cannot be convincing why one ought to adopt "the moral point of view" at all. Let us, then, examine

this moral point of view" characteristic in more detail -- for "the moral point of view" seems to be a characteristic of content.

It is difficult to understand if "the moral point of view" refers to any point of view in particular, that is, if it is a view that IS actually held or one that OUGHT to be actually held. There is an important difference here which has important ramifications for the idea that "the moral point of view" is a content-characteristic in defining a moral judgment or in distinguishing a moral judgment from other normative judgments.

How can "the moral point of view" be a point of view actually held by anyone? It is actually the case that different people adopt a different moral point of view regarding abortion, say, so that if "the moral point of view" has any standing it must be a point of view that OUGHT to be held, not one which actually IS held. Let us see if this alternative makes sense.

To endorse such a theory as "the moral point of view" is the view that OUGHT to be adopted because it OUGHT to be adopted is (clearly) circular. Or even worse, for Baier to argue that "the moral point of view" has the standing of moral because it is the point of view that OUGHT to be adopted is contradictory to his theory. He has just argued that morality is not to be based on self-interest.

But if "the moral point of view" is that point of view that OUGHT to be adopted, upon what basis other than self-interest OUGHT it to be adopted? Baier has not supplied any other basis, except to say that self-interest OUGHT not to be the guiding basis for ethical decision making.

If the above is correct, it seems impossible to formulate a moral theory such that the defining characteristic of a moral judgment is that it is adopted within the confines of "the moral point of view." It seems clear, then, that Baier's criterion is found wanting; and this particular attempt at a content approach to defining and justifying moral judgments in incorrect. "The moral point of view," then, cannot be THE indicator of proper moral growth. Put differently, merely because one's moral judgments are imbedded in "the moral point of view," it does not follow that moral development has occurred--for "the moral point of view" has been shown not to be THE defining characteristic of moral judgments.

Footnotes

1. Thomas Lickona, Ed., Moral Development and Behavior. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), Part II.

2. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958), Chapter One.

3. Lawrence Kohlberg develops this line of reasoning in "Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental View," Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), pp. 31-53.

4. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, p. 61.

5. Ibid., p. 80.

6. Ibid., p. 102.

7. Ibid., p. 201.

8. Ibid., p. 309.

bc/mpv/031888

Is There Consciousness in Writing?

A Philosophical Exploration

George W. Stickel
Northwestern College
Orange City, Iowa

I want to write a paper for a Chicago conference. I have two weeks in which to write it. What do I write about? I have a lot to do; I do not have time to research a new idea. I need a topic. Do I write about what I have recently read? Do I rework a paper I will present in three weeks at another conference? If I do not present a paper I will not receive as much travel money from my institution. What do I do?

The question before me is not what do I write or even do I write? The question is at what point in my deliberation does consciousness arise? The rationality of why that is the question to be addressed here will be discussed later. For now let us ask if this is a philosophical question; it seems psychological. In fact, a great deal of research is developing in rhetoric, literary criticism, cognitive psychology, and psycho-linguistics to address the "composing process."[1] Patricia Smith Churchland discusses both the psychology and philosophy of consciousness as well as neuroscience in a recent book entitled Neurophilosophy. She suggests that there is indeed a philosophical side to the question:

> The theoretical problem that emerges from a study of the work on memory, learning, and other higher functions, such as consciousness, is this: if the psychological (functional) taxonomy is ill defined, then the search for neural substrates for those functions will be correspondingly ill defined. There are remarkable data, found at all levels in psychology and neuroscience, but precisely how to interpret the data in terms of a theory of neurobiological capacities, representations, and processes is yet to be discovered.

> Standing back from the details of individual experiments, what we want to know is how humans and other animals learn, what makes them smart, how they plan and problem solve, how they recollect and forget, how their brains differ when their personalities differ, how they can be self-aware, what consciousness is. The treacherous difficulty here is that we cannot be sure we are asking the right questions.[2]

There is a lot of room for theory. In fact it may well be the theories that help us ask the right questions. "When does consciousness arise?" is a question that rests within the ontological and epistemological frameworks of whomever might be asking the question.

Our concern in education rests somewhere in the notion that consciousness and learning are related; they are, as Churchland suggests, some of the higher functions of the brain. If there is a relationship, then we might want to know how they are related. What, then, calls us to consciousness and when? When does learning take place? The question of when does consciousness arise in writing a paper may help in ascertaining something about learning. (Because my guess is that most professors have read student papers in which our prejudices tell us that no learning has taken place and the student has been totally unconscious during the process.) So, as I prepare to write a paper, is there a time when I am conscious?

Until recently I would have said that definitely a consciousness is called forth in the writing of a paper. There is learning that takes place and one must be conscious to learn. The theory which seemed to best explain the learning process and consciousness was the philosophy of George Herbert Mead. In Mead's philosophy of the act he asks the question: "Is the actual object of knowledge . . . a newly discovered present which can only be known

and interpreted in the past which it involves?" He affirms that it is and then continues:

> The answer turns, as I have indicated, more or less upon identification of knowledge with scientific research. . . . Knowledge, I conceive, is the discovery through the implication of things and events of some thing or things which enable us to carry on where a problem has held us up. It is the fact that we can carry on that guarantees our knowledge.[4]

The process he refers to is well known to us through John Dewey's work, particularly his How We Think.[5]

Mead develops the process of learning in his The Philosophy of the Act as a four staged sequence beginning with an impulse which yields the problematic situation. The impulse is an external stimulus which provokes the individual out of a habitual response to the environment. Mead begins his book:

> All perception involves an immediate sensuous stimulation and an attitude toward this stimulation, which is that of the reaction of the individual to the stimulation. This reaction, in so far as the perception does not go out into instantaneous overt activity, appears in consciousness only as an attitude, but as such it is the first stage in the complete response or group of responses which the stimulation in question calls out.[6]

The knowing process requires the individual to be pricked to a consciousness. Here the consciousness begins as an attitude. In Art as Experience, Dewey says of this process as he discusses the relation of the mind to the environment:

> Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situations in which we find ourselves.[7]

The situations are those events in our lives in which we find ourselves maladjusted to our environments (including other people). The impulse of the maladjustment produces in us an awareness of our problematic situation which

means we can no longer respond to our environment in the manner (or in the habit) we were responding. Mead writes:

> The facility of habitual conduct forbids such separation between the stimulation-cue and the response. The more perfect the habit the less possibility would there be that the content which serves to stimulate could serve directly as the symbol of the response, could bring out separately and relate to itself the reaction for which it is responsible. If the fact be simple, consisting only in well-organized stimulation and response, there cannot be found in its mechanism the occasion for the appearance of the consciousness of meaning. The perfection of adjustment between these two parts of the act leaves no opening for the distinction between characteristic and its meaning, and without such a distinction, involved in the process of relation, there can be no recognition of meaning. Furthermore the contents in consciousness which answer to the meaning of objects are our generalized habitual responses to them. These contents are the consciousness of attitudes, of muscular tensions and the feels of readiness to act in presence of certain stimulations. There is nothing in the economy of the act itself which tends to bring these contents above the threshold, nor distinguish them as separable elements in a process of relation, such as is implied in the consciousness of meaning.[8]

The habit calls forth an immediate response. The more fully formed the habit, the more immediate the response. If a stimulus results in a conflict of the habitual act toward the environment then an attitude is called forth as we saw earlier. The "complete response or group of responses which the stimulation in question calls out"[9] gives rise to a consciousness of meaning. Mead continues:

> The same psychology that states meaning in terms of the attitudes which are the registrations in consciousness of habits of reaction is wont to find in conflicting activities occasion for reflective consciousness. Thinking for this psychology is always the solution of a problem. It would then be consonant with this point of view to find in conflicting activities just that conscious distinction between the characteristic in the stimulation and the attitude of response which is the prerequisite of the consciousness of meaning. For example, a man is in

> doubt whether the clouds and wind mean rain or fair weather. His inclination to walk abroad, and his inclination to seek shelter are in conflict. This conflict is precisely the situation which brings sharply into consciousness the characteristics of sky and atmosphere which are signs of fair and of foul weather.[10]

The conflict resulting from the impulse yields in turn a perception stage in which the sense organs perceive the environment, that is, there is now a consciousness of the details of the problematic situation.[11] Elsewhere Mead refers to this perceiving as the forming of an aesthetic image.[12] The aesthetic image is then narrowed to a working image,[13] that is, manipulated as a decision or hypothesis is made.[14] Within this third stage is reflective thought. The stages of the act are now consummated in a physical act which carries out our hypothesis correcting our conflict or maladjustment.[15] If the problem is rectified the individual is now different relative to the environment having some bit of new knowledge, some new experience which suggests that something, however subtle, has been learned. Consciousness was called forth in the first stage of the learning act.

While the above discussion is brief, it seems that learning situations (i.e. those situations where there is a change in the individual) require a consciousness. Does writing a paper constitute a learning situation? To put the question in another way, does the conflict suggested in the opening lines call for a consciousness which leads to a change?

Some learning situations seem to short circuit Mead's stages and yield a behavioral response to a stimulus--a la Little Albert. Is consciousness present or is reflective thought present in such situations? The behavioral methods employed with the mentally handicapped seem to short circuit the consciousness, perception, and reflection jumping from stimulus to response. Perhaps writing could be a similar response.

One might suggest that there is a component of creativity in the writing of a paper which is not there in learning situations. There does seem to be something mystical about an idea pouring forth from the inner depths of the soul. Literary lines unfold in a poem, or feelings rush forth in the colors and textures left by the brush with no thought but only a baring of oneself to the spirit within. So Jacques Maritain writes in Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry:

> . . . Aristotle's Poetics tells us, in more moderate but no less significant terms: "Hence it is that poetry demands a man with a happy gift of nature, or else one with a strain of madness in him." And the Rhetoric: "Poetry is a thing inspired"; and the Eudemian Ethics: "As in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything. The starting point of reasoning is not reasoning, but something greater. What, then, could be greater even than knowledge and intellect but God? . . . For this reason, those are called fortunate who, whatever they start on, succeed in it without being good at reasoning. And deliberation is of no advantage to them, for they have in them a principle that is better than intellect and deliberation. They have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. . . . Hence we have the melancholic men, the dreamers of what is true. For the moving principle seems to become stronger when the reasoning power is relaxed." Not Romantic authors alone thought of the poet as a "dreamer of what is true," a man moved by "some breath, as it were, of insanity" or frenzy.
>
> > Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> > Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
> > More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> > The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
> > Are of imagination all compact. . . .16

The poem is from Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream; perhaps Shakespeare agrees that there is less than consciousness among poets.

Doris Grumbach, a novelist and literary critic, suggests that such creativity requires that the mind be a fertile compose heap.[17] To create there needs to be a richness of experiences which ferment and distill into a fruitful mixture. Is there consciousness in such creativity?

Julian Jaynes argues that learning does not require consciousness; nor do judgments, reasoning, or problem solving require consciousness.[18] Each of these activities can take place below a level of consciousness. One becomes aware of the task and the goal, but is not always conscious within the process of the solution. Jaynes asks you to do a simple experiment:

> Take a coin in each hand and toss them both, crossing them in such a way that each coin is caught by the opposite hand. This you can learn in a dozen trials. As you do, ask, are you conscious of everything you do? Is consciousness necessary at all? I think you will find that learning is much better described as being 'organic' rather than conscious. Consciousness takes you into the task, giving you the goal to be reached.[19]

He continues that consciousness may even impede your learning. Dewey admonishes us to "stop and think" (required for reflection after the impulse);[20] my father would occasionally remark when I was learning something: "Don't think, just do it!" If children are more conscious of riding bicycles are they more apt to fall as they learn? Should they not "Don't think, just do it"?

Jaynes continues that consciousness is not even necessary for reason:

> The picture of a scientist sitting down with his problems and using conscious induction and deduction is as mythical as a unicorn. The greatest insights of mankind have come more mysteriously. Helmholtz had his happy thoughts which "often enough crept quietly into my thinking without my suspecting their importance . . . in other cases they arrived suddenly, without any effort on my part . . .[21]

Brewster Ghiselin records the creative process of many problem solvers and artists. He writes:

> The unsearchable insight which we call inspiration is sometimes given wholly at one stroke. Poincare' indicates that for him it was. Henry James reports a somewhat similar experience in writing <u>The Ambassadors</u>.[22]

Jaynes suggests that much of what we do is below a level of consciousness because we have previously established procedures which automatically solve the problem for us. He calls this preconceived process or system, structions.[23] He continues:

> Structions are like instructions given to the nervous system, which, when presented with the materials to work on, arrives at the answer automatically without any conscious thinking or reasoning. And this phenomenon applies to most of our activities, all the way from such simplicities as judging weights, to solving problems, to scientific and philosophical activity. Consciousness studies a problem and prepares it as a struction, a process which may result in a sudden appearance of the solution as if out of nowhere. During World War II, British physicists used to say that they no longer made their discoveries in the laboratory; they had three B's where their discoveries were made: the bath, the bed, and the bus. And as I have mentioned earlier, this process on a smaller scale is going on in me at present, as my words are "as if chosen for me" by my nervous system after giving it the struction of my intended meaning.[24]

Jaynes defines consciousness as "an analog of what we call the real world. It is built up with a vocabulary or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogs of behavior in the physical world."[25] Consciousness has three features which follow from the above. The primary feature is what Jaynes calls mind-space, in which the conscious individual searches for possible solutions. The second most important feature is the analog 'I'. He writes

> As the bodily I can move about in its environment looking at this or that, so the analog 'I' learns to 'move about' in mind-space concentrating on one thing or another. If you 'saw' yourself swimming [if you image the last time you went swimming] . . it was your analog 'I' that was doing the 'seeing'.[26]

The final feature Jaynes calls narratization, which is "the analogical simulation of actual behavior."[27] The narratization anticipates behavior; it fills in the situation, in a sense, so we can choose the optimal behavior or

response. He continues that the "essential rule here is that no operation goes on in consciousness that was not in behavior first. All of these are learned analogs of external behavior."[28]

Applying Jaynes to the writing of this paper, there exists within me a set of structions which I have worked out in the past that order my nervous system in a given way to write a paper. I take out pencil and paper and begin writing. By beginning to write, I have found in the past, that ideas begin to flow. Given another personality and set of structions, I might snatch "a jug of wine, a loaf of bread, and . . ." thus pour forth as the spirit moves me.

Consciousness would only be called forth when I began rummaging through my mind selectively choosing specific words which might sound better, or specific examples to clarify my creative endeavor according to Jaynes. I could visualize myself selecting a topic on which to write. I might even see myself writing it out or presenting it to colleagues.

There are those times when a voice (my voice) precedes the pencil with the word. The ideas flow. Perhaps this is beneath the level of consciousness and takes place at a level of the structions. Jaynes suggests of his writing that it develops as consciousness "studies a problem and prepares it as a struction, . . . this process . . . is going on in me at present, as my words are 'as if chosen for me' by my nervous system after giving it the struction of my intended meaning."[29] This seems to imply a consciousness existed prior to the writing which prepared my mind for the writing.

Henri Poincare says of the stroke, illumination, or inspiration of creativity he experienced in mathematics:

> There is another remark to be made about the conditions of this unconscious work [the inspiration]: it is possible, and of a certainty it is only fruitful, if it is on the one hand preceded and on the other hand followed by a period of conscious work. These sudden inspirations . . . never happen

> except after some days of voluntary effort which has appeared absolutely fruitless and whence nothing good seems to have come, where the way taken seems totally astray. These efforts then have not been as sterile as one thinks; they have set agoing the unconscious machine and without them it would not have moved and would have produced nothing.[30]

A consciousness seems to be evident even as part of the inspirational process.

Jacques Maritain, true to his Aristotelean rationality, writes:

> Is there, then, any truly philosophical solution to the debate of reason and poetry; is it possible to show that, in spite of all, poetry and the intellect are of the same race and blood, and call to one another; and that poetry not only requires artistic or technical reason with regard to the particular ways of making, but, much more profoundly, depends on intuitive reason with regard to poetry's own essence and to the very touch of maddness it involves? . . .
>
> It is difficult to speak of this problem without discussing a whole philosophy of man. We risk, moreover, being misled by the words we use. I would observe especially that the word unconscious, as I use it, does not necessarily mean a purely unconscious activity. It means most often an activity which is principally unconscious, but the point of which emerges into consciousness. Poetic intuition, for instance, is born in the unconscious, but it emerges from it; the poet is not unaware of this intuition, on the contrary it is his most precious light and the primary rule of his virtue of art. But he is aware of it sur le rebord de l'inconscient, as Bergson would have said, on the edge of the unconscious.[31]

For Maritain the creativity plays between a consciousness and unconsciousness. There is an "Illuminating Intellect" which is the germ of the idea. He argues:

> Then it is the intellect itself, which, having been impregnated by the impressed pattern or intelligible germ, vitally produces--always under the activation of the Illuminating Intellect--an inner fruit, a final and more fully determined spiritual form (species expressa), the concept, in which the content drawn from the images is brought to the very same state of spirituality-in-act in which the intellect-in-act is,

> and in which this now perfectly spiritualized content is seen, is actually an object of intellectual vision.[32]

In Jaynes words, we have the narratization of the analog 'I' operation in the mind-space. In order for the "Illuminating Intellect" of Maritain to work, there must be established the structions of former experiences. Even Maritain would agree for he says that "we know through our senses . . . . [and perception is not] by the senses only but . . . by the sense as a sharp point of the intellect intent on the world of experience."[33] There is a dynamic for Maritain between the internal essence and the external experience. For this reason he condemns the behavioral approach to learning.

> I should like to observe now that a kind of animal training, which deals with psychophysical habits, conditioned reflexes, sense-memorization, etc., undoubtedly plays its part in education: it refers to material individuality, or to what is not specifically human in man. But education is not animal training. The education of man is a human awakening.[34]

For philosophical reasons, then, Maritain would suggest that something less than human is taking place in such stimulus-response learning situations. The behavioral response is apart from the rationality he finds in consciousness.

As we return to Jaynes, the behavioral approach might be possible on a less than conscious level, because of the structions previously established in a consciousness. If we return to Mead the immediate responses show a perfection in habit, which are established over time as the individual continues to find him or herself in similar arresting situations in which their reflective thought or manipulation yields consistent decisions toward actions. Those repeated actions, which rectify the problem, produce habit. The habit is learned knowledge, that is, it is experience continually acted upon and continually yielding the same results. Perhaps habits and structions

are the compost of Grumbach and yield the "Illuminating Intellect" of Maritain.

I have tried to show that there is a consciousness present at some point even in the seemingly unconscious activities of behaviorism or creativity. Let me add two other points which may clarify consciousness in the writing of a paper.

First is a brief examination (from Mead's perspective) of Jaynes's metaphorization required of consciousness, i.e. the mind-space, the analog 'I', and narratization. In Mead's reflective self, the "I" of the individual (the actor, or subject of the sentence) is internalized:

> The self appearing as "I" is the memory image of the self who acted toward himself and is the same self who acts towards other selves.[35]

Mead writes of intelligence:

> In reflective intelligence one thinks to act, and to act solely so that this action remains a part of a social process. Thinking becomes preparatory to social action. The very process of thinking is, of course, simply an inner conversation that goes on, but it is a conversation of gestures which in its completion implies the expression of that which one thinks to an audience. One separates the significance of what he is saying to others from the actual speech and gets it ready before saying it. He thinks it out, and perhaps writes it in the form of a book; but it is still a part of social intercourse in which one is addressing other persons and at the same time addressing one's self, and in which one controls the address to other persons by the response made to one's own gesture. That the person should be responding to himself is necessary to the self, and it is this sort of social conduct which provides behavior within which that self appears. I know of no other form of behavior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself, and, so far as I can see, the individual is not a self in the reflexive sense unless he is an object to himself. It is this fact that gives a critical importance to communication, since this is a type of behavior in which the individual does so respond to himself.[36]

The individual becomes an object to himself or herself through interaction with the social other. That is, it is past experience which defines the role of the individual. As the individual reflects, the individual "sees" (in some way) the self within the situation--Jaynes's analog 'I'. It always comes out of past experiences.

Second is the coin toss experiment. I contend that there is consciousness present. One is conscious of the problem, i.e., there is an impulse from Jaynes which calls us to a conscious attitude of our surroundings and our ability. That attitude yields to a consciousness of meaning as we visualize ourselves tossing the coins. Maybe you can begin to sense yourself in the situation as I talk. While I performed the experiment, I found that I needed to "concentrate" on my actions and conscientiously manipulate my hands. While there is some "organic" behavior, that behavior, is in reality those eye-hand skills developed in other tasks. The habits of moving my hand toward a falling object is a struction established earlier in my life.

In fact, I had my class do the coin toss. Five of the seven students felt they learned something in doing it. The five had never juggled before. One student said she felt she had accomplished something. Another felt like a failure until she tried more tosses. These two students saw themselves as successful or a failure within the consciousness of meaning of the analog 'I'. Two students said they did not learn anything, but still felt they were conscious of what they were doing. These two had juggled before, but never juggled coins. They felt there was not significant "conflict," as Mead stated above, in this stimulus--one took two tries before succeeding, the other four tries. (Incidently, they decided that a requirement to juggle swords might be a significant enough stimulus to warrant learning.) As I observed all seven

students, they were concentrating on what they were doing. I suggest that consciousness is indeed present.

In conclusion, is there consciousness in writing this paper, and if so, at what point does it enter the process? To answer that, let me provide some background. I usually am involved in reading several books at the same time. I was particularly perplexed by several points of Julian Jaynes's The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. I also was studying creativity as suggested by Jacques Maritain and we were using his book on education in a philosophy of education course. Additionally, a friend had recommended that I might enjoy Brewster Ghiselin's The Creative Process. As I read these books I found conflict in what I previously believed, which, in turn, raised a number of questions. I also tried my hand at some creative writing to get a feel for the intuition Maritain discusses, and I spent time in several art museums attempting to get a better feel for visual art (an interest of mine from earlier years). I, at least, had a compost heap of ideas.

The concerns from reading those books and seeing visual art and reading poetry were more what Mead would call attitudes of concerns. I can say I was conscious of attitudes while meanings seemed to escape. I happened to reread a call for papers and realized I only had two weeks to finish a paper--a new impulse resulted in a new problem for me.

I sat down to force myself to accomplish something and began to write out some thoughts--jumbled as they were. They flowed more intuitively from an inner soul than analytically from the analog 'I' and I then realized that some of my problems with Jaynes and Maritain resulted from an uneasiness in what was being said about consciousness. The stimuli from reading and the call for papers resulted in a group of responses too complex for a simple analysis or

immediate response. They called forth a consciousness of attitude which led to a perception of part of the problem. As time went on, the perception became clearer so that a consciousness of meaning could be called forth resulting in the final version of this paper. It meant false starts in places and an editing of the paper. At each point in the writing there seemed to be a narratization as the analog 'I' put things in perspective within the mind-space.

After about two pages of writing, I would have said that consciousness was called forth about two thirds of the way down the first page. In the opening lines, I had seemed to be in a non-reflective posture resulting in what could be called: mostly rambling. After studying the ideas of consciousness and creativity more, I would have to conclude that a consciousness of attitude was called forth immediately which yielded a meaning beyond the behavioral or intuitive level by the end of the first page. In fact, my "I" did "see" itself in relation to the task, to the ideas, and to the past which defined the habits or structions for writing a paper. I learned in the process, having added a knowledge of the authors I read to my repetoire of experiences. Consciousness, while not obvious, is more a part of human problem solving than Jaynes gives us credit for, and there is a dynamic between the mind (and its past) which provides a fertile compost heap of intuition. To write a paper (at least to write one which has purpose) requires consciousness.

There are still many questions to be answered about creativity and consciousness, reasoning and consciousness and so forth. Here I have attempted to show that consciousness can be related to the creative process (writing a paper) and that the consciousness in learning is not as obvious as one might think at first glance.

Endnotes

[1] Robert M. Gorrell, Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg, The Bedford Bibliography for Teachers of Writing (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1948), pp. 5-6.

[2] Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986), p. 152.

[3] George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 94.

[4] Ibid., pp. 94-5.

[5] John Dewey How We Think, John Dewey: the Middle Works, vol. 6, ed. JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978).

[6] Mead, The Act, p. 3.

[7] John Dewey, Art as Experience, John Dewey: The Latter Works, vol. 10, ed. JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987); p. 268.

[8] George Herbert Mead, Selected Writings, ed. Andrew J. Reck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 128-9.

[9] Mead, The Act, p. 3.

[10] Mead, Selected Writings, pp. 129-30.

[11] Mead, The Act, pp. 8-16.

[12] George Herbert Mead, "Philosophy of Education," Typescript of student notes by Juliet Hammond on Mead's course, 1910-11, Box VIII, Folder IX, George Herbert Mead Papers, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, p. 63.

[13] Ibid., pp. 82-3.

[14] Mead, The Act, pp. 16-23.

[15] Ibid., pp. 23-25.

[16] Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Bollingen Series XXXV.I (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 89-90.

[17] Doris Grumbach, The Literary Imagination," in Exploring the Concept of Mind, ed. Richard M. Caplan (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986), pp. 121-131.

[18] Julian Jaynes, "How Old Is Consciousness," in Exploring the Concept of Mind, p. 54; and Julian Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 6-11.

[19] Jaynes, Origin, p. 33.

[20] Dewey, How We Think, p. 344.

[21] Jaynes, Origin, p. 43.

[22] Brewster Ghiselin, "Introduction," The Creative Process (New York: Mentor, New American Library, 1952), p. 30.

[23] Jaynes, How Old, p. 55.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p. 56.

[26] Ibid., p. 58.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., p. 55.

[30] Henri Poincare, "Mathematical Creation" in The Creative Process, ed. Brewster Ghiselin, p. 38.

[31] Maritain, Creative, p. 90-91.

[32] Ibid., pp. 97-98.

[33] Ibid., p. 165.

[34] Jacques Maritain, Education at the Crossroads (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1943), p. 9.

[35] Mead, Selective Writings, p. 143.

[36] George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 141-2.

Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay II

or

The Subjective Element in Esthetic Experience

Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

INTRODUCTION

Last November I gave my address to the MWPES as retiring president. It was entitled, "Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay Part I." I didn't answer the question myself but let my listeners decide for themselves. In the paper I drew on Dewey's statements on the role of the critic with respect to artistic objects. I suggested that the critic's role is essentially an educative one, so that the critic is in fact also the teacher. At that point in my address I assumed to role of critic/teacher and made a critical assay of Mozart's Masonic Funeral Music. The question became, I suppose, assuming that I performed the critical role according to Dewey and did so adequately, did it work? If it did, then did Dewey indeed dance?

Those of you who are even remotely familiar with Dewey's esthetics will know that he made a distinction between the art object and the work of art. For my assay I chose, as I said, Mozart's Masonic Funeral Music as the art object. On that occasion I completely, and deliberately, omitted consideration of the work of art--of the transaction or interaction between the perceiver and the art object, or of "what the product does with and in experience."[1] I did so because a long evening would have been made longer. However, today I want to look more closely than I did in Chicago at Dewey's views on the subjective element in esthetic experience. First, let me note that it (the perceiver's contribution to esthetic experience)

can't really be taught as "[i]t denotes the consumer's rather than the producer's standpoint."[2] Let me also emphasize, if I need to, Dewey's rejection of dualisms in fact (if not upon reflection) and state that for him there is in esthetic experience full integration of subject and object. But we are now reflecting. There is not only integration between subject and object, but there is also integration of responses within the perceiver. "Hence the peculiar well-being and rest in excitation, vitality in peace, which is characteristic of esthetic enjoyment."[3] At issue is what forms that bridge between the perceiver and the art object. Dewey says that there are four links--emotion, imagination, intelligence, and interest. I'll discuss each of these separately.

Emotion. Emotion, to repeat, forms part of the bridge between the subject and the object. It is not something that belongs exclusively to the organism. Dewey denies that there are such abstract emotions as love, fear, hate, and so on. That we jump when we are frightened and blush when we are ashamed are examples of reflex actions; they only become emotional as they connect with a situation "the issue of which is in suspense and in which the self that is moved in the emotion is vitally concerned."[4] The emotion must be connected to something objective, which may be an idea as well as an actual occurrence. There must, in fact, be "an interpenetration of self with objective conditions."[5] Therefore, "emotion in its ordinary sense is something called out by objects, physical and personal; it is response to an objective situation."[6] It is this that brings about the selection of appropriate material with the corresponding rejection of the irrelevant. Thus a bridge between the self and the object is made.

Emotion brings about a new fusion by selecting what is congruous and dying "what is selected with its color, thereby giving qualitative unity to materials externally disparate and dissimilar. It thus provides unity in and through the varied parts of an experience."[7] An experience becomes an integrated whole through the selection of external materials that emotion directs. This pervasive character is essentially esthetic. It is clear that an art product is not an expression of an emotion dangling, as it were, by itself. It is the expression of an emotion connected with some objective occurrence. This emotion sustains the artist, in this case Mozart, as he selects what is significant from the external world, at the same time as it brings about exclusion of what is uncongenial, "[b]ut it is not what is expressed."[8]

Emotion has a further reach in art beyond its unifying power, and it is in this respect that the arts are more amenable to esthetic approbation than other experiences in life. In art emotion is clarified; it is objectified and given indirect expression. For instance, irritation or annoyance at some event may display itself in some overt act or word of anger. On the other hand, it may be sublimated and expressed in some other way, perhaps in the tidying of one's room. Thus a change is brought about not only in the physical environment but also within the organism. Dewey elaborates,

> The emotion of affection that operates not through an overt act of caress but by searching out the observation or image of a soaring bird, the emotion of irritating energy that does not destroy or injure but that puts objects in satisfying order, is not numerically identical with its original natural estate. Yet it stands in genetic continuity with it. The emotion that was finally wrought out by Tennyson in the composition of "In Memoriam" was not identical with the emotion of grief that manifests itself in weeping and a downcast frame: the first is an act of expression, the second of discharge. Yet the continuity of

> the two emotions, the fact that the esthetic emotion is native emotion transformed through the objective material to which it has committed its development and consummation, is evident.[9]

Art, then, is not nature "but is nature transformed by entering into new relationships where it evokes a new emotional response."[10]

Thus the artist builds up a concrete situation, born of another concrete situation viewed emotionally, and permits this distilled experience to evoke an emotional response on the part of the perceiver. The perceiver will, in turn, react to the art product emotionally, with the full implications that this word carries. This is part of the work of art, and, as such, is always a novel occurrence. The great power of art lies in the fact that "[i]nstead of a description of an emotion in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist 'does the deed that breeds' the emotion."[11]

Imagination. Whereas emotion has often been considered an abstract, disconnected phenomenon, imagination has frequently been considered a separate human faculty, differing from our other faculties in that it possesses some sort of mystical quality. Dewey denies this when he says that imagination "designates a quality that animates and pervades all processes of making and observation."[12] He continues,

> It is a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole. It is the large and generous blending of interests at the point where the mind comes in contact with the world. When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When the new is created, the far and strange become the most natural inevitable things in the world. There is always some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination.[13]

Imagination, then, is closely involved with the occurrence of the novel, with the remaking of the old and the fashioning of the new in an individual form. Dewey writes, "[A]n imaginative experience is

what happens when varied materials of sense quality, emotion, and meaning come together in a union that marks a new birth in the world."[14] Imagination operates in both the production and perception of an art object. It is the activity by which outer vision, as occasioned by some objective material, and inner habits, and impulses, are combined. This interaction is imaginative, and "as imagination takes form the work of art is born."[15] Imagination is essential to the artist in bringing the novel into concrete expression, to the perceivers as they experience the work of art, and to the critics in their synthetic role as they focus perception in some unique, creative way.

Imagination does not exist completely apart from the environment, although it is a function of the live creature. It is by means of imagination that things not physically present can be brought into contact with the environment. All past experiences, for instance, connect with the present by means of the imagination. In Democracy and Education Dewey remarks upon the importance of imagination when he says, "Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it."[16] Imagination is part of the human contribution to esthetic experience because it "involves a dissolution of old objects and a forming of new ones in a medium which, since it is beyond the old object and not yet in a new one, can properly be termed subjective."[17]

Interest. Interest is, for Dewey, a developing phenomenon, and is akin to growth. All education must engage interest and then expand

it. If it fails, then the activity has been mis-educative. To engage interest, for Dewey, means to make apparent the connection between purposes in the future and the present power, or state of the organism. As Dewey writes, "interest measures--or rather is--the depth of the grip which the foreseen end has upon one in moving one to act for its realization."[18] In the long run, intrinsic interest is closely connected to the act of thinking. But interest is not engaged in a vacuum. Dewey's most focussed discussion of interest is contained in his 1913 pamphlet, Interest and Effort in Education. In it he makes clear that interest, while it may be developed, is not something artificially attached to an object or action, rather interest is identification of the self with the object, or, in Dewey's own words, with "the fact to be learned or the action proposed."[19] "Genuine interest is the accompaniment of the identification, through action, of the self with some object or idea."[20] Dewey stresses the integrative nature of interest when he notes that "[i]nterest marks the annihilation of the distance between the person and the materials . . .it is the sign of their organic union."[21] He constantly emphasizes that interest is not something applied, not something stirred up by something else, not something brought about by promise of threat or reward; interest is not "passively waiting around to be excited from the outside," rather it "attaches itself to an object,"[22] an object of "direct value." Then, in one of his comparatively rare references to music, Dewey gives an example of the type of unity, of integrity found in aesthetic appreciation: "The existing experience holds us for its own sake, and we do not demand that it takes us into something beyond itself. With the child and his ball, the amateur and the hearing of a symphony, the present object engrosses. Its value is

there, and is there in what directly is present."[23]

While emphasizing that interest is one of the contributions of the subjective in the "taking in" of an art object, one of the ingredients in the work of art, the teacher's (or critic's) obligation is to see that the materials selected are "in relation to the child's [or perceiver's] present experience, powers, and needs; and that (in case he does not perceive or appreciate this relevancy) the new material be presented in such a way as to enable the child [or the perceiver] to appreciate its bearings, its relationships, its value with what already has significance for him."[24]

It goes without saying that interests are not static but are built up as the "funded and retained meanings of things become a part of the self. They constitute the capital with which the self notes, cares for, attends, and purposes."[25] Or, put another way, "there is assimilation and reconstruction of both background and of what is taken in and digested."[26]

Intelligence. To emotion, imagination, and interest should now be added intelligence, which is, of course, a central feature of all Dewey's work. Its role is implicit throughout his writings. It is intelligence that gives meaning to any experience and through its operation conflicts between organism and environment are resolved.

Dewey notes that the method of intelligent perception and appreciation are not opposed, rather, esthetic experience has intellectual aspects. The road to appreciation of art is not an easy one, and Dewey was well aware of this fact. To help the student learn to proceed along this route is the task of education, and hence the critic/teacher's role is extremely important. Dewey writes,

When the method of the teacher leads the pupil to see in the

> object features and relations he had not seen before, both teacher and pupil come into intellectual and emotional control of the situation. Then the habit of objective seeing is formed, and the habit operates in subsequent seeing. The information acquired, instead of being put into dead storage, becomes an active resource. Experience is immediately enriched, and the capacity for growth, for continuing experience, is expanded and directed.
>
> To learn to see anything well is a difficult undertaking. It requires the activity of the whole personality. Learning to perceive demands the interaction of the whole personality with things about it. This is true whether one is seeing a picture or painting it, building a new type of bridge, or reading the poetry of Keats.[27]

There can be no misunderstanding the vital role of the teacher, and the part he or she plays in developing intelligent perception.

Critical reflection is the means of developing intelligent perception, and it is performed upon the gross experience. This is the stage in which one applies thought to what has occurred. It would be true to Dewey's esthetic theory to say that, although immediate assimilation is the initial ingredient of esthetic experience, such experience only becomes fully esthetic in retrospect, as its meaning is perceived. It would make no sense, for instance, to read an analysis of Mozart's Masonic Funeral Music without having heard the music. It is only possible to distinguish between what is mere excitement and what may qualify as an esthetic experience after the event. Therefore, analysis of a musical experience after it has taken place should indicate, up to a point, whether the teacher has achieved the goal of increasing his or her students' susceptibility to esthetic experience. This is the stage of critical reflection. Here Dewey reverses the customary sequence in teaching appreciation, in which intelligent understanding is presumed to precede esthetic experience. Dewey changes the order, and places the gross, immediate experience first, to be followed by more exacting discrimination. He writes,

"While both original seizure and subsequent critical discrimination have equal claims, each to its own complete development, it must not be forgotten that direct and unreasoned impression comes first."[28] This effects subsequent esthetic experience and enriches it. Thus increased esthetic perception becomes a matter of growth. The end, as ever with Dewey, is not final, but becomes in its turn a means to further ends.

This is the time during which initial liking or interest can express itself in responsible and informed ways. It is the time during which intelligence comes into play upon the matter in hand in enhancing perceptions and enlarging meanings. It is the time to take a new point of view and to revise and refine what fell within one's earlier perspective. It is the time when both teacher and pupils turn critics, with the objective of enabling the students eventually to be each their own critics. For, as Dewey writes, "every intelligent appreciation is also criticism."[29] The goal of esthetic education is to enable the students to stand critically on their own two feet. Or, in Thomas Munro's summary of Dewey's esthetics, "You should have a vivid, visual or auditory experience, and then use your head in interpreting what that experience means to you."[30]

SUMMARY

I've discussed, at some length, the four elements that mark out, for Dewey, the subjective human contribution to esthetic experience. They are emotion, imagination, interest, and intelligence. They are mutually interdependent and any attempt to engage the intelligence without at the same time stimulating interest, and encouraging emotional response and imaginative vision would be contrary to Dewey's guidelines. Dewey holds that esthetic experience is found in those

situations in which the organism and environment cooperate to form a unity. It is a function of the subject quite as much as it is of the object, and it may occur under many conditions and arise from many cues. The work of art for Dewey lies in the transaction that takes place between the perceived and the perceiver. The result is an act of reconstruction, or re-creation.

In support of Dewey's position, anyone who has walked the galleries of any large art museum knows too well how easy it is to pass by acknowledged masterpieces without being touched at all esthetically. Aimless strolling past pictures in a museum is unlikely to occasion an esthetic experience which necessitates direct communication between the picture and the viewer, which, if you like, requires work. The same is true of a piece of music. Music may serve as background accompaniment to other activities, as a spur to national fervor or to inspire fear. This is not necessarily to be deplored, but it should be recognized for what it is and not considered as an esthetic experience in musical terms, even though it may contribute to a total esthetic effect. For an esthetic experience to occur in music some activity must be called out by the art product itself and generated across the channel between subject and object. This is the work of art.

REFERENCES

[1]John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 3.

[2]Ibid., 47.

[3]John Dewey, "Affective Thought," in Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Balch, 1931), 122.

[4]Dewey, Art as Experience, 67.

[5]Ibid.

[6]John Dewey, Experience and Nature (2nd ed., New York: W.W. Norton, [1929]), 390.

[7]Dewey, Art as Experience, 42.

[8]Ibid., 69.

[9]Ibid., 78-79.

[10]Ibid., 79.

[11]Ibid., 67.

[12]Ibid., 267.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid., 268.

[16]John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 277-78.

[17]Dewey, Experience and Nature, 220.

[18]Dewey, Democracy and Education, 152.

[19]John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975), 7.

[20]Ibid., 14.

[21]Ibid., 17.

[22]Ibid., 19.

[23]Ibid., 21-22.

[24]Ibid., 23-24.

[25]Dewey, Art as Experience, 264.

[26]Ibid.

[27]John Dewey, "Foreword" to Art of Renoir by Albert C. Barnes and Violette de Mazia (New York: Minton, Balch, 1935), X.

[28]Dewey, Art as Experience, 145.

[29]Dewey, Experience and Nature, 398.

[30]Thomas Munro, Typescript of a recorded interview with Thomas Munro by Kenneth Duckett at the Cleveland Museum of Art (April 26, 1967), to be found in the archives of the Cooperative Research on Dewey Publications Project, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.

1988 Annual Meeting

November 11-12

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1988 Annual Meeting
Loyola University-Water Tower Campus, Chicago, IL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11

12:00-1:00 Registration
1:00-1:10 Welcome: David Annis, President MPES

Session I Chair: Byron Radebaugh, Northern Illinois University
1:10-1:40 "The Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Development: A Critique," Robert Craig, Sisters of Charity-Houston
1:40-2:00 General Discussion

Session II Chair: Marie Hungerman, IHM, Nazareth College
2:00-3:30 Panel Discussion: "Children's Rights."
Speaker: Joan Whitman Hoff, Bentley College
Respondents:
Richard Pipan, Oakland University
Marie Hungerman, IHM, Nazareth College
General Discussion

Session III Chair: Mary Abascal-Hiledbrand, University of San Francisco
4:00-4:20 Graduate Student Competition Paper
"Sorokin's Theory of Sociocultural Change, Creative Altruism, and Education," Dale Snauwaert, University of Illinois at Urbana
4:20-4:30 General Discussion

Business Meeting 4:30-5:00

MPES Banquet Faculty Dining Room, Marquette Center
7:30-8:00 Presidential Address, "Vice and Virtue in Higher Education," David Annis, Ball State University
Response: Arthur Brown, Wayne State University
Chair: George Kizer, Iowa State University

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 12

Session I Chair: Wilma Miranda, Northern Illinois University
9:00-9:30 "Janusz Korczak and Self-Governing Schools in the Twentieth Century," Ronald Swartz, Oakland University
9:30-9:50 General Discussion

Session II Chair: Lawrence Dennis, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
9:50-10:20 "Was John Dewey a Nominalist? The Realist/Anti-Realist Debate," Philip Smith, Ohio State University
10:20-10:40 General Discussion

Session III Chair: George Stickel, Northwestern College
11:00-11:30 "The Classics, Progress, and the Future," David Owen, Iowa State University
11:30-11:50 General Discussion

The Virtue Ethics Approach To Moral Development: A Critique

Robert P. Craig, Ed.D., Ph.D.
SCH Health Care System
Houston, Texas

A popular theory elaborating the characteristics of a moral judgment is the virtue ethics approach. The work of Alasdair MacIntyre is noteworthy in the recent development of this approach. Although this theory is a complex one, we want to argue that it holds promise for answering the question: What characteristics make a judgment moral? But, as will be argued, the virtues approach by itself has severe philosophical flaws.

The virtue ethics approach goes back to the work of Aristotle. Such an ethic attempts to define the ends of human life and to enumerate the characteristics which constitute a "good person." [1] The argument is that once the nature of human virtues is discovered, then the living of the good life is the living out of the virtues -- the end of human life and the good life for humans, then, become synonymous.

Virtue, therefore, is the disposition to act on principles of right conduct. Virtue becomes that which a good person does. One such delineation is offered by MacIntyre. He offers a definition of virtue, although he refers to his definition as "partial and tentative." [2] He writes:

> A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.[3]

Inherent in MacIntyre's definition of virtue is the distinction between goods external to and internal to practices. This distinction is in need of clarification. To illustrate the distinction MacIntyre offers the example of the child, the candy and chess:

> Consider the example of a highly intelligent seven-year-old child whom I want to teach to play chess, although the child has no particular desire to learn the game. The child does however have a very strong desire for candy and little change of obtaining it. I therefore tell the child that if the child will play chess with me once a week I will give the child 50 cents worth of candy . . . Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win . . . so we may hope, there will come a time when the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands.[4]

Such goods as analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity are, for MacIntyre, goods internal to the practice. He defines a practice in rather board terms:

> A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods.[5]

MacIntyre, then, wants to maintain a particular logical process of prioritization in understanding and articulating virtue. The process is initiated by determining what is valuable, that is, the values internal to practice. Once this is accomplished, one can determine which qualities are virtues and which are vices. This is still rather vague, but MacIntyre attempts to clear things up by suggesting that it is the particular satisfactions of engaging in practices that set off those qualities that are virtues from those that are vices.[6]

What makes MacIntyre's position a bit muddled is that he also wants to maintain values external to the practice are also part and parcel of valuing, such as wealth and recognition.[7] Perhaps the more primitive a society was, the closer tie there would be between values internal to practice and values

external to practice -- the reason being that in such a society life would consist almost entirely of practices, practices the members all agreed upon and all participated in to some extent. Perhaps, though, as Edmund Pincoffs suggests, "the issue . . . whether internal or external values are most worth cultivating is irrelevant here."[8]

Perhaps the issue here is misplace. Instead of asking about the import and status of values internal or external to practice, the real issue is with competition among values, not complementary values. As Clinton Collins suggests:

> It seems to me that the different sources of value in human lives lead not, as MacIntyre assumes, to complementary values but rather to competing values . . . He does not, however, consider the possibility that the objectivity of virtues is in no way a guarantee against their being in conflict with one another.[9]

One may wonder if in the quest to conceive life as a unity, part of MacIntyre's Aristotelian project, he is short sided regarding the nature of human life, that is, the competition of values in one's life -- the need for value prioritization.

It is clear that MacIntyre is attempting to find an objective basis of ethics. Indeed he laments the fact, as he understands it, that contemporary thought has so tied virtue to subjectivity that any possibility of objective value is lost. This is inherent in his critique of emotivism. It is this proposed (or sought after) objective basis of ethics which gives unity to a person's participation in the common practices of the culture.[10]

The basis MacIntyre is looking for he discovers in the narrative unity of a human life which is transmitted in the telling of stories.[11] It is the narrative unity of one's life, then, which is the criterion of the worthiness of one's practices. Note, however, that in none of MacIntyre's arguments does he argue for the objectivity of virtue. Nor does he argue that when certainty

regarding value is found, so will objectivity be discovered. Almost like a Cartesian he assumes that certainty is equivalent to objectivity. MacIntyre, then, assumes the unity of narrative with practice.

For MacIntyre, the unity of a person's life is embodied in "the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life."[12] It follows that the good life for an individual consists in the systematic living out of that unity. As much appeal as MacIntyre's theory might have (Who would not like to think of their life as embodying unity? To view one's life as fragmented certainly is less than desirable), Kai Nielsen notes some difficulties with MacIntyre's position. In the first place, one could be kind, decent and understanding, one's life could be unified by such a narrative and "still be a lost human being utterly astray in Eliot's Wasteland."[13] Secondly, there are numerous individuals whom most of us would describe as having lived a life unified by value, but by a value we find despicable, such as Hitler. Nielsen continues:

> One's life can be through and through evil and still have such a unity and it could, in certain respects, be a good life and lack that unity.[14]

Likewise, one still wonders what criteria MacIntyre would give for success or failure in living out one's narrative. One is never sure if one's life is being proportioned appropriately. I feel, for instance, that since my wife recently had a baby I need to travel less and be at home more. Does this mean that I'm presently not successfully living out the unity which is my narrative? If I attempt to travel less I will not earn the proper amount of money to support my baby in a way my wife and I feel is necessary. How do I know when my life is in balance? MacIntyre does say that "the only criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are the criteria for success or failure in a narrated or to-be-narrated quest."[15] But this begs the question of the very criteria which would do the job. That there must be criteria is certain. That MacIntyre has not supplied any is also certain.

Likewise, MacIntyre certainly has offered a definition of the good. But he still hasn't given instances of it: he hasn't said what it is. He does write:

> . . . those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kins of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the human dangers and distractions we encounter. . .[16]

All this is well and good -- and the above might even be a true characterization of the good -- but it is hardly a hint at what a person's final end is. MacIntyre continues:

> We have arrived at a provisional conclusion about the good life for man: the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what less the good life for man is.[17]

Is MacIntyre saying that the good is beyond grasp, that the quest is all there is? Without some knowledge of what the destination is, how does one know which train to catch? MacIntyre, then, has not delivered the ethical goods. Surely he has correctly diagnosed the serious destruction of the objectivity of ethics. Surely he has offered wisdom regarding the processes in life which indicate our need to unify our lives. And surely he has helped us understand the relationship between moral tradition and social/political practices. But before one can begin to address the question: What are the characteristics of a moral judgment (What makes a judgement moral?), one needs to know more than MacIntyre offers. If a judgment is moral because it is in conformity with the good, one needs to know what the good is -- and that good needs to have universalizability. If MacIntyre is correct, as he may not be, when he notes that much of one's moral life consists of choosing between types of evil, it seems to be impossible to engage in the task of choice if there is no good by which to measure which degree or aspect of evil to comply with. It is for all

the above reasons that, no matter how insightful MacIntyre's theory may be, MacIntyre's brand of virtue ethics is not helpful in answering our question. His analysis gets us to the verge of an answer without giving it. To merely supply a process of attainment leaves much to be desired.

The following is a clear example of MacIntyre's logic: supplying reasons why knowing one's telos in life is essential without indicating what that good is:

> I have suggested so far that unless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity, it will both be the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness will invade the moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the context of certain virtues adequately.[18]

The sense and seriousness of this sentence can easily be appreciated. But MacIntyre begs the question of the nature of that telos by remarking (again with high seriousness and sense):

> . . . there is at least one virtue recognized by the tradition which cannot be specified at all except with reference to the wholeness of a human life -- the virtue of integrity or constancy.[19]

Is the virtue of integrity or constancy synonymous with one's telos? At times MacIntyre seems to be suggesting this. And if this is the case, the question of moral development makes little sense in a MacIntyrian moral universe -- for the end cannot be specified except in a reference to something else, integrity or constancy. But to add, "This notion of singleness of purpose in a whole life can have no application unless that of a whole life does," adds poetry and mysticism, but hardly clarity. Again, we may be looking in the wrong place for the clarity needed to answer, "What makes a judgment moral?" If it exhibits singleness of purpose in a whole life may be some kind of answer, but one needs more fleshing out than MacIntyre affords. Such ambiguity and

vagueness make MacIntyre's brand of virtue ethics irrelevant in the arena of moral education. Put differently, before schools offer programs of moral development accenting virtue ethics, much more integrating of virtue into life in classrooms needs to occur. And for such a project to be a success, much more clarity on the relationship between virtue development and moral judgment -- making needs to be established.

A final view of virtue ethics we will examine in some detail is that of James Wallace.[20] Wallace views the virtues as integral to appropriate human moral behavior, that is, the living out of the moral virtures (which, as Philippa Foot notes, contra Aristotle, need to be separated from the aesthetic virtues, say)[21] is the single most important factor which contributes to human good. As Wallace writes:

> Particular virtues perform certain functions, play certain roles, in human life. A great number of factors in many different ways contribute systematically to human good, and virtues in specifiable ways so contribute...[22]

According to Wallace, then, ethics is a practical subject, what today is called "applied ethics." It is ethics, in this view, which orders human conduct -- within the family, one's business, or the larger community, for instance. Since the development and living out of virtues is the sine qua non of the moral life, for Wallace, humans are to be characterized as possessing certain (proper) capacities and tendencies. Thus:

> We can conceive of the creature's good as the unimpaired exercise of these capacities. Thus, an individual's living well or badly will be a matter of its relative success in carrying on these activities. To understand what success in these activities is, one must understand the activities.[23]

This view seems to be at odds with the notion that certain universal traits or tendencies issue in specific virtuous acts. Although there is an evident theoretical difficulty here, Wallace contradicts himself when he admits:

> Our notion of a human being living well is bound up with a multiplicity of complicated moral and social values. There is an obvious conventional aspect of these matters, and therefore conceptions of the good life have varied so from time to time and from community to community. Human health may be studied as one studies the health of other living creatures, but the idea of a human being's living well, in the full sense, is so bound up with conventional values, that its study must be very different from the study of other living things.[24]

Now it may be true that "certain conventions will be better than others for a given community in a certain situation."[25] But if virtue is as closely tied to convention, values and behavior as Wallace argues, his brand of virtue Ethics is philosophically problematic. To follow convention may (or may not) lead to the building of community -- but at the sacrifice of certain members of that community who disagree with its "virtue conventions." Or, one could follow the "virtue conventions" of an oppressive community only to find the community secure, while citizens are in constant danger if they disagree with "conventional virtue." Put differently, "convention" is an ambiguous concept; and following convention is not synonymous with developing personal virtue.[26] If this is what Wallace means by "living the good life," his concept of such a virtuous life is indeed limiting and questionable.

Using Wallace's "virtue ethics," then, leads to a fixed idea of virtue. This is implied when he writes that "only if individuals have certain fairly fixed traits of character can they live successfully . . ."[27] There is no room for growth in virtue given this theory. It is as if Wallace does not seem to realize that the virtuous life is one in which ethical conflicts are the pattern of the day. And in ethically conflicting situations virtues are not enough, for both virtues and ethical principles need to be prioritized if the virtuous life is to be led. The point is that moral judgments cannot even be made if virtue is fixed within the individual. Morality itself becomes mechanized and routine -- certainly not "the life worth living" with its tragedies, complexities and conflicts.

Rather than viewing ethical judgments within the context of virtue ethics, this writer would take another road. It can be argued that particular events take on additional significance from their contexts. A note played by itself has a particular sound. The same note with the same sound heard as part of a melody has an additional significance. It is heard not in isolation but in relation to the notes which come before and those which come after.

In a similar way many human actions gain an additional significance from their context. The act of shaking hands has one significance when old friends meet, another significance when strangers are introduced, and still another significance when two people who have quarreled are reconciled. To point out another's mistake has one sort of significance when it is done to tease a friend, a different significance when a devoted teacher helps a student, and a third kind of significance when it is done out of spite. Clearly, one cannot judge whether an act is good, nor the extent to which it is good, if one does not grasp the contexts which give additional meaning to the act -- a fact to which Wallace seems oblivious.

One important context arises from the fact that doing things of a particular kind makes one a particular kind of person -- extending virtue ethics in this sense. If one frequently tells lies, for instance, one constitutes herself as a dishonest person. Once she realizes that this is so there is a new dimension added to her choice about whether or not to tell the truth. One becomes responsible not only for the particular good or bad things once causes outside of herself by her choice. She becomes responsible for the kind of person she is and will become.

At this point she can put more of herself into a moral judgment. One chooses one or another alternative not only because of its quality in itself but also because one chooses to become a particular kind of person. In this way, one may choose to be loyal to a friend not only because of what it does for one's friend, but also because one wills to be the kind of person who is loyal to friends. It is this concept of willing which is absent from virtue ethics.

In commenting on virtue ethics, Philippa Foot views the virtues as "correctives to vices."[28] This view also has built into it a rigid notion of virtue, as well as a questionable philosophy of human nature, that is, humans are viewed with suspicion, as opposed to being viewed with trust. Foot is certainly not a romantic. Yet in her "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?" she argues that they are not. She says:

> It seems then that the thesis that evidential moral considerations are invariably taken (by anyone who cares about morality) as more important than other considerations is simply false. The thesis that verdictive moral considerations are invariably taken as more important than other considerations is also false.[29]

Without developing her reasons for this conclusion (and without examining the difference between evidential and verdictive moral considerations), the reason Foot is correct is that moral judgments appear in contexts of the sort we have previously suggested. It is no credit to virtue ethics, then, to not have noticed this, nor to have minimized the place of human will in making moral judgments.

Let us examine virtue ethics from another perspective -- that of Bernard Williams. For Williams, it is not the virtue habits one has which are the primary factors in understanding the nature of moral judgments; it is an examination of one's projects, or what we referred to as contexts earlier.[30] Williams uses various synonyms for project in his work, such as "desire," "concern" and "commitment."[31] And, projects can be of a variety of sorts -- from a concern with basic survival to religious commitment, say. Williams refers to the latter sorts of projects as "ground projects," and under this category he includes artistic interests and strongly held moral convictions.

It is the projects in one's life, for Williams, which "help to constitute a character."[32] That is, it is one's projects which morally (and in other ways) set her apart from others -- demonstrate her uniqueness and individuality, an

exactly different philosophical emphasis than Wallace's, say, with his emphasis on convention and uniformity. And it is precisely these "ground projects" which define someone as a human person, for they persist over time.

One value which Williams holds strongly to is "integrity."[33] For him it is integrity which indicates human wholeness and a commitment to living out one's moral commitments. Any moral philosophy, then, which views impartiality as a primary moral value in moral judgment making is suspect, given Williams' position. Let us examine why this is so.

In certain consequentialist ethical theories, for example, it is necessary for the human moral agent to predict the consequences, total social happiness, say, which would result from acting on particular moral judgments. This view is problematical because it is assuming that one's personal happiness (or misery, for that matter) is on the same footing with everyone else's. Clearly this is incorrect. One's commitments and scruples play an essential part in one's moral judgment making, and if the view we have described above were true, there would be no room for moral commitment. Put in practical terms, one's commitment to one's child, say, and not the expansion of social happiness for all, is at the heart of one's moral judgment making. Put differently, one does not kill one's child to increase the general happiness of society because one is committed to the child -- the child takes precedence to increasing social happiness. It is simply not true that each person's concerns are on an equal footing with everyone else's -- a position which the formalist impartiality theories leads one to. Williams writes:

> Instead of thinking in a rational and systematic way either about utilities or the value of human life, the relevance of the people at risk being present, and so forth, the presence of the people at risk may just have its effect . . . for most human purposes (sub specie aeternitatis) is not a good species to view the world under . . . very often we just act as a possibly confused result of the situation in which we are engaged. That, I suspect, is very often an exceedingly good thing.[34]

Such theories of virtue ethics, then, are not much help in programs of moral education. If we are correct in our conclusion that virtue ethics has seemingly no room for moral commitment within its theoretical geography, then virtue ethics is certainly suspect as a theory of moral judgment making. And since moral commitment is integral to moral development, a theory which denies the importance of moral commitment in the moral life is of little value in programs of moral education.

Footnotes

[1]This point is developed in Samuel Enoch Stumpf's Philosophy: History and Problems. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983), pp. 78-104.

[2]Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 178.

[3]Ibid., p. 178.

[4]Ibid., p. 178.

[5]Ibid., p. 176.

[6]Ibid., p. 177.

[7]Ibid., p. 180.

[8]Edward Pincoffs, "Definition of the Virtues," Virtues and Medicine: Explorations in the Character of Medicine, Ed. Earl Shelp. (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), p. 125.

[9]Clinton Collins, "Before Virtue: A Critique of the New Essentialism in Ethics and Education," Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Ed. Emily Robertson. (Normal, Illinois: Illinois State University, 1985), p. 210.

[10]Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 203.

[11]Ibid., p. 114.

[12]Ibid., p. 203.

[13]Kai Nielsen, "Critique of Pure Virtue: Animadversions on a Virtue-Based Ethic," Virtue and Medicine, p. 139.

[14]Ibid., p. 139.

[15]Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 203.

[16]Ibid., p. 204.

[17]Ibid., p. 204.

[18]Ibid., p. 189.

[19]Ibid., p. 189.

[20]James Wallace, Virtues and Vices. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[21]Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices," Virture and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. (Berkely: University of California Press, 1978) Chapter One.

[22]James Wallace, Virtues and Vices, p. 15.

[23]Ibid., p. 26.

[24]Ibid., p. 33.

[25]Ibid., p. 36.

[26]The Work of Lawrence Kohlberg, which we have previously reviewed, is a position contradictory to Wallace's.

[27]James Wallace, Virtues and Vices, p. 160.

[28]Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, Chapter One.

[29]Philippa Foot, "Are Moral Considerations Overrriding?" Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, p. 187.

[30]J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," Utilitarianism: For and Against. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 110-112 and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," The Identifites of Persons, Ed. Amelie Rorty. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 201.

[31]Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", p. 201.

[32]See especially, Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. L, 1976, pp. 115-135.

[33]Ibid., pp. 118-125.

[34]Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," p. 118.

bc57042788

CHILD CUSTODY, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND EDUCATION

J. WHITMAN HOFF

Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts

I know a child who is abused. At least, she is neglected. It is not so much that she is physically abused as she is mentally. She is threatened by her mother, being told that she will be abandoned if she does not do what her mother wants her to do--including not see her father. She is unable to make choices concerning the nature and frequency of her visits with her parents. In school, her teachers refuse to recognize that she indeed has two parents in two different homes, and she is denied her request of receiving two pieces of information concerning school policies and events. She is assigned to read fairytales which are highly critical of stepparents, of which she has one. While there have been some occassional informal discussion groups concerning "blended families" at her school (a Catholic one) the groups are run inconsistently and apparently focus on feelings but not on what the children in the group might do to change things in their lives. Moreover, when she tries to find avenues, such as the court, where her voice can be heard, her attempts are thwarted. She longs to see her half brother and sister as they long to see her. But none of these children has any legal recourse, especially her siblings. In the eyes of the court they do not exist. I am this child's friend. She has contacted me on several occassions for consolation and for advice. However, she knows that simply as her friend I have no power, no control, no voice.

The child to whom I am referring is a child of divorce. While both parents have joint and physical and legal custody of her she now primarily lives with her mother since her father has remarried and moved out of state. The child had established a very close bond with her father at an early age. Her father had potty-trained her, took her to daycare, school and, in many ways, acted the role of "mother" more than her "real" mother did. However, she has been denied visitation with him on several occassions. She wants to live with her father but has been told by her mother that if she chooses to do so her mother will never see her again. Her father's attempts to resolve the situation have been unsuccessful. In the eyes of the law fathers cannot raise children. Attempts to disprove this fail when the child is not allowed to be present at the hearing and/or allowed to meet with the attorneys and/or judge, and parents and attorneys lie. This child has needed counseling and has often done poorly in school as a result of her situation. Neither the schools nor her mother--the ones who have control over her life--seem to recognize or care that she is in such distress. Clearly, her voice really does not matter to them. She is treated like property. Later, when she is either an adult or bordering on adulthood she will have a voice. Until then she has no power, no control. Sadly, by that time she herself may learn to manipulate others and deny them a voice.

There are many aspects concerning children's rights which can be discussed in light of the above scenario. However, I am going to focus on three issues which will be appropriate to the

subject matter of education. First, I am going to discuss why I believe children are abused and neglected by the court, particularly in custody situations. Second, I am going to focus on some reasons which have been given in support of children not having active rights in custody situations (and others). Third, I will discuss the role I believe the educational system should play in making children aware of the rights I suggest.

Why Children Have Rights (and How the Courts Abuse Them)

My contention that children have rights is based on the simple premise that children are sentient beings who have interests and who, to some extent, are capable of asserting them. The nature of those rights and their manifestations have been noted in detail by Farson, Holt and others (1). One right which seems to be common to all those who posit that children do and should have rights is the right not to be abused and neglected. Abuse is viewed as a positive action toward someone or something which infringes on their mental or physical being while neglect is viewed as a more passive position toward an individual but which can result in the same things as abuse. The primary importance of both of these, as I see them, is that, with respect to children, there is a failure to recognize the humanness of a child. This may result from a historically abusive childhood of the abuser or neglector or from an intentional arbitrary infliction of pain. Persons have rights in society (and I would argue that there are more fundamental rights as well) because they can think

and have a voice. They are able to assert their rights. They are can act in their own interests and have desires and preferences. Children certainly can be categorized as persons (2).

I shall adopt Mary Vetterling-Braggin's argument (3) which is a combination of the paternalist and libertarian arguments. Her agrument is as follows.

1. All people ought to be treated alike unless there is a justificatin for difference in treatment.

2. Adults with morally relevant properties (A,B,C, etc.) ought to have legal liberties (X,Y,Z, etc.) and adults without (A,B,C, etc.) ought to be denied (X,Y,Z, etc.)

3. There is no justification for treating children as a class differently from adults as a class with respect to the granting of (X,Y,Z).

---

4. Children with morally relevant properties (A,B,C, etc.) ought to have legal liberties (X,Y,Z, etc.) and children without (A,B,C, etc.) should be denied (X,Y,Z, etc.)

Let A, B, and C include the properties of ability to reason and make choices and let X,Y, and Z include the right to make choices in all situations and decisions concerning them.

It may sound rather simplistic to claim that children have rights because they have the capacity to think and make choices. One question which immediately comes to mind is "what allows a person to have rights?" This question is not a new one, and there are a variety of possible responses to it. However, herein, my claim is that, indeed, people who can think and make decisions are usually granted rights, at least in most societies. My argument is simply that

there is nothing significant which distinguishes children from adults. In this sense they deserve the same rights in society as adults deserve. In particular, custody decisions affect children in more significant ways then other decisions do. Since it is such an important decision children should at least have a voice in the decision. If they are incapable of doing so then someone other than their parents should represent them.

Divorce is stressful on all persons involved, and it is said to be most stressful on children. However, the fate of those children is often left up to attorneys, judges and the courts. Although judges follow past cases which have set precedents, much of the rulings in courts are at the discretion of judges. It is a well-known fact communicated by many attorneys that judges may be quite whimsical with regard to divorce settlements and the status and placement of children in those divorces. Also, judges often have personal beliefs which infringe on true justice. Judges have handed down decisions which left children in the hands of physically abusive parents after children have begged to be held in protective custody (5). Appellate Court simply addresses formal procedural errors and does not give people a second chance to prove themselves. Also, once a decision is made, it is unusual to have a case heard a second time. Lies, witholding of information and the short time allotted for divorce and custody hearings often prevent adequate decisions to result from such hearings.

The lack of a child's involvement in custody proceedings constitutes a belief that (a) the child should not be exposed to

such hearings; (b) the child cannot choose; so, (c) the child should not be put in the position of having to choose in such cases; (d) the child does know fact from fiction; and/or (d) this is really a matter between the parents since parents are the "protectors" of children. This last option actually revolves around the historical notion which exists in some cultures that a child is an extension of his/her parents. Until adulthood, children are essentially the property of parents just as ones body is ones own property (Lockean). Hence, it is not simply neglecting children to forget about them and their intentions and interests in court hearing but it is an active refusal to have them partake of the court hearings and other proceedings. In this sense I believe the courts are abusive. They know what they are doing in that they are acting in their own interests with a set of fixed beliefs. While they might not always intend to harm they allow harm by not removing children from environments which damage them physically and/or emotionally and from which the children themselves have asked to be removed (4). By intentionally ignoring children's requests and, even prior to that, their voice and presence, the courts neglect children's true interests. This neglect becomes abusive when the court continues to subsequently refuse the child access to the court-room when the child specifically asks to be there. Judges often deny requests, specifically from parents, for children to participate in hearings especially when the child is under 12. But perhaps more importantly, children have no direct access to petition the court to hear them concerning matters of custody,

abuse, and the like. Unless the court specifically appoints a guardian ad litem, which is requested usually by an attorney and/or a social service agency then the child has no recourse to file complaints, assert her interests or make any kind of decision related to her welfare. Do children know when to call police when being abused? How will they know to call an attorney? What attorney will take their case? Should attorneys be involved at all?

The fear of being "found out" and perhaps beaten more severely is often what keeps children from telling anyone about physical abuse. This fear is appealed to as a reason why children should not be able to participate in court hearings. However, if they were not afraid, and wanted to report abuse what options do they have? One might argue that they indeed do have options. But how are they to become known to the child? And, will the child understand them? Many people have argued that children do not have the capacity to understand such options, so they cannot be communicated to them. Hence, the job of reporting the act of child abuse is left up to school officials and/or others who know the child and witness the effects of the abuse. However, physical abuse is the only type which is truly explored. It is often argued that it is too difficult to determine physical abuse and even more difficult to determine emotional abuse. Unfortunately, without any type of abuse there simply is no avenue for anyone to take, particularly the child. To simply assert the child's wishes to see her/his parents, or be in the custody of a particular one

is not a right of the child. Only parents and the court have these rights. Why?

Why Children do not have Rights

There are some simple explanations for why children do not have substantial rights in our society. One reason given is that children do not have the capacity to make decisions for themselves, especially ones that shape their futures. Especially in custody situations, it is the assumption that children are already caught in the middle of an ugly debate and it is harmful to them enough without involving them even more. Even some people who support more liberal custody actions argue that no child should be put into the position of choosing between parents (6). However, the process does not need to be so adversarial. To state preferences does not necessarily mean to choose. But this further complicates matters. If given the chance, many people claim that children would prefer the parents to stay together, something which is not possible. Hence, the child is said to not fully understand the nature of the divorce, and her fantasy simply cannot be fulfilled. Further, this indicates that the child simply should not be involved. But one must keep in mind that ex-spouses often feel this way, too. Fantasy is not limited to children not is it the foundation upon which all of their statements are established.

Another issue which is relevant to the discussion of children making choices concerns the child's ability to know fact from fiction. Children are said to fabricate stories about parents and their situations leaving the court and others

not knowing what to believe. This ability to fantasize is one strong reason why children are not consulted in such court matters. It would simply complicate the situation. However, adults lie, too. And perhaps more than children do. It is not a good enough reason for denying them access to hearings concerning their own welfare. Likewise, it seems unfair to assume that children lie more often than not or that there are certain conditions under which all children will do so. This seem to be more likely of a particular child, perhaps, than of all children in general. And with respect to Vetterling-Braggin's argument, cited above, there is no natural significant difference between adults and children; hence, children deserve the same considerations as adults.

The general attitude, then, toward children is that children often have rights of protection, education, maybe even well-being. However, "protection" and "education" are subject to interpretation and "well-being" usually does not include having a voice. Remember how long it took to pass the law for 18 year olds to vote even though they were representing our country in war. The claim is that people under 21, maybe 18 cannot make decisions on behalf of their own welfare because they are predisposed to those things which they desire and not those things which are beneficial to them. They simply do not know the difference between the two. Likewise, allowing children to make decisions, again, puts too much stress on them.

Psychological literature to some extent supports the claims I have discussed. Counseling/psychotherapy is the

suggested avenue for working out disputes between parents, children, and even the "blended family". But this approach tends to be pollanyish. Also, the process lends itself to misinterpretation, and often promotes stress and conflict more than it does relieve it, especially when not all of the people involved think that this approach is the best one. Perhaps more importantly, the basic human right to choose is taken away, especially if, as is uaually the case, the psychotherapy takes place after the court process, when decisions have already been made.

It seems to me that the best method to use in these matters is one which involves full participation of all parties in discussions concerning matters which are relevant to them. Children are people and have interests. They should have a right to voice them. The process through which this can take place may vary. One particularly positive one is mediation. It is non-adversarial in nature and enhances open communication among the parties. As a matter of fact, many states, like Oregon and California, mandate mediation prior to divorce proceedings in court. However, the child is not always present in this and that is what I contend should change.

If one accepts that children should, at least, have a voice in custody situations, and perhaps others, and if one accepts that children should have a voice because they have rights, then how are those rights to be communicated to them? How is a child to learn about the various avenues which might be open to her? One avenue is through education. However, how this

can be implemented, and whether or not it should be is subject of debate.

Why Education can and should Play a Role in Teaching Children about Their Rights

In order for children to enact their rights they must know about them. If one is educated at all about her rights it is usually done in high school and college or simply through life experiences. However, many people never go to college and a large number never complete high school. Some schools do not discuss rights. Hence, some people fall prey to injustices due to lack of knowledge. This leaves one to be ignorant without recourse until it is simply too late.

In addition to this problem, one might argue that learning about rights, especially in such matters as custody disputes, is like morality and sex: the job of the parents. It is a private matter and should not be addressed in the public arena. Likewise, it might be argued that there is no proper place in the curriculum for such subject matter. Further, the educational environment as it exists is intrinsically authoritative, and hence, not conducive to learning about the self-empowerment needed to attain rights. Anyway, who would teach children about rights that most of society does not believe they have?

Learning about rights seems to be fundamental to ones participation, active or passive, in society. It is not merely a private matter. If we are social beings and are expected to grow up and function fully in society then we must know how to

do so prior to that participation. Specifically with respect to custody, the divorce rate and the increasing number of blended families (in our society) have changed our society's nature. Schools and other institutions can no longer operate under the assumptions that a child is living with two parents, that a child is living with all of her brothers and sisters, or that a child is not subject to a unique type of abuse in the home. Courses in the nature of the family, the nature of abuse, and rights could, and I believe should, be integrated into the curriculum. There are social agencies which serve the educational system and visit schools with the intention of educating children about abuse. But this is no longer sufficient. With the dramatic changes which have occurred in the family there needs to be more extensive education and training for children, and perhaps adults. There are many ways in which education can provide a forum for these types of learing activities for parents and children. In addition to formal curriculum enhancement, there could be extracurricula activies, discussion groups and speakers whoh focus on these issues. The school are the focual point of learning. They have an obligation to impart the truth in all of its various manifestations. They must keep abreast of our changing society and help to truly educate children in what they really need to know. The schools are capable of being unbiased at least more so than parents might be and this lends itself to an objective environment for learning about rights.

In addition to the schools, legislation must be passed on

behalf of children to participate in the court concerning matters of their well-being, or, and preferably, other, nonadversarial, means of resolving disputes should be employed. Ombudspersons, similar to the ones in Norway, must be appointed to serve as an avenue for childre to discuss their problems, rights and responsibilities in society.

Summary

The subject of children's rights is a complex one. Where to draw the line between rights, responsibilites, ability to participate and not participate remains a mystery to some. However, the fact that children are persons who can and do think, who have interests, and who may assert them warrants a more serious consideration of children as participants in hearings and other dialogues concerning their welfare. The particulars of this most certainly need to be developed.

Chances are that I am not the only person who knows a child who is abused. Families are torn apart, children never get to know their siblings, and one of the most fundamental institutions of society is destroyed simply because children are not informed, not consulted, about their interests. Assumptions are made and dictates are handed down about the way life should be. Isn't it time to make a change? Isn't it time to give children a voice? I think that it is.

ENDNOTES

1. See Richard Farson's BIRTHRIGHTS (NY: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1974), and John Holt's ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (NY: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1974).

2. I am assuming that children are persons because of their capacity to think and make choices. Others who have these capacities, including some children, but who are incapable of asserting their choices (mentally retarded, and emotionally disturbed persons) are also persons who "deserve"/have rights, too.

3. Mary Vetterling-Braggin. "A Note on the Legal Liberties of children" in THINKING, THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN, Vol. 4, # 3 & 4.

4. See Judith Courcy's "A Case History of Child Abuse" in WHOSE CHILD? (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980); pgs. 3-12. This is a case where children were brutally abused by their father. One child begged the judge to keep her in custody but the judge claimed that he would not take children away from their parents.

5. "Court Returns Foster Son to Biological Mother" in the Johnson City Press Chronicle, Johnson City, TN, March 3, 1978; cf. WHOSE CHILD by W. Aiken and H. LaFollett (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980).

6. See Mel Roman and William Haddad's THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978).

7. "In Norway, children have an ombudsman to stand up for their rights"; "About Education" by Fred M. Hechinger, NEW YORK TIMES, Sunday,

CHIDREN'S RIGHTS REVISITED: A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION

Richard C. Pipan
Assistant Professor of Education
Oakland University
Rochester, Michigan

> Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become universal law.... So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or that of any other, in every case as an end with all, never as a means only.
>
> Immanuel Kant

Joan Whitman Hoff's paper entitled "Child Custody, Children's Rights and Education" is not unlike a traditional, wooden Russian doll: many versions of the same icon are nested one inside the other; each successive layer reveals yet another variant of the same form. In the case of the Hoff paper, "children's rights" constitute the prevailing form, and layers are composed of expressions of that form in the varying contexts and languages of the law, family privacy, social mores, individual freedom, and education. The tantalizing prospect of playing with a Russian doll is that one participates in a concrete manifestation of an infinite regress -- when will we reach the first (or last) doll, and how will it be the same and yet different than those that preceeded it? Given that the crux of Joan Whitman Hoff's paper is her critique of how children's rights are arrived at in legal, social and educational systems, I wish to offer some thoughts on her critique and suggest a curricular response to the challenge of expanding our understanding of the normative dimensions of human rights discourse.

Property Rights vs. Liberty Rights

Hoff's examination of abuses of children's rights invites a needed, if painful, gaze into the abyss of more general, pervasive human rights abuses. The abuse of children's rights shares a common etiology with other abuses of the human family. Hoff portrays one significant fissure within the gaping abyss of other abusive relationships. Hoff's portrayal of the experience of children in a world governed by adult interests reveals a divided world -- a split between the current, abusive situation and one that is advocated as a preferred alternative. I have tried to graphically represent this split in Figure 1. In her paper, Hoff describes the present situation (**property interests**) as one in which children are abused, neglected, threatened, abandoned, they do what they are told, they are unable to make changes in their lives, their desires and needs are refused recognition, their requests are denied, they are assigned to various relationships, and their attempts to express or exert their preferences are thwarted. Certainly, this is a disquieting scene. And to add to this macabre situation, all this is accomplished by presumably well-meaning adults, following legal protocols, and acting ostensibly with the best interests of children in mind.

Against this decidely unattractive situation, Hoff offers a preferred alternative which I am representing as **liberty interests**. Within this situation, Hoff advocates for children to have the right to visit with their parents, to provide information to the stewards of their fate, to participate in the the process of change, to have their voices heard, to have their longings considered, and to be a part of the consultation and advice that

PROPERTY INTERESTS

ABUSED
NEGLECTED
THREATENED
ABANDONED
DO WHAT YOU ARE TOLD
UNABLE TO MAKE CHANGES
REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE
DENIED HER REQUEST
ASSIGNED
ATTEMPTS ARE THWARTED

130



LIBERTY INTERESTS

VISITS WITH PARENTS
INFORMATION
TO CHANGE THINGS
VOICE CAN BE HEARD
LONGING
CONSULATION AND ADVICE

131

FIGURE 1

impacts upon their well-being. These seem hardly to be unreasonable requests, but Hoff's paper offers numerous examples where this preferred alternative is pervasively and systematically thwarted within our legal and educational systems.

At the base of the fissure represented in Figure 1, are the three potential sources of the etiology of separation Hoff has identified: **NO POWER. NO CONTROL. NO VOICE.** If, as Hoff has depicted, children are powerless, they are controlled by others, and their voices are disregarded, how might such an abridgement of their rights be remedied? I might extend this "bridge" metaphor to Hoff's recommendations which are strung tenuously across the fissure: She recognizes that adults can acknowledge that they are able to be a child's friend; adults can try to find avenues from potentially abusive to potentially supportive situations; adults can seek legal recourse for expanding the protective possibilities against abuses of children's rights; and adults can maintain and/or improve contact with children.

There are several pivotal issues upon which an analysis of children's rights turn. The first and most salient is the tension between **liberty interests vs. property interests.** In his article "Child Maltreatment: An Ecological Integration," Jay Belsky describes how abusive relationships and conditions "nest" within multiple contexts. (It appears that the Russian doll metaphor is not an inappropriate conceit!) Four contexts Belsky identifies are the **ontogenic** which refers to the individual; **micro-system** which refers to family structures; **exosystem** which refers to community configurations; and **macrosystem** which refers to the wide scope and influence of culture. Each of these contexts affords manifold variables which can

contribute to, or counteract, abusive relationships and conditions. Belsky's analysis focuses pointedly on how cultural beliefs contribute to the pervasive maltreatment of children within the United States:

> Also implicated in this macrosystem analysis of the etiology of child abuse is society's general attitude toward children. Particularly important may be the belief that children are property to be handled as parents choose. (cf. Garbarino, 1977b; Gil. 1976). It is worth pointing out that the historic roots of such a belief system, as well as evidence of its potential role in the maltreatment process, can be traced to early Roman law and the writings of Aristotle (Bakan, 1971; Collins, 1974; Gil, 1976; Radbill, 1974). Consider, for example, Aristotle's commentary concerning a father-son relationship: "The justice of a master or a father is quite a different thing from that of a citizen, for a slave is property, and there can be no injustice to one's own property" (quote in Bakan, 1971). Although some critics might debate the significance of such cultural history for understanding contemporary child maltreatment, Zigler (1977) has pointed our that the aforementioned Supreme Court decision [Ingraham vs. Wright] was predicated on the very assumption that children's rights are distinct from those of others: While criminals are protected by the Eighth Ammendment from cruel and unusual punishment, the majority opinion of the Court ruled that schoolchildren have little need for such protection. Undoubtedly, Aristotle would have concurred.[1]

While the Supreme Court has generally been flacid in its protection of school children, it has affirmed (e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, Burnside v. Byars) that school children have the right to due process. The Supreme Court, while weak in its protection of children from unusual punishment, at least protects children from capricious punishment.

This debate between liberty and property interests has gained some prominance in recent "current events." Media mogul Ted Turner's recent acquistion of MGM and its film archives presents a case in point. Turner has aggressively pursued his commercial and aesthetic interests by "colorizing" various film classics. When critics attacked his alteration of the

monochromatic films, Turner replied that he had bought the rights to these films, they were his property, and he would damn well do with them as he wished. Even under the rubric of "property interests," there exists debate about whether one can do "no injustice to one's property." While the abovementioned case is largely an aesthetic debate, others are framed in qualitative social and community interests. Protective zoning laws, environmental protection requirements and occupational health and safety regulations point to the intersection of liberty and property interests. The co-penetration of liberty and property interests will continue to require -- certainly in the context of ecological and environmental concerns -- redefinition and reconfiguration of our cultural, legal and educational values and actions.

I wish to suggest that our cultural depiction of children as property is pervasive and corrosive. It is an inherently reductionist metaphor. From a Buberian perspective[2], such a conception of children is unethical: children are made objects. Such a relationship is "I-It," not "I-Thou."

I propose that our legal and educational systems would significantly improve the condition of children (and adults) if they were to focus more directly on liberty rights and diminish their implicit application of property interests against children.

A Curricular Perspective

I wish to offer a few direct recommendations for a curricular response to the problem of redefining adult relationships to children and the rightful place of children in our society: First, that children's rights be subsumed

under the broader rubric of **human rights**. By drawing distinctions between the rights of children and adults, we may be inadvertantly guilty of agism. Second, that a Rawlsian sense of social justice guide teacher-student relationships -- specifically, that legitimate and understandable differences between children's and adults' capabilities and experience need not result in differential ethical regard:

> ...the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.... No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingincies work for the good of the least fortunate.[3]

The interpretation I wish to make of this "difference principle" extends beyond the commonplace understanding that it applies to innate talents, material wealth, or priviledged status. I would propose that one might also include differences in experience and maturity. To restate my thesis, the mere fact that children are not as experienced as adults does not inherently dictate that adults deserve differential rights or privileges. In other words, ethical treatment of children requires identical consideration for fair treatment as that afforded adults. As the Honorable Justine Wise Polier[4] has eloquently argued, children must be afforded the basic human rights of due process, privacy and equal protection.

Third, that **human liberation** be the central aim of social, political, legal, and educational change. The work of Paolo Freire[5] is particularly illuminating in this area. Freire suggests that human actions be directed

toward reducing oppressive conditions and relationships, that "emancipatory interests" prompt us to reduce unnecessary social constraints, and that through a process of "conscientization" we become aware of our complicity in oppressive conditions and our potential agency to act against such conditions. Thus, "liberty interests" are best defended through actions guided by emancipatory actions, not ownership nor control interests.

Fourth, that the elimination of oppressive and abusive relationships and conditions may be better understood in terms that Martin Buber has used: "The opposite of constaint is not freedom, but community." Hoff has pointed to the importance of affiliative values, to the inclusion of children into public discourse, and to an expansion of the role of children to participate in a just community.

This brings me to the last, and perhaps most radical, suggestion I wish to make toward curricular, social, legal and political evolution: I wish to suggest that we struggle to rid ourselves of a virulent form of anthropocentrism. Many of our diverse cultural traditions have situated human beings in a priviledged status vis a vis the material world and other "lower forms" of animal life. In solidarity with Astrid Lindgren[6], the Swedish author and humanist, and in the spirit of Joan Whitman Hoff's paper, I propose that we reconceptualize our relationship to the world in a way that avoids such hubris. **We share the world with other sentient beings.** I propose that, in keeping with liberty interests, our relationships and interactions with other sentient beings should be guided by a concern that we not inflict unnecessary pain and suffering. This agenda has long been expressed by animal rights activists ranging from militant

antivivisectionists to vegetarians. Such an ecological and radical form of ethics seems to take seriously the potentially abusive, exploitive use of material and living forms in our world. We are currently witnessing significant change in social, political and environmental policy in this area. Sweden has just passed far-reaching legislation (titled "Lex Astrid," in honor of Ms. Lindgren's advocacy of this issue) to protect farm animals from overly restrictive and painful forms of "animal husbandry." While not prohibiting human consumption of farm animals, such legislation prohibits agricultural practices that unnecessarily constrain, inflict pain on, or otherwise abuse farm animals. Such legislation, I believe, is an advance in human compassion and conscience.

I wish to conclude with a quotation by Robert H. Mnookin from his second chapter of In the Interest of Children entitled "The Enigma of Children's Interests":

> Deciding what is best for a child often poses a question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself. Should the decisionmaker be primarily concerned with the child's happiness or with the child's spiritual and religious training? Is the primary goal long-term economic productivity when the child grows up? Or are the most important values of life found in warm relationships? In discipline and self-sacrifice? Are stability and security for a child more desirable than intellectual stimulation? These questions could be elaborated endlessly. And yet, where is one to look for the set of values that should guide decisions concerning what is best for the child? Normally judges look to statutes, but custody statutes do not themselves give content or relative weight to the pertinent values. Moreover, if one looks to our society at large, one finds neither a clear consensus as to the best child-rearing strategies, nor an appropriate hierarchy of ultimate values. The answer, in short, is indeterminate.[7]

While the answer may be "indeterminate," it need not be relativistic. I would like to suggest that a curriculum guided by principles of social

justice, directed at human liberation, and conducted ethically, would do much to counteract abusive and dehumanizing practices in our society.

Joan Whitman Hoff identifies four bridges spanning the abyss of human injustice: cultivating friendship, respecting each other's search for avenues toward preferred alternatives, developing sensitive legal recourse for conflicts, and establishing responsible contact with others. These bridges, and others we may each propose, can empower, can respect our shared destiny, and enable us to hear the voice of the other, however faint or foreign.

REFERENCES

1. Jay Belsky. "Child Maltreatment: An Ecological Integration." American Psychologist vol. 35 no. 4 (April 1980) p. 329.

2. Martin Buber. I and Thou. Translation, prologue and notes by Walter Kaufmann. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970).

3. John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 101-02.

4. Justine Wise Polier. "Myths and Realities in the Search for Juvenile Justice: A Statement by the Honorable Justine Wise Polier," Harvard Educational Review. vol. 44 no. 1 (February 1974).

5. Paolo Freire. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. (New York: Continuum, 1970). Education for Critical Consciousness. (New York: Continuum, 1973). Pedagogy-in-Process. (New York: Continuum, 1978. The Politics of Education. (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1985).

6. "Outspoken Pippi Longstocking Creator Crusades for Animal Rights." The Ann Arbor News April 16, 1989, p. F10.

7. Robert H. Mnookin. "The Enigma of Children's Interests," in In The Interest of Children. ed. Robert H. Mnookin (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1985), p. 18.

SOROKIN'S THEORY OF SOCIOCULTURAL CHANGE, CREATIVE ALTRUISM, AND EDUCATION

Dale T. Snauwaert
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Introduction

In the age of "future shock" the question of social change confronts us with greater intensity than it has in any other time in history. What are the basic causes of change? What are its dynamics? Is history a linear process? Or does it repeat itself in a cyclical fashion? Where is our society headed? Given the answers to these questions, what type of education should be endorsed? The purpose of this paper is to address these questions from the perspective of a brilliant but seemingly forgotten theory of sociocultural change developed by P.A. Sorokin in the early part of this century.

Sorokin held that a given culture is an integrated whole which is unified logically on the basis of its dominant system of truth. In other words, a culture, its social institutions, and the personality of its citizenry, are all integrated on the basis of meaning derived from a particular view of ultimate reality. It is this world view that forms the basic premise from which the whole culture is derived. That is, the central core of the culture, its major social institutions, and the nature of the personality of its citizenry follow logically from the world view of a given culture.

In his historical account of Western civilization Sorokin identifies three dominant systems of truth or attitudes toward ultimate reality that have served as the basic premises of various cultural epochs. They are: the senses as the most valid source of knowledge which forms the Sensate variety of culture, intuition or revelation as the most valid source of knowledge which forms the Ideational variety of culture, and a combination of senses and intuition mediated by reason as the most valid source of

knowledge which forms the Idealistic variety of culture. Sorokin maintains that these world views, and consequently the three varieties of culture, fluctuate throughout history. Hence, Sorokin posits a "variably recurrent" theory of sociocultural change. The purpose of this paper is to articulate the main details of this theory and to discuss its implications for education. Given the fact that Sorokin took four large volumes consisting of hundreds of pages to delineate his theory, it would be ludicrous to attempt much more than a review of the central features of his theory. The paper will consist of six parts: (1) the principles of cultural integration, (2) types of culture, (3) the dynamics of change, (4) creative altruism, (5) education, and (6) conclusions. Let us begin with the principles of cultural integration.

The Principles of Cultrual Integration

Sorokin defines culture broadly as the "sum total of everything which is created or modified by the conscious or unconscious activity of two or more individuals interacting with one another or conditioning one another's behavior (1)." The question that Sorokin begins with is whether a culture is an "integrated whole, where no essential part is incidental but each is organically connected with the rest? Or is it a mere spatial congeries of cultural objects, values, traits which have drifted fortuitously together and are united only by their spaital adjacency (Dynamics, p.2)?" In answer to how a culture is integrated Sorokin posits four possible forms of cultural integration. The first is what he refers to as spatial adjacency or mechanical integration. This type of cultural

---

(1) Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultrual Dynamics (abridged). Boston: Porter Sargent, 1957, p.2. All further references to this work are cited in the text in the following form: (Dynamics, p.xx).

integration ranges from a fortuitous merging of two or more culutral objects to a mechanical union of cultural elements into a structural whole (e.g. glueing two objects together to form a third object). In the case of this type of integration, the bond of integration is either coexistence in a social or physical space without any other connection (e.g. an untidy attic) or mechanical unity (Dynamics, p.4).

The second type of integration is "indirect association through a common external factor (Dynamics, p.4)." This type is a greater form of unification in that two or more cultural elements that are spatially adjacent without any functional or logical relation are connected to a common factor external to both or all of them. This association with a common external factor gives them a greater bond than merely spatial coexistence. For example, lemon aid, swimming trunks, and lawn chairs coexisting in a certain physical space are not functionally or logically related but they are related to a common external factor, a summer climate.

The third type is "causal or functional integration (Dynamics, p.5-7)." A causally or functionally integrated culture is a social system where all the elements are directly interdependent upon one another and upon the whole system. For example, if event A is always followed by event B, then they are causally or functionally related. The elimination of A will result in the elimination of B.

> This means that any cultural synthesis is to be regarded as functional, when, on the one hand, the elimination of one of its important elements perceptibly influences the rest of the synthesis in its functions (and usually in structure); and when, on the other hand, the separate element, being transposed to a quite different combination, either cannot exist in it or has to undergo a profound modification to become a part of it (Dynamics, p.6).

From this perspective, a society or culture may be viewed as consisting of

one or more variables which function as the basic cause(s) of all or the majority of characteristics of that culture. For example, a Marxian view of society in which economic factors (modes of production) function as the basic cause of the structure and change of all other features of the culture is a causal-functional theory of society. Likewise, Weber, Mannheim, Montesquei, Comte, Saint-Simon, Durkheim all hold the view that society is functionally integrated in that they all posit one or more variables as basic causes. The causal-functional type is a highly integrated culture. However, Sorokin posits a fourth and even higher type.

Sorokin maintains that the causal method seeks to break things down into their simplest components, then the relationships between these simplest elements are studied, and in turn formulas that describe the nature of the uniformity existing between them are generated. These formulas of uniformity enable one to understand and introduce causal order into the enormous complexity of a culture. However, according to Sorokin, culture cannot be broken down into cultural atoms. In order to locate the common denominator or the uniformity of a culture one must look at the "mentality" of that culture.

Sorokin maintains that

> Hidden behind the empirically different, seemingly unrelated fragments of the cultural complex lies an identity of meaning, which brings them together into consistent styles, typical forms, and significant patterns. If, therefore, uniformity of relationship is the common denominator of casually united phenomena, in the logico-meaningful union it is identity of central meaning or idea (Dynamics, p.10).

Hence, we have the fourth type: the logico-meaningful integration of culture.

The logico-meaningful type of integrated culture is one where the

fragments of a culture are unified logically on the basis of central meaning. That is, the elements of a culture combine to form one "supremely integrated" whole, a "seamless web (Dynamics, p.8)," by virtue of their logical relation to the central meaning or basic premise of the culture. What one finds in an integrated culture of this type is that the elements of the culture exist in logical harmony with, and not in contradiction to, each other. Their logical harmony is based upon the fact that they are all consistent with, or follow from, a basic premise. This basic premise is the "dominant attitude toward the nature of ultimate reality (Dynamics, p.15)." This dominant attitude in a sense, permeates the numerous elements of the culture and "gives sense and significance to each of them, and in this way makes cosmos out of a chaos of unintegrated fragments (Dynamics, p.14)."

Sorokin maintains that throughout the history of Western civilization there has basically been three dominant attitudes toward the nature of ultimate reality (as implied above these attitudes comprise the "mentality" of a given culture). On one extreme is a mentality that views ultimate reality as that which is perceived by the senses (Dynamics, p.25). For those with this mentality, only those propositions that can be verified empirically are thought to be meaningful (e.g. positivism). On the other extreme is the mentality that views ultimate reality as that which is supersensory, immaterial, and spiritual. For this mentality the senses only allow access to appearances which are inherently illusory. True reality can only be realized by transcending the senses and coming to a direct apprehension or intuition of the immaterial, spiritual dimension of life (e.g. mysticism) (Dynamics, p.25-26). In between these two extremes is a mentality that holds that ultimate reality can only be

realized through a mixture or combination of the two extremes above. According to Sorokin there are two different types of mixtures that can be held: (1) a mechanical mixture wherein idealistic rationality takes precedence (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas) (Dynamics, p.228), and (2) a integral mixture wherein the senses, reason, and intuition are unified in a three dimensional system of truth (e.g. Plato) (Dynamics p.690). The integral system of truth is the closest to absolute truth. All the other mentalities, senses, reason, and intuition taken alone are only partial truths.

Before moving on to a discussion of the types of culture these different mentalities structure, it is important to note that Sorokin held that the culture of a given society was not entirely integrated logically. He held that in any culture there can be found spatial and/or external unities as well as causal and logical unities. However, the core of all the main cultural epochs in the history of Western civilization have been logically integrated. From Sorokin's perspective the dominant theories of social change that are adhered to today overlook this subtler aspect of culture and hence they posit an exclusively causal view of change (e.g. Marx, Weber, Mannheim, etc.).

Types of Culture

Corresponding to each system of truth delineated above is a particular type of culture. The mentality dominanted by the senses gives rise to a Sensate culture, the supersensory, intuitional mentality gives rise to a Ideational culture, and their mixture gives rise to an Idealistic culture. As noted above there are two types of idealistic mentality which give rise to two different types of Idealistic culture: a mechancial type dominated by reason and an integral type dominated by the

integral theory of truth. In this section the cultural features of each type of culture will be briefly discussed in terms of their systems of art, truth, and ethics and law. Let us begin with Ideational culture.

Ideational Culture

Again the basic premise of ideational culture is the attitude or mentality that ultimate reality can only be known through a direct supersensory apprehension or intuition of the immaterial, spiritual dimension of the world (Absolute Being or God). The major categories of ideational culture are permeated by this mentality.

Ideational Art. "In its content as well as its type, ideational art articulates the major premise of ideational culture that the true reality-value is God. Therefore, the topic of ideational art is the supersensory kingdom of God (2)." Its nature is "religious through and through (Crisis, p.31)." Its focus is not persons, events, or objects of the sensory world, but it uses these as symbols to give visible form to the immaterial, invisible nature of ultimate reality. In this way ideational art is a part of religion; it is a religious act whose purpose is not to entertain but to "bring the believer into closer union with God (Crisis, p.31)."

Ideational Truth. The ideational system of truth is based upon revelation. Knowledge is valid only if it is obtain directly through "divine inspiration" or through reference to scripture which is divinely inspired. Empirical testimony and logical reasoning only have a subsidary role. If they contradict scripture in anyway they are rejected as invalid or even deemed as heresey (Dynamics, p.228-229). Revealed religion and

---

(2) Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1941), p. 31. All further references to this work are cited in the text in the following form: (Crisis, p. xx).

theology are the queen "disciplines" of the ideational system of truth.

Ideational Ethics and Law. The purpose of ideational ethics is not the maximization of utility or the fair distribution of goods, but "a union with the Absolute (Crisis, p.135)." The norms of the ethical system emanate from the God; therefore, they are "absolute, unconditional, unchanging, and eternal (Crisis, p.135)." They have to be adhered to regardless of the conditions or the consequences of action in accordance with them, whether pleasure or pain. In the final analysis they are vehicles to God realization.

Ideational law is "viewed as given by God or the Absolute (Crisis, p.146)." Its provisions are regarded as the commandments of God, and therefore, they are absolute dictates which demand strict compliance and they stand as unamendable. Their wisdom and justice cannot be doubted. The purpose of Ideational law is to facilitate union with God by providing a code of behavior in accordance with God's will and by providing purification for all those who transgress God's laws.

In summary, ideational culture is a unifed system whose major features follow from its attitude that true reality is supersensory, superrational, and essentially spiritual. An example of this type of culture would be the cultural epoch that occured in Europe between the sixth century and the twelveth century A.D.. A contemporary example of an ideational culture (or at least an attempt to create one) is Islamic Iran.

Sensate Culture

Sensate culture is premised upon the attitude that reality is sensory, that knowledge of true reality can only be gained by empirical means. From this mentality follows the nature of the major systems that comprise the Sensate culture.

Sensate Art. The purpose of sensate art is to produce a refined sensual enjoyment. "Its style is naturalistic, visual, even illusionistic, free from any supersensory symbolism (Crisis, p.33)." Its subject matter is the everyday world of the senses, "empirical man, empirical events and adventures, empirical portraiture (Crisis, p.32)." Realism is its dominant feature.

Sensate Truth. "Sensate truth is mainly the truth of the senses (Crisis, p.86)." Empirical testimony is the supreme source of validity, without it an experience or proposition is illusory or meaningless. The sensate system of truth denies any supersensory reality or value. What cannot be empirically verified simply does not exist. Consequently, the emprirical, scientific disciplines are dominant. Philosophy becomes dominated by empricism, positivism, materialism, and it takes on an analytic orientation. Since truth is derived through the senses, relativism is ubiquitous.

Sensate Ethics and Law. The aim of sensate ethics is to "increase the sum of sensate happiness, pleasure, utility, and comfort. . .(Crisis, p.136)." The rules of such a system are "not absolute but are relative, expedient, and changeable, according to the persons, groups, and situations involved (Crisis, p.137)." They are man-made, and if they do not serve to increase happiness, they can be discarded.

The aim of sensate law is the protection of person and property, the maintenance of peace and order, and the establishment of happiness within the society at-large, or at least, within the dominant group which enacts and enforces the law (Crisis, p.152). The norms of the law are man-made, relative, changeable, and conditional. "Nothing eternal or sacred is implied in such a system of law (Crisis, p.153)."

In summary, the features of sensate culture follow from its attitude that reality is sensory. We presently live in a sensate culture. Every aspect of our culture is permeated by the sensate mentality, from art, philosophy, literature, politics, our advertisement dirven economy, mass media, relativistic ethics, to the "American Dream."

Idealistic Culture

Idealistic culture is premised upon the attitude that ultimate reality is a mixture of the supersensory and the sensory. As with the two other types of culture, the major features of idealistic culture follow from its own mentality. In the following discussion the features of an idealistic culture following from the mechanical type of mixture will be reviewed. The type of idealistic culture that follows from the integral theory of truth will be discussed in a later section.

Idealistic Art. Idealistic Art lies in between ideational and sensate art as a general form of art. Its style is "partly symbolic and allegoric, partly realistic and natural (Crisis, p.34)." The world it depicts is partly supersensory and partly sensory. Although, it only depicts the "sublimest and noblest aspects of sensory reality (Crisis, p.33)." "Its emotional tone is serene, calm, and imperturbable . . . it represents a marvelous synthesis of the ideational and the noblest forms of sensate art (Crisis, p.34)."

Idealistic Truth. Idealistic truth in its mechanical form is the "truth of reason (Dynamics, p.228)." Its main method is deduction and dialectic, but supplemented by both reference to the senses and to scripture. However, the primary judge of truth is human reason and logic.The great rationalist philosophers are primary examples of this system of truth (e.g. Descartes). Ultimate reality from this perspective

is thought to be knowable through the power of human reason.

Idealistic Ethics and Law. Idealistic values are a synthesis of ideational and sensate ethical norms. Idealistic ethics views the highest value as God or the supersensory Absolute, while at the same time that it positively views those sensory values that are noble and do not contradict the Absolute. A good example of this position is the following statement made by St. Thomas Aquinas: "The perfect happiness of man cannot be other than the vision of the Divine essence (cited in Crisis, p.137)."

Idealistic law again is the synthesis of the ideational and the sensate. It concerns itself with the sensate values of protection of person, property, and the pursuit of happiness, while at the same time it seeks its foundations in absolute values.

In summary, the features of the idealistic variety of culture follow from its dominant attitude that reality is knowable primarily through human reason, supplemented by empirical and scriptual knowledge. Idealistic cultures in the history of Western civilization have been hailed as golden ages, there have been few but they have had a notable influence (e.g. ancient Athens at its peak). With an understanding of the prominent features of the three types of culture in view let us turn to a discussion of the principles that explain their fluctuation throughout the history of the West.

Dynamics

Sorokin maintains that there are three possible ways of viewing sociocultural change. One can view change as either linear, cyclical or variably recurrent. For Sorokin change is a process of movement, modification, transformation, alteration, or evolution a logical subject undergoes "in the course of time, whether it be a change in its place in

space or as modificaton of its quantitative or qualitative aspects (Dynamics, p.53)." This process can either be linear, cyclical, or variably recurrent.

The linear view perceives the direction of change as limitless, as never undergoing any repitition but progressing in a straight line which is unique at every point. Any process that is unique at each stage of development is necessarily linear (Dynamics, p.61-62). An example of a linear view of social change is the conventional version of history given in the "Ancient-Mediaeval-Modern" framework that views the history of Western civilization as a linear progression from a less civilized to a more civililized state.

In contrast to the linear is the cyclical view. The cyclical view posits that change is recurrent. That is, the direction of change runs circularly, in that "the last phase of a given recurrence returns to its first phase, and the cycle begins again, traversing the same route through which it has passed before (Dynamics, p.62)." Hence, from the cyclical perspective, the patterns of change are forever repeating themselves in recurring cycles. An example of this view is the East Indian theory of time which views the history of the universe as unfolding in three recurring cycles or "yugas."

The third view is what Sorokin refers to as the "variably recurrent" theory of social change. From this perspective, "historical and social processes incessantly undergo ever new variations of old themes (Dynamics, p.63)." This theory maintains that many processes progress in a linear direction for some time, but sooner or later this trend reaches its limit,and then the process turns to a new path. However, there exists a limited number of fundamental forms that a sociocultural unit can turn

into. Consequently, the fundamental forms of culture recurr throughout time, but this recurrence is only in the fundamental form (i.e. the three types of culture discussed above) and not in all the various accidental properties of the culture. That is, the basic type of culture, defined by its mentality, recurrs, but there are variations to this common theme. For example, Ancient Rome in its decline and our contemporary culture are both Sensate, but they are not identical. It will be worthwhile to go into the principles of change at some length.

The Principle Of Immanent Causation. Sorokin suggests that there are three theories that explain change: an externalistic theory, an immanent theory, and an integral theory. The externalistic theory suggests that a sociocultural system is in a state of static equilibrium and only an external force can cause it to change. On the other hand, the immanent theory maintains that change occurs due to the system's own forces and properties. The integral theory is a combination of the two.

Sorokin concludes that the forms, phases and activities of a system are "determined mainly by the system itself, by its potential nature and the totality of its properties. [He adds] the totality of the external circumstances is relevant, but mainly in the way of retarding or accelerating the unfolding of the immanent destiny [of the system] . . . but these circumstances cannot force the system to manifest what it potentially does not have; to become what it immanently cannot become; to do what it immanently is incapable of doing (Dynamics, p.639)."

Sorokin argues that due to this principle of immanent causation a social system "will inevitably be worn out, modified or transformed (Dynamics, p.652)." From this perspective, it is inevitable that a particular social system will peak in its growth and then decline when it

has reached the limit of its inherent creativity. Thus, a culture may progress linearly for some time, but it eventually reaches a limit, thereby forcing it to redefine its basic premises. However, there is a limited number of possible forms it can assume.

The Principle of Limited Possibilities of Change. Sorokin argues that an unlimited possibility of change is not feasible due to the fact that for a system to have an unlimited possibility of change it would have to be able to become anything, thereby becoming radically different to the degree that it would become unidentifiable. In order for change to occur there has to be some central identity that is constant; an unlimited change would be equivalent to replacing the system with a totally new one, thereby causing the cessation of the original system. Sorokin concludes: "For these almost axiomatic reasons, practically any system must have and does have limits to the range of its change. The limits transgressed, the system disappears (Dynamics, p.654)." Consequently, "the number of fundamental new forms, patterns, and appearances the system can assume is limited and bound (Dynamics, p.654)." Having assumed all possible forms, the system either ceases to exist, or it repeats one of the forms it has already passed through. Therefore, sociocultural systems "display recurrent qualitative, quantitative, spatial rhythms, turns, patterns, forms, [etc.] (Dynamics, p.654)."

However, this recurrence is never completely identical with all the characteristics of the preceeding or even the following recurrences. It is only identical in its esential traits but not necessarily all of its accidental properties (Dynamics, p.673). Sorokin argues that this "variably recurrent" pattern of sociocultural change is due to the principles of limited possibilities and causation, but he points out that

there is an even more fundamental reason.

The deeper reason for variably recurrence is that each major sociocultural type (Ideational-Sensate-Idealistic) is premised upon partial truth. It would be worthwhile to quote Sorokin at length here.

> [T]he super-rhythm [Ideational-Sensate-Idealistic] studied seems to be possible only under the condition that each of the three main systems of truth and reality -- and the corresponding form of culture -- is partly true and partly false, partly adequate and partly inadequate. Only because each of them contains a vital part does it give to its human bearers the possibility of an adaptation to their milieu -- cosmic, organic, and social; gives them a minimum of real experience to meet their needs; and serves as a foundation for their social life and culture. But because each of the three systems has also an invalid part -- error and fallacy side by side with truth -- each of these systems leads its human bearers away from reality, gives them pseudo knowledge instead of real knowledge, and hinders their adaptation and the satisfaction of their physiological, social and cultural needs . . . The moment comes when the false part of the system begins to overweigh its valid part. Under such conditions, the society of its bearers is doomed either to perish, or it has to change its major premise . . . and with it, its system of culture. In this way the dominant system prepares its own downfall and paves the way for the ascendence and domination of one of the rival systems of truth and reality, which is, under the circumstances, more true and valid than the outworn and degenerated dominant system. The new dominant system undergoes again the same tragedy, and sooner or later is replaced by its rival . . . the recurrence of our super-rhythm of Ideational-Idealistic-Sensate systems of truth and reality, and of their corresponding system of culture, becomes not only comprehensible but logically and factually inevitable. The only alternative to this inevitablility is the perdition of the society and culture. Such is the deeper reason for the 'why' of the super-rhythm studied (Dynamics, p.681-682).

In summary, each one of the systems of truth, ideational, idealistic, and sensate, alone do not give one a complete understanding of reality. Reality is holistic in that it is sensate (material), spiritual (immaterial), and open to rational comprehension. Any view that perceives reality as only sensate, spiritual, or rational is necessarily limited to partial truth. Consequently, due to the prinicple of immanent causation and the principle of partial truth a cultural system that is premised upon

one of these systems of truth will eventually exhaust its necessarily limited potential and will have to shift to one of the other systems of truth in order to survive. Hence, we have a fluctuation of the major types of culture throughout history.

Sorokin maintains that the current sensate epoch has reached its peak and is in a state of decline. He argues that most of our soical problems are signs of this decline (e.g. widespread drug abuse, the rise of totalitarianism, facism, moral decadence, etc.), and he felt that due to the technological advances that have been made in this sensate epoch, which on the one hand have resulted in the enrichment of human life, and on the other hand pose a severe threat to the very existence of human civilization. He felt, as many theorists have, that the unprecedented technological advancements of our present epoch, which find their basis in the sensate mentality, have outpaced our ethical sensitivity. Consequently, Sorokin strongly believed that it was imperative that our next cultural epoch be premised upon complete truth characterized by creative altruism.

Creative Altruism

Sorokin believed that we face two possible futures: either we shift to a sociocultural system premised upon a system of integral truth and an ethic of love, or we will perish. He took it upon himself to find a way to ensure peace in the face of the declining sensate epoch, for the outbreak of another world war would mean the total destruction of human civilization. Sorokin maintained that a lasting peace "cannot be achieved without a substantial increase of love, sympathy, and free cooperation in overt relationships of persons and groups (3)." He wrote: "Through the universal practice of love, hatred, antagonism, and injustice would be

eliminated, and abiding harmony would prevail throughout the entire human universe (Reconstruction, p.42)."

This universal practice of love is what Sorokin refers to as "creative altruism." Creative altruism is defined as action that is freely chosen, performed for its own sake apart from any considerations of pleasure or utility, and motivated by love for others (unselfish concern for the well-being of others) (Reconstruction, p.58-59). Sorokin distinguishes creative altruism from the more common conception which views it as a blind and passive submission to the will of another person which merely fuels the egoism of the recepient. From Sorokin's perspective genuine altruism is inherently creative; it has a profound transformative and enriching effect on the recepient and his enivronment. Consequently, he views such action as one of the highest, if not the highest, creative acts a human being can perform (Reconstruction, p.57-64).

Creativity in any field is contingent upon knowledge or truth; the degree of truth that one possesses determines the degree of creativity that one can express. This is true for art, music, science, philosophy, or any other field of human endeavor, including altruism. Therefore, genuine creative altruism must necesarily be based upon complete truth rather than partial truth. Sorokin maintains that taken separately each one of the three systems of truth, empiricism, rationalism, and mysticism, reveals only partial truth. He states:

> The organs of the senses, not controlled by reason or intuition, can give us but a chaotic mass of impressions, perceptions, sensations, incapable of applying any integrated knowledge . . . Likewise,

---

(3) Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Reconstruction of Humanity. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948, p.54. All further references to this work are cited in the text in the following form: (Reconstruction, p.xx).

> mere dialiectic speculation cannot guarantee to us any valid knowledge of empirical phenomena. It can give us unimpeachable syllogism or a mathematical deduction, but such a syllogism or deduction will be empirically valid only when its major and minor premises are empirically valid. And this empirical adequacy cannot be derived from and by the truth of reason. Finally, intuition uncontrolled by the truth of reason and the senses goes very easily astray, and gives us an intuitive error instead of the intuitive truth. Each of these sources and systems of truth misleads us much more easily when it is isolated from, and unchecked by, the other sources and systems of truth than when it is united into one integral whole with the others (Dynamics, p.691-692).

Hence, the integral system of truth provides a more adequate knowledge of reality than any one of the three forms taken separately, and is therefore "nearer to the absolute truth than any one-sided truth of one of these three forms (Dynamics, p.690)." Thus, it follows that creative altruism, being one of the highest, if not the highest, forms of human creativity, must be based upon the integral system of truth.

To explain this further, Sorokin maintains that the human psyche is composed of four levels: (1) the Unconscious which is comprised of the instinctive drives, inhibitions, and actitivites of the human being, (2) the Bioconscious which signals the conscious awareness of biological need (e.g. hunger), (3) the Socioconscious which consists of the "conscious sociocultural energies, activities, egos, and roles," and (4) the Supraconscious which is the transcendental, "Divine" dimension of the human psyche (4). Sorokin maintains that the Supraconscious is the "fountainhead of the greatest achievements and discoveries in all fields of human creative activity: science, religion, philosophy, ethics, law, the fine arts, economics, and politics (Love, p.98)." This level of the psyche is inherently egoless (Love, p.99) and is characterized by a pure

---

(4) Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Ways and Power of Love. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1954, p.84-89. All further references to this work are cited in the text in the following form (Love, p.xx).

and wise love which embraces the "whole of humanity and the whole cosmos (Reconstructuion, p.63)." The direct non-sensory appprehension of the Supraconscious is experienced as a "mystical" union with the absolute non-changing, spiritual dimension of life, sometimes referred to as the "God" within. It is the direct experience of the Supraconscious which forms the mystical system of truth and which is the fountainhead of creative altruism, but, just as other forms of creative inspiration springing from the intuition of the Supraconscious need to be supplemented by empirical knowledge and reason in order to be manifested into concrete achievement, the universal love unleashed through the realization of the Supraconscious must also be supplemented by empirical knowledge and reason in order to be translated into direct and transformative action. Consequently, creative altruism is premised upon the integral system of truth. The more one realizes the truth of this system, the greater one's capacity for creative altruism. However, although the integral system of truth is a necessary condition for creative altruism, it is not a sufficient condition.

The remaining condition for creative altruism is the social environment. Sorokin held that a culture, its social instituitions, and the personality of its citzenry are causally and logically integrated. He writes: "These three aspects constitute an indivisible trinitiy bound together by the ties of causal and meaningful interdependence. Hence, any important change in one of these aspects of a group is usually followed, sooner or later, by a corresponding change in its other two aspects (Reconstruction, p.94)." Consequently, Sorokin asserts:

> altruistic individuals cannot be reared in a milieu of egoistic culture and social instituions. Conversely, an altruistic culture and altruistic social instituitions are incompatible with egoistic members . . . Thus, if we wish to eliminate wars and establish a creative altruistic order, we

> must modify simultaneously our culture, our social institutions, and the personality of our citzenry in an altruistic direction (Reconstruction, p.95).

Given the principle of logical integration, the only way to achieve this transformation is by altering the major premise of the culture from which its character is derived. As Sorokin asserts: "Since the superstructure of such a socioculutral system is built upon its major premise, a rational change of the entire system in a desirable direction must concentrate first upon this major premise . . . the replacement of the major premise by a more desirable one leads automatically to a corresponding transmutation of the entire system (Reconstruction, p.99-100)." It can be inferred that just as individual altruism is premised upon the realization of integral truth, the creation of an altruistic social order must also be premised upon the integral system of truth. As Sorokin put it:

> The major premise of sensate culture must be replaced by the broader, deeper, richer, and more valid premise that the true reality and value is an infinite manifold possessing not only sensory but also supersensory, rational, and supperrational aspects, all harmoniously reflecting its infinity . . . A culture built upon such a premise effectively mitigates the ferocity of the struggle for a greater share of material values, because material values occupy in it only a limited place and not the highest one. A large proportion of human aspirations tend to be channeled in the direction of the rational or the supperrational perennial values of the Kingdom of God, of fuller truth, nobler goodness, and sublimer beauty. The very nature of these values is impersonal and universal, altruistic and ennobling. As these values are infinite and inexhaustible, the quest for them does not lead to egoistic conflict. Hence, the replacement of the major premise of sensate culture by the fundamentally different one which I designate as the idealistic premise, is the most fundamental step toward the establishment of a creative, harmonious human order (Reconstruction, p.107-108).

How can the major premise of our sensate culture be changed from the sensate to the integral system of truth? Sorokin felt that education had

the potential to be one of the mainsprings of such a change.

Education

Sorokin maintains that ideally education should achieve three goals: (1) the development of wisdom, (2) the development of character, and (3) social selection on the basis of principle.

Sorokin points out that today the curricula of our schools are mainly devoted to intellectual training and the transplantation of "miscellaneous bits of information" from teacher to student. The tendency, especially on the college level, is to produce standardized specialists "rather than original creators (Reconstruction, p.152)." Not surprisingly, given the fact we in live a sensate culture, the knowledge base of today's curricula is overwhelming empirical. Rationalism and the development of the powers of logical, ciritical thought which render insight are, for the most part, sacrificed for the transference of empirical information. Curricular components devoted to the development of spiritual experience are totally absent.

Sorokin argues that in order for education to contribute to the development of an altruistic social order, it "must imbue the students with a sense of true wisdom, which [he adds] is infinitely more practical in the long run than most of the so-called 'practical' theories of our time (Reconstruction, p.153)." "True wisdom" for Sorokin is the realization of the integral theory of truth. He does not specify curricular changes, but it follows from his theory of integral truth that a curriculum devoted to the development of wisdom would incorporate the three systems of truth into one unified whole. Such a curriculum would presumably entail specialization in an empirical discipline, supplemented by a "broad general education making students the inheritors, users, and

guardians of the immortal values of human culture in all its fields (Reconstruction, p.153)," and spiritual exercises, forms of meditation and other "spiritual systems of man's transfiguration" that would enable the student to experience the supraconscious dimension of his pysche. Such a curriculum would enliven the student's "creative genius;" it would provide the knowledge base for the development of creative altruism (Reconstruction, p.153 and p.215-216). However, in accordance with the principle of integration, this knowledge base must be supplemented by a social climate that would reinforce the development of creative altruism.

Sorokin maintains that the family is "the first and most decisive molder of the personality and conduct of children (Reconstruction, p.149)." The second most powerful molder is the school. He argues that proper education can reinforce sound family upbringing, and it can also overcome, to a large degree, family education that is defective.

Sorokin argues that our contemporary schools are permeated by competition and a utilitarian ethic which breed egoism rather than altruism (Reconstruction, p.150-151). He writes: "Such an atmosphere breeds, for the most part, a cynical, nihilisitc, amoral, asoical horde (Reconstruction, p.106)." To develop altruism the social milieu of the school must be changed from a competitive to a cooperative climate.

Sorokin maintains that, just as individuals are altruistic in varying degrees, organizations can be placed along an altruistic continuum. At one end is a social climate that is completely competitive (e.g. the New York Stock Exchange), at the other extreme is the ideal altruistic type of social organization. Sorokin describes this type of organization as being a "co-operative organization free from every competitive element, with the widest scope for its altruism, and

exhibiting the most intense, the purest, and the wisest forms of love . . . (Reconstruction, p.65)." The degree to which the social climate of a school can approximate this ideal is the degree to which it can mold the character of the student toward creative altruism.

Finally, Sorokin maintains that the "selective role of the schools is as important as their educational function (Reconstruction, p.149)." He argues that in our present cultural epoch the selective criteria of our schools are defective. Presently, our schools cannot distinguish between those individuals with highly developed characters and those with "egoistic, cynical, and weak characters (Reconstruction, p.152)." In fact, he suggests that the schools tend to promote those with defective characters to the upper strata of society. In addition, Sorokin argues that the schools "favor the standardized technicians (known as 'competent researchers,' 'precise scholars,' 'excellent organizers,' 'popular leaders of public opinion,' etc.) rather than creative geniuses; pretentious mediocrities rather thaan modest but competent persons; cynical go-getters rather than sincere and honest 'solitudinarians' (Reconstruction, p.152)." The result of defective selection criteria is that "leaders" are selected that are incapable of coping with the social problems of the day, and who are incapable of leading the society toward creative altruism and peace (Reconstruction, p.153).

In summary, an educational system that was capable of (1) developing true wisdom through a curriculum based upon integral truth, (2) molding the character of the students toward creative altruism through a cooperative social climate, and (3) selecting leaders in all fields on the basis of true creative genius and sound character would be a profound force in redefining the premises of our "overripe" sensate culture and

transforming it in the direction of harmony and peace. However, it can be argued tha if culutre, society, and personality are all integrated, and if the schools are publicaly controlled, then it will be very difficult to institute such a curriculum in schools controlled by a sensate public. Therfore, it seems that it would be very difficult for public education to be a mainspring for a change in major premises. But perhaps private schools could institute an integral curriculum, and through their outstanding example, influence the public in the desired direction. The political problem has plagued most, if not all, educational innovators.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Sorokin's theory of sociocultural change posits a level of cultural integration that transcends the exclusively causal and linear theories of social change widely acclaimed today. The apparent "unpopularity" of Sorokin's theory may itself be evidence of the sensate mentality dominating at present. However, regardless of theoretical perspective, it is apparent that our contemporary epoch is in a state of decline. Whether we view this decline as the end of capitalism, the rise of bureaucracy, or as cultural lag, or as the final stages of a sensate culture, I believe it is imperative that we re-examine the basic values of our society. In the final analysis, Sorokin provides us with the foundations for a penetrating and thought provoking re-examination.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

VICE AND VIRTUE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A FORGOTTEN ISSUE

David B. Annis
Ball State University

We are discussing no small matter, but how
we ought to live--Socrates

I. INTRODUCTION

Professional ethics, as it applies to higher education, has tended to be a neglected area. Although there exists the American Association of University Professors' Statement on Professional Ethics, and a few disciplines within academia have formulated ethical codes, the professional ethics of higher education certainly has not received the extended discussion that medical and legal ethics has received.[1]

One need only examine a few issues of the National Law Journal (a weekly newspaper for attorneys) to see that professional ethics receives considerable attention in the legal profession. Examining the pages of the Hastings Center Report (a journal concerned with ethical issues in medicine, the life sciences, and the professions) reveals that ethics as it applies to health care providers also is treated very seriously. But look at the Chronicle of Higher Education. Unprofessional conduct may be described or reported in its pages, but rarely is there any discussion of the professional ethics of higher education or what it requires. When you think about this for a moment, it is somewhat shocking. It suggests that academicians do not take the professional ethics of higher education seriously.

Public interest in professional ethics, however, has increased in recent years. Dramatic scandals such as Watergate in part explains this. The consumer rights movement also has sparked a greater interest. As the public has become

more assertive of its rights, and less tolerant of inadequate service, it has demanded better conduct of professionals. In addition, the public's growing dependence on professionals has made us more concerned with their conduct. As society has become more complex and technology has advanced, we have come to rely more on professionals to help maintain our health, and our legal, financial, business, and political affairs. This growing dependence has increased the power of professionals and made the public more vulnerable, and also more wary.[2]

II. THE NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Ethics deals with what acts are morally right or wrong, what our moral obligations are, what the conditions are under which we are morally responsible for our acts, what moral rules or principles are justified, what traits or dispositions are morally good or bad, that is, virtues or vices, what things are desirable from a moral point of view, and related issues.[3] Professional ethics deals with the same issues only it examines them in terms of one's professional role or the role of a profession in society, for example, what acts are right or wrong given one's professional role, what are one's professional obligations, etc.[4]

In assessing conduct, whether it is in our professional lives or our everyday, non-professional life, we may use a variety of ethical principles. Utilitarianism requires us to consider the consequences of our actions on human welfare. Does our conduct harm individuals or does it benefit them? Surely this is a relevant moral consideration when evaluating a person's conduct. Deontologists such as Immanuel Kant stress the principle of respect. Human beings have intrinsic worth, are ends-in-themselves, and are never to be

treated as a mere means. The Golden Rule would have us treat others in the way we wish to be treated. Principles of justice are also relevant when evaluating conduct. Are we treating similar cases in a similar way? Are we basing our decisions only on relevant criteria? Is there discrimination involved? Are we violating someone's rights? Have people been given equal opportunity?[5]

If we look at various occupations, some can be categorized as unskilled (hauling trash, sweeping streets), skilled (a tool and die maker), and some may be viewed as professions. Not all occupations that are categorized as professions share the same features, but there are several traits that are central.[6]

First, a profession requires knowledge of a fairly large body of specialized and interrelated or systematized information. Second, because of the necessary knowledge, extensive intellectual training and education involving higher-level cognitive functioning is required. Although certain physical skills may be acquired, the stress is on intellectual skills. Third, the practice of the profession is essentially intellectual in nature. One is required to apply the specialized body of information and general principles to diverse situations, to use the specialized knowledge and skills to make warranted inferences and solve problems within the profession. Fourth, the knowledge, skills, and resulting services provided by the practitioners are important to society. They serve important interests of individuals, as well as the public good. Without the medical and legal professions, without engineers, architects, business and financial consultants, many of our individual and common interests would suffer greatly.

The above traits are central to an occupation counting as a profession. Other common features (which may be usual but not necessary) include an

organization of the members, a certification process, and promulgation and enforcement of a code of professional ethics.

A career in higher education as a faculty member satisfies the four defining traits of a profession. It requires extensive intellectual training to acquire the skills and specialized body of knowledge relevant to one's discipline, and the central tasks of a faculty member are intellectual in nature. The communication of that knowledge, the development of skills in students, and the discovery of new knowledge serve important individual and public interests.

A number of issues in higher education are clearly recognized as ethical in nature, e.g., sexual harassment, discrimination, academic dishonesty, etc. Other issues have ethical dimensions, but may not be perceived as such. For example, student admission or faculty tenure criteria may be viewed as "purely academic" issues. To achieve academic excellence, what should our selection criteria be? But these issues clearly involve ethical questions. Providing equal opportunity has been an important public commitment in our society. And access to higher education is frequently important for achieving authority, power, wealth, etc. Highly selective admission criteria result in many young people being denied these opportunities. Is this morally justified or not? The issue of who to teach is thus at least in part an ethical question.[7]

As a matter of fact, higher education abounds in ethical issues. There are ethical problems in research such as the use of research subjects, the consequences of research, honesty in research, the balance between teaching and research, etc. There are also moral issues in teaching, e.g., who to teach, what to teach, problems of evaluating students, cheating, student-faculty relations, and many more. University-faculty relations is a rich domain of ethical issues. Just think of university governance, hiring,

evaluating, promoting, and paying faculty, and the allocation of resources to departments. University-student issues such as admission procedures and criteria, financial aid, disciplinary rules, and the fees to be charged also involve moral questions. Relations between the university and the wider public and the state and federal governments is another source of ethical problems.[8] What is hard to believe is that one could look at a university and fail to see that most important questions facing such an institution involve ethical considerations. And yet this is exactly what we have done! It is as if we are morally blind when it comes to questions involving higher education.

III. SOME COMMON REQUIREMENTS OF PROFESSIONAL CODES

One common feature of professional codes is the commitment to heightened standards of conduct. For example, the American Bar Association highlights "its goal of assuring the highest standards of professional competence and ethical conduct."[9] The Code of Ethics for Engineers states that "engineers must perform under a standard of professional behavior which requires adherence to the highest principles of ethical conduct...."[10] And the Code of Ethics for social workers affirms that the "social worker should maintain high standards of personal conduct..." and "the highest standards of professional integrity."[11] Furthermore, many of the codes require not merely adherence to the highest standards of conduct, but that one avoid even the appearance of any impropriety.[12]

These codes thus do not promote minimalism, the idea that one need only satisfy requirements of minimally acceptable behavior. Instead professionals are to be judged against high standards, standards that require more than the minimal. For example, in our ordinary dealings with people, we do not always

have to be diligent to provide accurate information. But in our professional role we may be required to do so. Again, in our everyday life, we may be able to talk fairly freely about our dealings with people. But in our professional capacity we may have to be much more careful about confidentiality.

There are several factors that make it reasonable to hold professionals to high standards of ethical conduct. First, as already noted, professions provide important or vital services to the public. Second, the professions also tend to have a monopoly on the services provided, so that others outside the profession may not provide the service. Third, professions are frequently self-regulating. The profession may control standards for admission and promulgate and enforce the professional code. Given these three conditions, if the professions were not held to high standards of ethical conduct, it would have a detrimental impact on the welfare of the public. There are thus good utilitarian reasons for imposing high standards. We also can justify this requirement from a contractarian point of view. Society has an important stake in the delivery of professional services. If society grants monopolistic and self-regulatory power to the profession, a reasonable condition of this grant is that the profession be held to high standards of ethical conduct in the delivery of these services. This seems to be a fair exchange that reasonable parties might agree to.[13]

A further argument for high standards is based on trustworthiness. Professionals usually have greater expertise within the profession than their clients. We trust professionals to provide us with accurate information, to carefully analyze problems, to recommend good solutions, etc. The nature of the relationship between the professional and client requires trust. Given how vital the professional service may be, being worthy of our trust implies living up to high standards of professional conduct.[14]

Essential to professional codes is a commitment to competence.[15] Without such a commitment, professionals would not be worthy of our trust. Competence implies that one has the necessary knowledge and skills. It also implies that one will continue to study, learn and enhance one's knowledge and skills to remain competent. A failure to keep abreast of new information in one's field or specialty, may involve not only a violation of professional ethics, but it also may constitute negligence or malpractice. For example, it has been held that it is malpractice for an attorney not to do legal research or to keep up on recent court rulings.[16] Many professional codes explicitly require that one only perform work that one is competent to do. Hence, if one does not have the required knowledge or skills, one must either acquire it or refer the client to a professional who is competent in the problem area.

Being diligent--actively, promptly, and carefully performing one's professional tasks--is closely related to, but distinct from competence. One can possess the requisite knowledge or skills, be competent, and yet fail to diligently pursue one's tasks.

Many professional codes call for diligence. The ABA's Model Rules states that "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." And it adds, "Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented that procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness."[17]

In response to complaints about the failure to be diligent, professionals frequently respond that they are under time pressures. When the pressure of

time is due to a failure to effectively manage time or to taking on too many clients, this is not a justified defense. Some codes have explicitly noted this. Thus the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes states, "It is a basic professional responsibility of an arbitrator to plan his or her work schedule so that present and future commitments will be fulfilled in a timely manner."[18]

Most professional codes require practitioners to protect the confidentiality of client information.[19] But few codes require professionals to communicate with clients so they are informed. This has been a major issue in medicine. Although the American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics does not include a duty to inform the patient, the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council requires informed consent.[20] The ABA's Model Rules requires lawyers to "keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."[21] But it is one of the few codes that imposes a duty of communicating with the client.

The failure to communicate violates client autonomy, frequently causes harm to his or her interests, and fails to show respect for the client. Hence, the duty of reasonable communication should be part of professional codes.

Another common, but by no means universal requirement, is the duty to report official misconduct.[22] Since professionals frequently have a unique expertise that lay people do not have, the professional is often in a better position to be aware of professional misconduct. Hence, a system of peer reporting may be necessary, if a profession is to be adequately supervised. Self-regulation certainly requires some kind of peer reporting system. This is clearly justified by utilitarian and contractarian arguments, and by considerations of trustworthiness. The ABA has acknowledged that self-regulation requires such reporting.[23]

IV. THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Institutions of higher education have a variety of goals. A survey of college and university mission statements reveals a commitment to excellence in teaching, research, and public service. Providing a liberal education, with its attendant goals of improving critical thinking, creativity, problem-solving skills, increasing understanding of one's culture and other cultures, etc, is frequently stressed. Offering vocational and professional programs to meet the needs of society, and enhancing the quality of life through research are also included as typical goals.[24]

Some of these goals have intrinsic value. One of the traditional justifications of a liberal education is that acquiring such knowledge is valuable in and of itself.[25] Obviously several of the goals in addition have high instrumental value. Having well educated people maximizes overall welfare. These goals also satisfy several Kantian moral notions such as respecting individuals, enhancing autonomy, and developing the potential of people.

Let's apply some of the common requirements of professional codes to higher education. Given the almost universal commitment to heightened standards of ethical conduct to be found in professional codes, one would expect it to be part of a code for the academic profession. But while the AAUP Statement on Professional Ethics notes that the professor is to hold before his or her students "the best scholarly standards of the discipline," there is no commitment to high or the highest standards of ethical conduct.[26] The National Education Association's Code of Ethics of the Education Profession explicitly endorses this requirement.[27] Given the importance of the goals of

higher education, the academic profession should be held to heightened standards, and there should be the additional commitment to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

If faculty are to be held to heightened standards of review, what are some of our research and teaching obligations? Many colleges and universities require faculty to do research, but is this a reasonable requirement from the point of view of a professional code of ethics? Professional codes must include a commitment to competence. This implies that one has the necessary knowledge and skills, and that one maintain one's competence. One can hardly help students master a body of knowledge and acquire the skills relevant to a discipline without continued study to keep abreast. Hence, the competence requirement, applied to the teaching goal, implies that faculty are required to do scholarly work. I doubt that faculty would dispute this, but on occasion at least, one wonders just how seriously this obligation is taken.

Should the academic profession in addition require faculty to make original contributions and extend knowledge in the discipline? If faculty teach graduate courses or even undergraduate courses to advanced students in the discipline, it is hard to believe that faculty could be on "the cutting edge" of their discipline and not be engaged in original research. At the advanced level, one is not simply presenting information, but is critically evaluating it, proposing different perspectives, etc. It is unlikely one could do this without engaging in original research.

Furthermore, maintaining one's competence in a field may imply engaging in original research. Maintaining competence does not simply mean keeping informed. Usually there are a variety of skills associated with a discipline. For example, philosophy requires using logic to carefully evaluate arguments and conceptual analysis to explain and clarify concepts. Among other things,

philosophy involves keen analytical skills and good imagination. Part of graduate education in philosophy is the development and sharpening of these skills. They are developed through use, and the claim I want to make is that they are maintained through use, so unless one engages in original research, it is doubtful that one is maintaining his or her competence.

Although the AAUP Statement on Professional Ethics does not explicitly mandate original research, it does come very close to such an endorsement. It states, "The professor, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advancement of knowledge, recognizes the special responsibilities placed upon him. His primary responsibility to his subject is to seek and state the truth as he sees it. To this end he devotes his energies to developing and improving his scholarly competence. He accepts the obligation to exercise critical self-discipline and judgement in using, extending, and transmitting knowledge."[28]

Many academicians view faculty who do original research as model or ideal faculty members. Faculty who do not engage in such research may still be viewed as satisfactory or even good. But the argument above implies that faculty doing original research are not acting beyond the call of duty; they are simply acting in a professional way, a way that is to be expected. And faculty who do not do original research are acting unprofessionally.

The competence, diligence, and communication obligations have a number of implications for teaching. Wilbert McKeachie, in his well-know book Teaching Tips: A Guidebook for the Beginning College Teacher, discusses a number of issues to help faculty be good teachers. In his chapter, "Countdown for Course Preparation," he states that "The first step in preparing for a course is the working out of course objectives, because choice of text, the selection of the type and order of assignments, the choice of teaching

techniques, and all the decisions involved in course planning should derive from your objectives."[29] But how many of us bother with goals or are careful about them? And think about textbook selection. Research shows that the text is a major influence on what students learn. "There is no substitute for detailed review of the competing texts for the course you are teaching."[30] Again, how many of us are diligent when it comes to textbook selection?

Preparing tests, grading and returning them, and assigning grades are additional responsibilities we have. But it is doubtful that faculty satisfy their obligations in these areas. There is a large body of scientific information on testing and grading, and yet most faculty have never had tests and measurement courses. Constructing a good test and grading it reliably are not easy tasks. But without knowing the scientific information readily available, our chances of doing these tasks competently is quite low.

The diligence and communication obligations imply that we should return tests and papers promptly, that we should inform students how they are doing in the course, and that we explain to them the basis of our evaluation, so they do not just receive a grade on a paper with or without terse remarks.

The argument is not simply that good teachers do these things, so that those who do not are poor teachers. The point is that these are professional obligations. Failing to do these things means that we are acting unprofessionally, unethically. We do not satisfy the conditions necessary to be worthy of the public trust.

Faculty excuse their behavior by citing lots of demands on their time—doing research, refereeing manuscripts, service responsibilities, advising students, teaching, etc. But part of what we expect of a professional is an effective manager of time. If our lack of promptness is due to being an ineffective manager, that is not a justified excuse. If we are truly

overworked, then we are obligated not to take on so many responsibilities. When a lawyer accepts so many clients that he or she cannot zealously represent their interests, that is unprofessional conduct. A university may impose too many responsibilities on faculty; if so, then the university bears at least some responsibility for causing the unprofessional conduct, and it should be held accountable.

A common feature of the professions is a fair degree of autonomy or individual discretion in the person's work. Practitioners typically exercise a high degree of individual judgment. This is certainly true in the profession of higher education. But wide discretion also may lead to ethical problems, a failure to live up to one's professional responsibilities. The trick of course is to allow the needed autonomy to perform teaching, research, and service activities, but to ensure responsible conduct. To find that fragile balance requires considerable discussion by the academic community.

The above initial examination includes some of our duties with regard to research and teaching . But there are many more obligations that we have in higher education. If we are to take our responsibilities seriously, there must be more discussion of what our professional obligations are. Silence on the issue bespeaks too loudly, and what it says is we care not.

NOTES

1. American Association of University Professors, Statement on Professional Ethics, 1964. This is reprinted in Codes of Professional Responsibility (ed.) Rena A. Gorlin (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1986) p.183-184. This book is very useful to anyone wishing to examine the ethical codes developed by various professions.

2. Michael Bayles, Professional Ethics (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1981). The Ethics of Legislative Life, A Report by the Hastings Center (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, 1985), p. 4f. Bruce Jennings et al., "The Professions: Public Interest and Common Good," Hastings Center Report 17(1987):3-10.

3. An excellent introduction is William Frankena's Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979).

4. Bayles, Professional Ethics. Alan H. Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980).

5. For a discussion of utilitarianism, Kant's theory, and principles of justice, see Frankena's Ethics.

6. Bayles, Professional Ethics, p. 7-8. John M. Rich, Professional Ethics in Education (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1984).

7. See George M. Robinson and Janice Moulton, Ethical Problems in Higher Education (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985) for a discussion of student and faculty selection criteria.

8. Robinson and Moulton, Ethical Problems in Higher Education, and Steven M. Cahn, Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986) discuss many of these issues.

9. American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1983, p. xi, hereinafter cited as ABA Model Rules.

10. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, p. 257.

11. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, p. 162.

12. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, Arbitration p. 6,7,8, Judiciary p. 31, Government p. 200, Banking p. 252.

13. For contractarian approaches to professional ethics see Bayles, Professional Ethics, and Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics.

14. See Ch. 4 of Bayles' Professional Ethics for a discussion of trustworthiness.

15. ABA, Model Rules, p. 3, Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, Dentistry p. 88, Medicine p. 101, Psychology p. 140, Nursing p. 156, Social Work p. 163, Accounting p. 238, Architecture p. 246, Engineering p. 258.

16. Victor Levit, "Malpractice: The Tactic is Prudence," The National Law Journal, May 23, 1988, p. 17-22.

17. ABA, Model Rules, p. 4.

18. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, p.22.

19. See the codes in Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility.

20. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, p. 121-122.

21. ABA, Model Rules, p. 4, 5.

22. ABA, Model Rules, p. 33, Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, Dentistry p. 88, Medicine p. 101, Social Work p. 167, Government p. 197, Engineering p. 257, Real Estate p. 272.

23. ABA, Model Rules, p. 33.

24. Look at any of the undergraduate catalogs from the University of Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio State, Illinois, Brown, Cornell, Harvard, Princeton, etc.

25. David B. and Linda F. Annis, "The Nature, Value, and Purpose of Liberal Education." Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, (eds.) Michael Smith and Joel Williams, (1983): 14-28.

26. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, p. 184.

27. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, p. 191.

28. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility, p. 183.

29. Wilbert McKeachie, Teaching Tips: A Guidebook for the Beginning College Teacher (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1986), p. 8.

30. McKeachie, Teaching Tips, p. 12.

A RESPONSE TO

"VICE AND VIRTUE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A FORGOTTEN ISSUE"

(Presidential Address, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society
by David Annis, Ball State University)

ARTHUR BROWN
Wayne State University

Dave has moved into an area which I agree requires study as well as action. Higher education, as we all know, has become an exceedingly important sector in our society. For one thing, it is very difficult to "make it" in this world without a degree. Hence more students of both traditional and non-traditional age are attending college. Further, it's to the advantage of a student to receive a degree from a prestigious college or university. Hence, the tuition costs in such institutions have risen astronomically. And institutions of higher education by virtue of their research capabilities as well as their educational function are regarded more than ever as of prime importance to the economic welfare of the state and the nation. As a consequence of all these factors -- and others I am sure -- ethical problems associated with higher education have become more numerous, more complex, and more public. A glance at almost any issue of the Chronicle of Higher Education is illustrative.

None of us, I am sure, would derogate professionalism. Of course we should treat our students with respect. Of course we should try to keep up with the literature. Of course we should be diligent about performing

our duties. Of course we should be doing some research and writing, etc., etc. Although particular ethical problems may not lend themselves to easy resolution, I think that, generally speaking, academicians know what their duties are. The question is: Why do we sometimes act unprofessionally? That question no longer is simply an academic one (if you'll pardon the pun), discussed privately in our offices or over lunch. For, thanks to people like Allan Bloom and William Bennett, criticisms of the professoriate and institutions of higher education are now part of public discourse and have become the latest phase of education bashing. The most recent such criticism is to be found in a book entitled, ProfScam: Professors and the Demise of Higher Education. Charles J. Sykes "examines the professor-as-villain." [1] He claims that professors are neglecting their students in order to work on meaningless research, turning them over to incompetent teaching assistants, and pursuing narrow and selfish interests. Professors, he says, "are politicians and entrepreneurs who fiercely protect their turf and shrewdly hustle research cash as they peddle their talents to rival universities, businesses, foundations, or government." [2] Much of what I have quoted of Sykes is probably accurate. But before I venture into that problem, I should like to look at Dave's position on competence.

Competence, he says, "implies that one has the necessary knowledge and skills. It also implies that one will continue to study, learn and enhance one's knowledge and skills to remain competent," etc. But, he continues, "Being diligent -- actively, promptly, and carefully performing

one's professional tasks -- is closely related to, but distinct from competence. One can possess the requisite knowledge or skills, be competent, and yet fail to diligently pursue one's task."

Now Dave can stipulate any definition he wants for the word "competence," but I would suggest that when he makes a sharp distinction between the attribute competence and the action which attends it, he is contributing to much of the mischief that follows from such a distinction. For example, it is not uncommon for people to be deemed competent by virtue of possessing certain knowledge or skills, who are remarkably inept in human relations; and relating to others is an essential part of their professional responsibilities. Thus, in the case of one regal, silver-tongued, but unsuccessful university president it was a never ending source of consternation among some of my colleagues that his performance did not conform to his appearance -- let alone his credentials. "But," they would lament, "he looks like a president." (My answer was, "What about Menachim Begin?")

Another example of mischief caused by distinguishing between competence and performance is the rationalization of the testomania which plagues the nation. The public is apparently convinced that a standardized test reflects competence and predicts performance. Consider, for instance, the view that since only 3% of Texas teachers failed a pen and pencil test, 97% must be competent. An obviously absurd conclusion. And on the predictive nature of tests or grades, consider the conclusion drawn by John Baird who in 1985 published a comprehensive review of studies on the subject, entitled "Do

Grades and Tests Predict Adult Accomplishment?" [3] "In general," Baird points out, "the studies demonstrated low positive relationship between academic aptitude and/or grades and accomplishment." (And, even more disquieting, one of the reasons for the low positive relationship, Baird claims, "is the statistical inadequacy and unreliability of criteria [for accomplishment].") [4]

I would contend then, that to be competent means more than having the requisite knowledge, skills, and dispositions; it means also performing competently, just as to be moral means to act morally. If that is not the case, competence is like Ryles' "ghost in the machine" or like Kohlberg's bag of virtues, something to be toted around without any relationship to reasoned action or envisioned consequences. My favorite passage in this regard is from Dewey's Experience and Education:

> The only freedom of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of judgment exercized (my italics) in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worthwhile. [5]

The distinction between competence and performance takes me back to the question I posed earlier: Why is it that we sometimes act unprofessionally notwithstanding the fact that we possess the requisite skills and knowledge and even know what our duties are? In dealing with that question, I should like to consider the relationship between the performance of professors and the policies of institutions, a matter which Dave does not take up but

about which I know he is concerned. For purposes of illustration, I should like to cite Paul Weaver who recently wrote The Suicidal Corporation. Weaver reviews his disillusioning years as an executive at Ford:

> . . . I had big problems with Ford's policy positions right away. We almost never said publicly what we actually thought about the merits of an issue. Instead we concocted positions we hoped would rig relationships with our customers, suppliers, or competitors in our favor . . . .
>
> The Machiavellianism that poisoned Ford's dealings with the government, I found created problems inside the company too . . . . Some colleagues lied routinely yet were never punished . . . .
>
> . . . . .
>
> It took me a while to put the pieces together. But I soon understood that by working at Ford I was witnessing people betraying themselves and their neighbors in pursuit of personal advancement and corporate advantage . . . .
>
> . . . . .
>
> I also began to see issues in my own life that paralleled those in the corporation -- and a habit of doing things i didn't care about to get ahead or to please others. I also saw hypocrisy in myself. [6]

Where I am going, I believe, is obvious. Professors are not immune to the cultural influences of the institutions in which they work. What can we expect by way of professional integrity when the policies of institutions are such that they create a climate of mendacity and of special privilege? When faculty and departments and colleges are pitted against one another? What can we expect when faculty feel disrespected?

When institutional policy is made in disregard of well known principles of organizational management? Or in disregard of available research or on the basis of no research at all?

I need not in this forum elaborate, but let me simply mention a few institutional policies which have a corrupting influence and may well constitute the major source of the professional behavior criticized by Sykes: the growing emphasis on publishing; centralization of authority and governance; big time athletics; merit pay systems which foster deceit and divisiveness and are often characterized by arbitrariness and politics; enrollment driven budgets; an obsession with grants and contracts; cozy relationships with business and industry and government officials; and excessive competition for state funds and for students. I am sure those of you in this audience could add many more items to the foregoing list.

In sum, if it is the case that there are serious and growing problems these days with professional behavior among academicians, we would do well to examine carefully the character of our institutional structures and policies. Professional morality cannot be separated from institutional morality.

END NOTES

1. Chronicle of Higher Education, November 2, 1988, p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Research in Higher Education, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 3.
4. Ibid., p. 7.
5. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1938, p. 61.
6. New York Times, October 2, 1988, Section 3, p. 3.

JANUSZ KORCZAK AND SELF-GOVERNING SCHOOLS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY[1]

by
Ronald Swartz
Professor of Education and Philosophy
Oakland University
Rochester, Michigan

> The man of the future will be astonished to find that we used cut flowers to decorate our apartments. And used animal skins for carpets..they will lament over our primitive systems of education.[2]
>
> Tommorow I shall be sixty-three or sixty-four years old. For some years, my father failed to obtain my birth certificate. I suffered a few difficult moments over that...It is a difficult thing to be born and to learn to live. Ahead of me is a much easier task: to die...I should like to die consciously, in possession of my faculties. I don't know what I should say to the children by way of farewell. I should want to make clear to them only this - that the road is theirs to choose freely.[3]

I. Remembering Korczak as a Self-Governing Educational Theorist

Janusz Korczak is often remembered as an eccentric Polish Jewish medical doctor who ran an orphanage for Jewish children in Warsaw from 1912 until he died as a martyr in the summer of 1942 when it is said that as a sixty-four year old emaciated victim of ghetto life he was killed by the Nazis as he led nearly two hundred of his half-starved charges to their death in the gas chambers of Treblinka. And in recent years Korczak's work as an experimental educational reformer has been documented by well-known scholars such as Bruno Bettelheim[4] and Lawrence Kohlberg.[5] Moreover, interest in Korczak's educational views may eventually receive greater attention in English speaking countries now that Betty Jean Lifton has written her widely reviewed book, The King of Children: A Biography of Janusz Korczak.[6] Although Lifton's book at

times provides "numbing details"[7] which distract from the general themes of Korczak's life and work, it is nevertheless the case that The King of Children is a gold mine for information about a facinating and remarkable twentieth century educational reformer and theorist.

In this brief essay I do not intend to offer a comprehensive account of Korczak's educational perspective. On the contrary, this paper should be seen as a preliminary report which explains how Korczak's educational work is part of a critique of conventional educational programs which consider it desirable for young people to be governed by the dictates of teachers and other adults who are placed in positions of power and authority in a society and a school. In contrast to this conventional model of educating young people, Korczak and a few other twentieth century educators such as Homer Lane, A.S. Neill, and Paul Goodman have argued for a self-governing approach to education which allows children to be personally responsible for making major decisions about what is learned in school; the self-governing educational philosophies that have evolved in the twentieth century have not had a significant impact on the way most individuals view educational programs for the young, but in spite of this fact Korczak's work at his Orphans Home in Warsaw does provide one of the best case studies of a self-governing learning environment that was able to remain in existence for nearly thirty years.

For an excellent summary about how Korczak's views on self-government were integrated into his life and educational philosophy it is worthwhile to recall that Bettelheim once wrote the following:

> Henryk Goldszmit was born on July 22, 1878, in Warsaw, the grandson of a well-known physician, the son of a successful lawyer. The family, although Jewish, had been well assimilated into Polish society. When Henryk was eleven, his father went insane; he died seven years later... As a young student, he once introduced himself as the "son of a madman who was determined to become the Karl Marx

> of children" - that is, even then Goldszmit was convinced that children must have the right to govern themselves, and he devoted himself to their liberation. To achieve his goal he went on to become a pediatrician... When he was twenty, he entered a literary competition under the pseudonym Janusz Korczak, the name he kept for the rest of his life... He gradually became well known throughout Poland for his writings, his skill as a pediatrician, and his radio talks and lectures on how children ought to be treated...With no children of his own, he took responsibility for hundreds of them...In order to act on his conviction that children should come first, when they are all too often put last, he became in 1912, at the age of thirty-four, the director of an orphanage for Jewish children in Warsaw. In 1919 he added to his work by becoming co-director of a Catholic orphanage.[8]

Korczak's outrageously grandiose goal to become the "Karl Marx of children" was coupled with the extremely radical idea that the human rights of youngsters should be guaranteed and protected by a "Magna Carta of Children's Rights."[9] The rights Korczak envisioned for children would make it possible for young people to have the kinds of freedoms similar to those found in the American Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Thus, Korczak's dream for the liberation of children incorporated ideals from German, British, American, and French political theorists. Moreover, prior to being killed by the Nazis, Korczak was acutely aware of the fact that during his lifetime his dream of a world of free children had lost ground as the Nazis daily denied his orphans all the rights included in his Magna Carta. Yet, as he spent his days scrounging the death cluttered streets of Warsaw for food, clothing, and shelter for his children, Korczak somehow kept his dreams alive. At night he would often write about his plans for new projects that would hopefully help to make his dreams come true; in his Ghetto Diary Korczak tells of his desire to write books for children about the lives of people such as "Pestalozzi, daVinci, Kropotkin, Pilsudski, and a few dozen more."[10]

The books Korczak wrote and planned to write were a significant part of the method he used to approach his utopian dream of a world where a "child has a right to be himself or herself."[11] And although Korczak's dreams were often viewed as extremely impractical in light of the world around him, it is nevertheless interesting to note that for nearly thirty years he was able to convince intelligent Jewish philanthropists that he was a responsible institutional administrator who should be given the kind of financial support that eventually made the Warsaw Orphans Home a model self-governing learning environment which was visited by "a constant parade of foreign officals and educators."[12] Those who came to the Orphans Home often heard Korczak expound on how his educational experiment granted children the kind of human rights Western liberal political theorists have been fighting for since at least June 15, 1215 when a small group of British barons forced King John to sign a document that provided the foundation for the Magna Carta.[13] And Korczak's efforts to create educational programs guided by a Magna Carta for children have been described by Lawrence Kohlberg in the following manner:

> The orphanages that Korczak ran were prototypes of what in America in recent years we have called the "just community school." Korczak called his experiment a Children's Republic. It had its own parliament, court, newspaper, and work schedules. He saw these not only as embodying respect for the child but as the vehicles of moral education or education for justice....Of particular interest was the children's court, in which the rules made by the parliament were applied to individual cases. All children took their turn in serving as members of this court. Korczak hoped that children would learn through it to judge fairly... The court also functioned as a collective review of the individual's progress in the school, guided by a notion of ethical levels of contribution to the community. The children's court reviewed the progress not only of the children but also of Korczak and the other members of the staff in terms of these levels.[14]

Briefly put, during the second, third, and fourth decades of the twentieth century Korczak was a bold educational theorist who had the courage, intelligence, and political astuteness to contribute to the

creation of experimental self-governing learning situations for many of the Jewish and Catholic orphans of Warsaw. And, until he was killed by the Nazi in 1942, Korcak's crusade for the creation of liberal democratic republics for children was remarkably successful under social and political circumstances which often encompassed ideals that were the antithesis of the ideals which gave Korczak reasons for living and dying.

II. Reconstructing Korczak's Educational Problem

Should the self-governing liberal democratic ideals articulated in the Magna Carta and the works of Marx be used as a central part of an educational philosophy that guides learning in social situations which include young children and their adult caretakers? This question can be referred to as Korczak's educational problem; throughout most of his years as a social theorists and reformer it appears that at the heart of Korczak's thinking is the assumption that it is reasonable to offer an affirmative solution to his educational problem.

Most Western educational theorists since the time of Plato have not considered it desirable or reasonable to ask a question similar to Korczak's educational problem. In other words, for the last twenty-five centuries the dominate Western views about children have assumed that it is a mistake to consider questions which might lead to the creation of liberal democratic social institutions that grant children the kinds of human rights and freedoms given to the male Athenian citizens who lived during the Golden Age of Pericles. Moreover, when people have asked a question such as Korczak's educational problem, it is usually the case that they have endorsed the arguments in Plato's Republic which clearly imply that it is best to assume that children should not be given freedom;

those who follow in the tradition of Plato's Republic have rarely considered it reasonable or desirable to take seriously the possibility that young children should be given the opportunity to live in liberal democratic communities which allow all individuals the opportunity to be personally responsible for determining their own learning activites and many of the social policies that influence one's life.

Korczak's educational problem can be viewed as a challenge to the ideals outlined in Plato's Republic; the educational problem that interested Korczak seems to be an outgrowth of the liberal educational tradition that has its historical roots in the teachings of Socrates as he is described in Plato's Apology. However, not all Platonic scholars endorse the historical interpretation that the educational views attributed to Socrates in the Apology are distinctly different from the educational ideals advocated in the Republic. Thus, there is much room for debate about how to account for the intellectual origins of liberal and illiberal educational philosophies; in this paper I do not want to argue once again for the notion that Plato's monumental work is a reservoir for at least two contradictory educational traditions.[15] What I wish to suggest here is that Korczak's educational views seem to be inspired partly by the philosophical tradition that has evolved from those individuals who have been captured by the arguments and personal characteristics of Socrates as he is portrayed in Plato's Apology. And what is so remarkable about Korczak's work is that he continued to develop and advocate a liberal self-governing educational philosophy even while he lived under the rule of the Nazis.

As with Socrates before him, Korczak's life demonstrates that with courage, insight, luck, and hard work it is possible for educational theorists to function as autonomous individuals who can transcend the

political, social, and intellectual circumstances that dominate the way education is viewed in one's cultural milieu. Yet, though Korczak was an extremely creative and original educational theorist, it would be a mistake to assume that he was alone in his efforts to explain the connection between educational theory and the political tradition that includes the ideals of the Magna Carta and aspects of Marxism; in his efforts to understand the place of freedom in educational programs Bertrand Russell cleary saw the association between educational issues and political views when he noted the following:

> ...political liberalism has been connected with the belief in compulsory education, while the belief in freedom in education exists in great measure among Socialists, and even Communists. Nevertheless, this belief is ideologically connected with liberalism, and has the same degree of truth and falsehood that belong to the conception of liberty in other spheres.[16]

In short, whereas most liberal political theorists have not claimed that their ideals are relevant for social institutions which educate young people, it is nevertheless the case that Korczak, Russell, and a few other twentieth century educational philosophers have attempted to ask questions that make it possible to use aspects of liberalism in learning environments with children.

III. Searching for a Perspective on Korczak's Educational Views and a Preliminary Report About a Self-Governing Approach to Studying the Holocaust

Details about how to understand the historical and intellectual foundations of Korczak's educational philosophy must wait for another time. However, before leaving my preliminary discussion of Korczak's life and work I would like to make some brief comments on the final two sections of this paper.

The unpublished letter to the editors of The New Republic was my first

attempt to explain how Korczak's social reform efforts related to the work of other modern educational theorists. As I now see matters, this letter is a good place to begin the process of understanding that Korczak was indeed a participant in an international self-governing educational reform movement that is slowly being forgotten by most modern mainstream educational historians and philosophers. Yet, my claim that Korczak is a precursor to people such as A.S. Neill and Paul Goodman should not be seen as an attempt to engage in trival polemics about who is the most original self-governing educational theorist in the twentieth century; my views on intellectual precursors have been significantly influenced by Jorge Luis Borges who has claimed the following:

> In the critics vocabulary, the word "precursor" is indispensable, but it should be cleansed of all connotation of polemics or rivalry. The fact is that every writer creates his own precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past, as it will modify the future.[17]

The concluding section of this essay is a poem I once wrote about Nazi Germany. And after becoming familiar with Korczak's life and work I slowly began to realize that my poem "Numbers Not Yet Forgotten" provides a self-governing approach to the difficult problems associated with teaching and learning about the Holocaust. Furthermore, my poem can be seen as a critque and alternative to the teachings of people such as Elie Wiesel who seems to disagree with Korczak's idea that children should be allowed to "choose freely" the road they will take;[18] the self-governing educational philosophy advocated by Korczak clearly suggests that children should be given the option of forgetting about the Nazis, but for Wiesel adults should do everything in their power to deny children the freedom to forget. Wiesel's views in favor of teaching the young to remember the Holocaust were summarized when he claimed the following about forgetting:

...the Jews in my town refused to believe that men - even Germans,

> even Nazis - could commit crimes so odious, so monstrous... to forget is to make oneself an accomplice to the executioner... How could we speak of the unspeakable? How could we express the ineffable? The hunger of the old people, the death of children - that can't be recounted. And then there was also the fear of not being able to make oneself understood; what's the use of talking if it does no good? These inhibitions prevented the survivors from unburdening themselves. Some felt guilty because they remained silent; others because they did not...
>
> The danger lies in forgetting. Forgetting, however, will not affect only the dead. Should it triumph, the ashes of yesterday will cover our hopes for tomorrow.[19]

IV. An Unpublished Letter to the Editors of The New Republic

June 9, 1988

The Editors
The New Republic
1220 19th Street. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

To the Editors of The New Republic:

In her essay "The Saint In the Ghetto" (NR, June 6, 1988) Marie Syrkin provides important historical information that explains how Janusz Korczak contributed to the twentieth century movement which has attempted to liberate children from the clutches of "well-intentioned adults." Yet, Ms. Syrkin is mistaken about her claim that Korczak (1878-1942) was a contemporary of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827). Furthermore, Korczak's efforts to create a "children's republic" in 1912 where similar to the schools started by American educational reformers such as Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888) and Homer T. Lane (1875-1925).

Alcott is often remembered as the loving incompetent father of Louisa May Alcott, but during his lifetime he was called the "American Pestalozzi" partly because of his efforts to create a self-governing school in Boston that was a children's republic in embryonic form. As for Lane, he was a social reformer whose work has been almost totally forgotten by the majority of modern mainstream American educational theorists such as Diane Ravitch (1938-) who has written well known educational essays which include "The Schools We Deserve" (NR, April 18, 1981).

Although Ravitch and most other twentieth century educational historians have ignored Lane's work in their modern dialogues about the kinds of schools that are now needed in liberal democratic societies, it is nevertheless the case that a few individuals have noticed his educational reform efforts; when Lane's work has been remembered he is usually given a

great deal of credit for helping A.S. Neill (1883-1972) develop the educational philosophy which has guided Neill's school Summerhill since the 1920's. Moreover, Lane's contribution to the idea of making a school a republic for children is clearly documented by the work he did at the Ford Republic Reform School in Farmington, Michigan, during the first decade of this century. Also, Lane's ideas associated with granting children basic human rights that are given to citizens in republics such as the United States were further developed at the Little Commonwealth Reform School in Dorset, England.

Lane's work at the Little Commonwealth during the second decade of this century attracted the attention of well known liberal educational reformers such as Bertrand Russell (1872-1970). And in a number of ways Russell's educational essays often provide an initial attempt to solve problems suggested by educational programs which follow in the tradition of the Ford Republic, the Little Commonwealth, and Summerhill. Yet, it was not Russell who fully grasped the radical nature of schools which try to be republics. During the second half of the twentieth century the American poet and social reformer Paul Goodman (1911-1972) deserves much credit for his efforts to explain the modern significance of the educational philosophy developed by Neill, Lane and Russell.

Goodman had little or nothing to say about Lane's educational endeavors, but he did clearly suggest that "republics" such as Neill's Summerill provided the kind of schooling that is needed for children growing up in modern twentieth century societies; in a vast variety of essays which include his outrageous article "Why Go To School" (NR, October 5, 1963) Goodman argued for the creation of educational programs which follow in the tradition of Summerhill. And although it appears that Goodman was not familiar with Korczak's work, modern American educational theorists who have not yet forgotten Goodman's massive intellectual achievements will no doubt suggest that Goodman would likely claim that Korczak's Magna Carta for children is the kind of "medicine" which might provide a beginning "cure" for the many educational "diseases" that have helped to make modern schooling miseducative.

Briefly put, Korczak's educational views can be seen as part of a twentieth century international social reform movement that has failed miserably in its attempt to create numerous schools which function as republics for children. But, fortunately, the end of this movement does not yet appear to be in sight; with more efforts such as Syrkin's "The Saint In The Ghetto" we may eventually learn how to have educational programs that respect a child's right to live and die with the kind of human dignity suggested by people such as Lane, Neill, Russell, Goodman and Korczak.

Sincerely,

Ronald Swartz
Professor of Education and Philosophy

V. Numbers Not Yet Forgotten

It is written in the Torah: "And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil."...indeed every man can become

righteous man like Moses our master, or wicked like Jeroboam, he can be wise or foolish, merciful or cruel, base or noble, and so on in regard to all qualities. But there is none who forces him, none who determines him, none who draws him toward the one or the other of the two ways. It is he himself who, out of his own volition, turns to the path he wishes to take.[20]

I

During the year in which I celebrated the 25th
anniversary of my bar mitzvah

I somehow found myself at an airport in Florida
on Christmas day.

And with the hope of organizing the wiry gray hair
that is rapidly beginning to cover my head

I walked into a washroom where I saw a 60 year
old man raise his elbow in order to sprinkle
water on his face.

And as innumerable images flashed in the washroom
mirror before me I noticed that on the skin of
his ageing right arm someone had once tattooed
a small group of difficult to read little numbers.

II

As I looked at the series of small blue swiggles
before me

I tried ever so hard to remember the first time I
had seen a person

With those illegible tiny figures.

And as my mind wandered back through an infinite
labyrinth of forgotten memories,

I found myself once again in a cold winter storm strolling
home from Hebrew school.

III

During one of my numerous trips home from Hebrew
school

I remember stopping at a barber shop to get a crew
cut.

And as Jake the barber circled around me to clip
away at my hair

That was once as dark and wavy as the trunk of
an old elm

I had what I now think of as my 1st contact with
a victim of the Nazi Holocaust.

IV

On my way home from Hebrew school I would occasionally
stop at Jake's barber shop.

And when I was a young Jewish child of 10

Jake used a sharp pointed scissors to snip away
at my hair

As I eagerly waited to have a bar mitzvah which
would be celebrated nearly 13 years

After the last survivors from the concentration camps
had walked away from a death they had lived for years.

V

When Jake was nearly 50 years old his wrinkly
tattooed arm

Used to circle my head as my eyes tried ever so hard
to decipher the mystery of those little swiggles.

And out of the corner of one eye I would get a momentary
glimpse

Of that indelible blue ink that once rested in

A Nazi needle.

VI

Over the last quarter of a century I have come to
see fewer and fewer

Of those Jews who had once been branded by the horror
of the Holocaust.

But when I recently saw that man in an airport
washroom

I was reminded once again that Hitler more than Moses

Has influenced my decision to remain a Jew.

VII

One of the ironies of my life is that my Jewishness
owes much to the age of terror when the Nazis
reigned supreme.

And although it is somewhat peculiar to think that
Hitler and his henchmen and henchwomen

Have done much to encourage me to keep my membership
in the Jewish tribe,

I nevertheless realize that whatever spiritual inspiration
I have found in the dark corners of the maze I now visit

Has nothing to do with a belief in the God of Abraham
Isaac, and Jacob.

VIII

It is not the supernatural god of my forefathers that
makes me feel at home in the buildings where Jews
pray.

And when I now mumble along with others the sacred
Hebrew prayer, "Hear O Israel: The Lord our God,
the Lord is One."

I am acutely aware that my faith is that of an eternally
unredeemed Job

Who no longer sees the need to continue a divine
dialogue in a world where

The swastika carrying lackeys of the Nazi Death's-Head
units once plucked the eyes of children who died as
their mothers shrieked to a god with no ears.

IX

In the muddle which has become the Jewish tribe I now
walk with

The dwindling few who felt a Nazi needle pump warm blue
ink in their flesh

Belong to a small select group in a community
of outcasts.

And there is no way to measure the blessings of
those of us who have had the good fortune to
avoid having our arms stained by the diabolical
deeds of people who slobbered over the testicles

Of a small funny looking man with an unforgettable
mustache that Chaplin and Brooks have used in their
hilarious dances across celluloid.

X

People who have lived their lives outside the Nazi
horror can never know

What it was like to see the morning sunrise on a
clear cool Spring day in Dachau, Auschwitz, or
Buchenwald.

But in spite of the fortunate limitations of my life

I have often had nightmares about what it would be
like to spend a moment, a second, a minute, an
hour, a day, weeks, months, and years

In a concentration camp.

XI

In my Nazi nightmares which began decades ago as Jake
wizzed his arm over my head I am often standing naked
before a grizzly greasy Gestapo agent who sends me to
a dark deep pit

Where my head is shaved to the bone and I sit on a stool
clutching my genitals with my fingers as the fear of
castration tingles in every nerve ending of my body.

And while I anxiously wait for a hatchetman to sling his axe
there are blue veins popping from my skull as a gorgeous
Aryan woman pulls a hand from my groin.

And as every inch of my skin is shivering and shaking
the pretty blond lady of my dreams tries to puncture
my arm with a needle whose point is oozing with ink.

But before my Nazi foe can discolor my flesh for life I
usually find myself staring out into space with nothing
more serious to worry about than that damn wiry gray
hair that goes every which way.

XII

As my present problems consume my being

My mind recalls once again the silence I heard from
the survivor I saw one Christmas day.

And when I have stood next to Jake and others who
have felt the sharp Nazi needle, I am often terrified
by their silence.

It is their silence that has haunted me so on sleepless
nights

When I always fail to comprehend what happened.

XIII

In their silence they have told us more than words
can say.

And the faded blue figures tattooed on their flesh speak
of human atrocities that can never be uttered.

Yet, it is the living presence of their ink stained arms
which makes it so difficult to forget

That only 4 decades have passed since the time when

Jews were slaves in the land where Kant the great freedom
fighter once failed to conquer the powerful precursors of
the Nazis.

XIV

It was the silent screams of fear which echoed loudly in
my ears that Christmas day in Florida

When my mind travelled back to the moment my great
grandfather and his friends quietly strolled to a
"schul" in Lithuania.

And as they joyfully floated through the streets with
torahs under arms which were never to be discolored by
blue markings

They were accousted by the ancestors of the Nazis

Who washed their faces with grease from the forbidden
pig.

XV

It was not only memories of the dilemmas of the Jews
which cluttered my head

As the maddening sounds from airplanes reminded me
of the deaf god of my forefathers.

And as I watched the big silver birds defy their
god's gravity

I could not help thinking about my Christian friends
who were celebrating the birth of Jesus.

And in my mind's eye I saw the death of the last
person to see Christ die on the cross.

XVI

As my mind wandered to places where airplanes never go

I thought of the day when there would never again be a person who had seen the blue marks

On the arm of a terror stricken Jew who had once looked into the beastly eyes of a Nazi.

And ever so slowly I began to realize that when my bones are dust

There will come a moment when the sight of those blue numbers will be nothing but a memory for those who live where dreams and nightmares are interrupted with reality.

XVII

Children not yet born will someday have to decide if they wish to remember that human beings once murdered 6,000,000 Jews

In mock shower chambers where a deadly gas filled the air as parents and children slowly watched one another suffocate to death.

And the great great grandchildren of those who now suck at their mother's breasts may choose to send to oblivion

The memory of those gas chambers and novel Nazi ovens which roasted millions of human bodies

As the sky over the land of death acquired a stench that has lingered in the nostrils of the few remaining survivors who smelled the hot air of burning human flesh on a cold windy winter night.

XVIII

The turmoil of that chaotic day in a Florida airport is rapidly becoming but a scrap of memory

In a storage bin overflowing with much baggage that will never be unpacked.

And as I now quietly sit alone in my 5th floor office looking out a big picture window that shines on the side of an obscure university hall

My eyes are being blinded by rolling fields covered with a beautiful blanket of crystal white snow

Which will eventually nourish the roots of lovely Spring flowers that will sparkle in the Summer sun.

XIX

It is not the beauty before my eyes that attracts me so
as my head hangs over a piece of paper

Where blue ink from my pen brings to my mind once again
the memory of the Nazi needle.

And as a cold winter wind blows in my ears which are being
warmed by a life preserving gas

I cannot help myself from thinking about how the great great
grandchildren of those who romp in the snow with my 6 year
old daughter

Will handle the sorry tale of the day when thousands of
people proudly marched to the music of Wagner as human
hearts pumped blood that boiled in arms wearing the Nazi
swastika band.

XX

Nothing really draws the children of the future "towards
one or the other of the two ways" they might go.

It is they who must decide what to do!

Will some of them remember?

Or, will all of them forget?

Take your pick.

Footnotes

1. Excerpts from this paper were read at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society in Chicago, Illinois at Loyola University on Nov. 12, 1988. During the discussion period after my presentation I received helpful critical suggestions from the following individuals: Arthur Brown, Robert Craig, Lawrence Dennis, Walter Krolikowski, Michael Oliker, Richard Pipan, and Phillip Smith. Also, the early drafts of this essay were criticized by Leonardas Gerulaitis, Robert Stern, Marla Swartz, and Susan Swartz. I would like to thank all the individuals mentioned here for their interest in my work, but I of course must accept full responsibility for what follows.
2. Janusz Korczak, Ghetto Diary (New York: Holocaust Library, 1978), pp. 97-98.
3. Ibid., pp. 174-175.
4. See the following: Bruno Bettelheim, "Janusz Korczak: Champion of the Children,"Reform Judaism, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring, 1986), pp. 8-9 and 38; Bruno Bettelheim, "Introduction" in Janusz Korczak, King Matt the First, trans. Richard Lourie (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1988), pp. v-xiii.
5. See Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: The Vocation of Janusz Korczak" in his Philosophy of Moral Development (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1981), pp. 401-408.
6. See the following: Betty Jean Lifton, The King of Children: A Biography of Janusz Korczak (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1988); Geoffrey Wolff, "A Saint's Life in Warsaw," The New York Times Book Review, pp.16-17; Neal Ascherson, "A Polish Hero," The New York Review of Books (September 29, 1988), pp. 7-8; and, Marie Syrkin, "The Saint in the Ghetto," The New Republic (June 6, 1988), pp. 44-48.
7. Geoffrey Wolff, "A Saint's Life in Warsaw," p. 16.
8. Bruno Bettelheim, "Introduction" in Janusz Korczak, King Matt the First, pp. x-xi.
9. See Lifton, The King of Children, p. 46.
10. Korczak, Ghetto Diary, p. 86.
11. Lifton, The King of Children, p. 355.
12. Ibid, p. 75.
13. For an account of the signing of the Magna Carta see Winston S. Churchill, The Birth of Britain (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1961), pp. 177-189.
14. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: The Vocation of Janusz Korczak," pp. 403-404.
15. See the arguments in the following: Ronald Swartz, "Toward a Liberal View of Educational Authorities, " Teachers College Record, Vol. 78, No. 4 (May 1977), pp. 413-436; Ronald Swartz, "Student Choices and a Standarized Curriculum Reconsidered," Proceeding of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, ed. Michael C. Smith (published by the Society, 1984), pp. 63-78; Ronald Swartz, "Summerhill Revisited: Searching for a Perspective on the Life and Work of A.S. Neill," Educational Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1986), pp. 195-210.
16. Bertrand Russell, Education and the Social Order (London, England: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p.21.

17. Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths (New York: New Directions Books, 1962), p. 201.
18. See footnote three.
19. Elie Wiesel, "Forward" in Voices From the Holocaust, ed. Sylvia Rothchild (New York: New American Library, Inc., 1981), pp. 1-4.
20. Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, quoted in A Jewish Reader, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), pp. 65-66. Also, this poem is dedicated to the loving memory of my mother andthe sustaining love of my wife and daughter.

IS THERE A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO OBJECTIVIST THEORIES OF MEANING AND RATIONALITY AS A BASIS FOR CURRICULUM?
- A WORK IN PROGRESS -

Philip L. Smith
The Ohio State University
October, 1989

Richard Bernstein defines Objectivism as "the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, a historical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, goodness or rightness."[1] Following in the path of a recent work by Mark Johnson that attempts to critique Objectivism as the orthodox academic philosophy of our time, I would like to expand on this definition.[2]

Objectivism would have us believe a number of highly specific things about the nature of meaning.

1. Meaning is an abstract relation between symbolic representation (either words or mental pictures) and objective (i.e., mind-independent) reality. These symbols get their meaning solely from their capacity to correspond to things, properties, and relations existing objectively "in the world."
2. Concepts identify what things or objects there are, what properties they have, and what relations they actually or possibly possess. Concepts need to be highly abstract, well defined and relatively general in character so as to subsume what is common to a range of particulars. For instance, the concept "chair", in order to apply to all

chairs, must imply what qualities all chairs possess, and so incidentally is not a particular image of this or that chair.

3. Concepts are "disembodied" in the sense that they are not tied to the particular mind that experiences them in the way that, say, images are. The image I form of a chair is assumed to be particular, subjective, and embodied (in me), whereas my concept of a chair is objective and, therefore, floats free of any given embodiment. It is this abstract and general nature of concepts that makes them shareable as knowledge.
4. The task of a theory of meaning is to be able to explain the intelligibility of a string of symbols. To give the meaning of a particular utterance is to give the conditions under which it would be true, or under which it would be "satisfied" by some objective state of affairs in the world. What this presupposes is that we can build up and verify complex propositions from smaller ones already established understood as semantic premitives. On the added assumption that there is a relatively small number of basic logical connectives for relating semantic premitives (and, or, if-then, etc.), it follows that we can, at least in principle, state the conditions for the truth or satisfaction of any meaningful proposition (you might think of a computer program here).
5. Any analysis of meaning must be given ultimately in terms of literal concepts. In the last analysis there can be

no concepts that are metaphorical or figurative. This restriction is required by the Objectivist thesis that basic concepts identify objects, properties, and relations in the world that are completely independent of human perception or understanding. If they are to map definite, discrete and fixed objects, properties and relations, these basic concepts must themselves be definite, discrete and fixed, the very essence of what is literal. The problem with metaphors is that they project rather than map onto an objective world. Whatever pedagogical value they may have in helping us to understand that world, they always end up somehow distorting it.

6. It is important to notice that the Objectivist theory of meaning is compatible with, and supports, the epistemological claim that there exists a "God's-Eye" point of view that transcends all human limitations and constitutes a universally valid perspective on what is real. This would be the measure by which human comprehension is judged. When the concepts are the correct ones, they are said to stand in logical relationships as a matter of objective fact, regardless of how people might actually grasp them or organize them into systems.

Associated with the Objectivist orientation toward meaning is its correlative view of rationality.

1. Rationality is said to consist in the rule-governed manipulation of linguistic symbols. Its core is formal

logic. Using a limited number of "logical-connectives" (and, or, if-then, etc.) that determine how the elements of language might be related, concepts are joined together to form various kinds of propositions. There are also "rules of inference" for deciding whether or not the connections between propositions are valid.

2. As with the Objectivist view of meaning, so here, too, rationality is essentially disembodied. It consists of pure abstract, logical relations that operate independently of subjective processes in the reasoner's mind. Images, metaphorical projections, and analogical leaps may help the reasoner in making novel connections, thinking up new arguments, and drawing out conclusions from premises. But they are irrelevant to the logical reconstruction and evaluation of reasoned judgments.
3. This idea of a transcendent rationality also supports a God's-Eye-View account of knowledge. If human beings are ever to comprehend the truth, they must somehow "plug into" a universal, autonomous rationality that stands beyond all historical development.

My contention is that while Objectivism may not be subscribed to, or even understood, at a conscious level by most people, it remains, for both philosophical and political reasons, the dominant attitude in our society and in our schools, especially when it comes to matters of curriculum. The philosophical reasons have to do with a fear of relativism, the political ones with a fear of jeopardizing the status quo. My

focus here will be mainly on philosophy, but, since the two lists of reasons are not totally unrelated, I will also touch occasionally upon political concerns.

Objectivist views create a dual problem of reference and realism by stipulating a gap between what we experience, or think we know, and the object itself. In modern philosophy this is understood as the gap between concepts, proportions, meaning and words, on the one hand, and physical objects, events and natural causal processes, on the other. The problem of reference thus comes to be defined as a question of how objects of one (subjective) kind (objects of the mind, and of language) can possibly map onto objects of another wholly different kind (objects in "the world out there") in a completely unmediated fashion. The huge metaphysical wedge that is driven between these two allegedly distinct realms has never been adequately overcome by any formulation of Objectivism.

How can language, and scientific language, in particular, correctly map onto a purely objective reality? Logical Empiricists of a few generations ago sought to ground knowledge in both its formal mode, defined as the logical structure of scientific theories, and its material mode, considered to be the uninterpreted perceptual data that give scientific theories their content. But there turned out to be no "bare sensations" of the sort that could serve as useful foundations of knowledge. More recent formulations of Objectivism, exemplified in the work of philosophers like Saul Kripke, replace talk of "bare particulars" and "sense data" with a theory of objective

reference that offers very abstract and subtle arguments that, since science does in fact progress, we must be getting closer to the truth about the way things really are; and so, there must be some mapping relation that connects our language to the world. Because the growth of our understanding is undisputable (at least in science), reason compels us to believe that our language is tied to real objects. Human understanding, human intentionality, let alone human imagination, have nothing to do with it.

The problem with these more recent formulations of Objectivisms is that, their claims to reason notwithstanding, they are just as arbitrary as the earlier attempts. They transform our sense of being in a world that makes demands on us into the assertion that we have access to a God's-Eye perspective on a fixed reality. But what reason is there to believe that a God's Eye perspective is even possible for us, or that there is only one correct description of reality? Most assuredly, Objectivism has not provided any. So far all it has done is convert the interests and needs of certain individuals, classes, and societies into universal criteria for truth. Except in fields of limited technological application, the project of establishing an ahistorical, neutral rationality, and a theory of meaning and reference in which words can map directly onto objective reality in a totally unmediated fashion has been a failure.

However, here is the rub. Without an Objectivist metaphysical realism of some sort or another, the alternative

appears to be an "anything goes" relativism. And the problem with that is if there is any greater threat to our individual and collective well-being than an oppressive universal truth, it would seem to be found in a world where there was no truth at all.

The idea that there is a middle ground between Objectivism and extreme relativism has been around as a serious proposal since the inception of modern times and today is regarded as a staple of democratic thought. Our hero, John Dewey, was an ardent champion of this position, arguably the best ever. In philosophy over the past decade the idea of a middle ground has been advanced most impressively by a number of individuals, including Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, and Thomas Kuhn.

Putnam maintains that there is no useful or interesting distinction between how we understand an object as meaningful and what purely objective or intrinsic meaning that object may have. Objects are meaningful for us when we grasp them within some conceptual scheme, and except "for us" there can be no meaningful objects. Objects arise, along with the language we use to describe them, within a system of meaningful structures designed by a community to promote its interests, purposes, and goals. Objects and the language we use to refer to these objects are both internal to this system, and this is what makes it possible to say what matches what.

Understood in this way, Putnam calls himself a realist, an "internal realist." This allows him to adopt the powerful

authority of the Objectivist theory of truth, where statements are said to be true because they correspond to reality and false because they do not correspond to reality. Only that for Putnam this correspondence is itself relative to some culturally generated conceptual scheme that simultaneously defines and reflects our understanding of the world and the words we use to describe it.

By its commitment to objectivity within a relativistic and naturalistic framework, Putnam's philosophy, which on this score begins to look an awfully lot like Dewey's, is open to two diametrically opposed but equally powerful complaints. The first is that without Objectivism, or some form of hard-nosed metaphysical realism, objectivity is mere illusion. The second is that objectivity, however it is based, typically ends up being used as a club to beat people into submitting to somebody elses truth. Those who purport to be objective predictably show little tolerance for those with the audacity to take a different point of view. About the first complaint, Putnam says that since hard-nosed realism is simply an impossible portion to defend, we have no choice but to think of objectivity in other, more practical terms. About the second complaint, he maintains that he allows for, indeed requires, continual critique, both of what we call objective and what we mean by it. Should we grant him this claim? Some would be reluctant, for they would say that, as philosophers are inclined to do, he over-intellectualizes belief, that even more than Dewey he relies too much for his conception of critical reason on a

dehumanizing model of experimental science. Putnam, of course, would disagree with this charge. But rather than try to figure out exactly how he would deal with it, given that his work is intended to address highly intellectualized questions, we might do better by considering briefly Mark Johnson's work that explicitly focuses on how these matters of mind are affected by the human body. For Johnson, that we have conceptual schemes is not a fact about us out of the blue. We have them because, as organisms struggling to survive and flourish, we have found them useful in our environment, broadly conceived to include our history, cultural traditions, language, social institutions, morals and so forth. We do not impose arbitrary conceptual schemes upon this environment any more than design them simply to reflect a fixed, outside order. They are the product of an organism-environment interaction that transforms each of these components through an ongoing historical process.....(At this point both time and energy have left me. The most interesting part of this paper needs yet to be worked out.)

FOOTNOTES

[1]Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 196.

[2]Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[3]Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

The Classics, Progress, and the Future

David B. Owen
Iowa State University

Earlier this year I attended a discussion of Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind held by the Iowa Philosophical Association. (I suspect Bloom would view the descriptor "Iowa philosopher" as an oxymoron!) Of the fifty members in the audience, few were willing to defend Bloom. One thread of the discussion grew prominent: Bloom's book = the old University of Chicago College's fixed curriculum = Mortimer Adler's Paideia Proposal = Robert Maynard Hutchins = the Great Books = "the past" = conservatism = Reagan supporter! I know you have all heard these kinds of public discussions where the relation between premise and conclusion was logically laughable. Still no one in the audience that day took any exception to the substantive results. I came away disturbed: apparently it is commonly accepted that interest in the classics is necessarily a sign of political conservatism. Yet this idea violates both my personal experience and that of students in my classes.

I had a second experience related to this just a week ago at the annual meeting of the American Educational Studies Association in Toronto. There a presenter argued, so I gathered, that the Hutchins college taught one historical lesson, namely, that the "One Best Curriculum" fails to educate because it is inherently fixed, dictatorial, and unfree. Once more, because so much of the Chicago curriculum was based on classic texts, the classics came off as profoundly undemocratic. Again I came away from an intellectual discussion that deeply violated my experience and that of my students. Again I asked myself, "Why?"

In my paper and the conversation I hope it stimulates this morning, I want to explore this issue with you. It is, of course, only one small aspect

of a very large problem, namely, the relation between general and special, or liberal and technical, education. My purpose, in brief, is to question the apparently common assumption that reading and teaching "classic" texts is inherently conservative, anti-modern, and undemocratic.

You may have run into this issue as a result of the remarkably widespread controversy sparked by the recent publication of Bloom's book and E. D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy. Responses to both works have generally divided according to individuals' political orientation, with conservatives in favor and liberals and radicals opposed. A central issue in the critiques of both is the place of "classic" texts in American education. Conservatives tend to argue that such works contain the "wisdom of the ages" and are "the birthright of every citizen." Liberals and radicals, however, tend to argue that such works present a distorted view of knowledge--what I have come to think of, given the recent election, as the WEMP factor (white, European, male prejudice)--; that their use in education is fundamentally racist, elitist, sexist, anti-modern, and anti-intellectual; and that, therefore, "classics" have little or no place in education in a democracy.

At times, this educational controversy has appeared to be almost an "instant replay" of an earlier one between traditionalists and progressives. Like today, that earlier controversy was founded on both theory and practice. One representative exchange was that between Robert Maynard Hutchins and John Dewey in the Social Frontier in 1936-37.[1] In his reviews of Hutchins' The Higher Learning in America, Dewey found Hutchins' chief failing to be his

> conception of the nature of intellectuality or rationality. This conception is characterized by two dominant traits. The first .z.z. is belief in the existence of fixed and eternal authoritative principles as truths that are not be questioned.z.z.z. The other .z.z. [is that] the remedy [to current educational problems] is to be found in the greatest possible aloofness of higher learning from contemporary social life."[2]

Hutchins attempted to defend himself, but of his reply he wittily observed:

> This I am unable to do, in any real sense, for Mr. Dewey has stated my position in such a way as to lead me to think that I cannot write, and has stated his own in such a way as to make me suspect that I cannot read.[3]

For our purposes, one of the four main issues Hutchins focuses on is relevant. In connection with his proposals in The Higher Learning for teaching the classics, he observes,

> At least one-third of the books proposed for study in general education .z.z. are in the social sciences and history. The discussion of contemporary problems would of course be an integral part of the discussion of these books.[4]

I will return to this comment in a few minutes.

In 1944-45, an analogous exchange occurred between Dewey and Alexander Meiklejohn in Fortune magazine.[5] Dewey argued that attempts, such as Hutchins' at Chicago, to return to "the Greek literary model" was dangerous.

> The attempt to establish linguistic skills and materials as the center of education, and to do it under the guise of "education for freedom" or a "liberal" education, is directly opposed to all that democratic countries cherish as freedom. .z.z. It marks reversion to the medieval view of dependence upon the final authority of what others have found out--or supposed they had found out--and without the historical grounds that gave reason to the scholars of the Middle Ages.
>
> The reactionary movement is dangerous (or would be if it made serious headway) because it ignores and in effect denies the principle of experimental inquiry and firsthand observation that is the lifeblood of the entire advance made in the sciences .z.z.z."[6]

The opposition Dewey sets up takes the form of dualisms not only of tyranny versus democracy and culture versus science, as in the quotation just read, but also of a pair more explicitly related to my theme today, namely, of past versus present, the ancient versus the modern. For philosophy in general as well as for philosophy of education, Dewey states that the issue

> presents the difference between an outlook that goes to the past for instruction and for guidance and one that holds that philosophy, if it is to be of help to the present situation, must pay supreme heed to movements, needs, problems, and resources that are distinctively modern.[7]

Meiklejohn replied to Dewey four months later in December, 1944. He took the tack of referring to his personal experience at the Experimental College at the University of Wisconsin and to the recent experience of St. John's College in Annapolis. He makes two main points in his defense. First, he notes that St. John's students "devote one-half of the entire course of study to the learning of science and of mathematics as the 'language' upon which advances in scientific achievement are seen to depend," a course of study including four years of laboratory work.[8] Second, with regard to Dewey's argument that the dualism of fact and value leads inevitably to "'fixed' and 'static' ideas of value," Meiklejohn argues that

> when St. John's College turns to Homer and Plato to find a beginning for its study of the humanities, to Euclid and Archimedes to find a beginning for its study of the sciences and technologies, it is not looking to those writers for "the last word" on those subjects. It is looking for "first words." Its entire scheme of education is built upon the basic postulate that, from the time of the Greeks until the present, the knowledge and wisdom of men have been growing, that, with many losses as well as gains, they are still growing.z.z.z.
>
> As he follows the sequence of ideas the pupil will be confronted, not with one "static" set of dogmatic beliefs, but with all the fundamental conflicts that run through our culture. He will find Protagoras at war with Plato, Kant at war with Hume, Rousseau at war with Locke, Veblen at war with Adam Smith. And he must try to understand both sides of the these controversies. He is asked, first of all, not to believe, but to think, as a precondition of justifiable belief.[9]

I would like to note in passing that this topic of the uses of the past raised tempers uncommonly high back then just as it has done in the current controversy over Bloom and Hirsch. Even Dewey is most uncharacteristically acerbic in his comments on Hutchins in 1937:

> I would not intimate that the author has any sympathy with fascism. But basically his idea as to the proper course to be taken is akin to the distrust of freedom and the consequent appeal to <u>some</u> fixed authority that is now overrunning the world.[10]

And eight years later, although Meiklejohn found much "common ground" with Dewey and his disciples in the analysis of educational problems, the enduring

unpleasantness of the debate led him

> to make a suggestion. I wish that Mr. Dewey and his colleagues would not speak of those who differ from them as "challenging liberal thought" [Dewey's phrase]. .z.z. Why are we accused of conspiracy, of being agents of the American Association of Manufacturers, or even of the Nazi party? I, for one, do not "challenge liberal thought." I do challenge Mr. Dewey's analysis of it. .z.z. We have common problems to tackle. We can and should deal with them in terms of mutual respect and friendly cooperation.[11]

Something in the exploration of this issue seems particularly conducive to displays of ill temper, even among normally civil individuals like Dewey.

Since our present issue is about the past, let's go even farther back. The traditionalist-progressive debate just recounted is <u>itself</u> a reflection of an extremely old debate, namely, that between "ancients" and "moderns." This debate strikes to the heart of a central issue of knowledge and education, the relation of past and present. It has gone on explicitly since Socrates' questioning of existing traditions led to his trial and execution. His student Plato corrected Homer and the other poets of tradition in <u>The Republic</u>, and <u>his</u> student Aristotle exhaustively pointed out the errors of his predecessors, including his master (as in his rejection of the theory of forms in the <u>Ethics</u>, I, 6). And so on through the ages. A brief but extraordinarily stimulating review of the phases of this controversy appears in a paper entitled "The Battle of the Books" given by Richard McKeon at the 1966 Liberal Arts Conference at the University of Chicago College.[12] (In what follows, I want to explore several of McKeon's ideas that are relevant. I do this because I consider him my Master [and like Aristotle under his master, it took me 20 years to complete my graduate work--all you still working on degrees, have faith!], because I find his name and ideas have disappeared from educational discussion, and because I think his voice needs to be heard. This, then, is my first public attempt to reintroduce him.)

The title of McKeon's paper is "borrowed from Swift's An Account of a Battel between the Ancient and Modern Books in St. James Library, published in 1704."[13] Using Swift's mock-classic satire as his touchstone, McKeon structures the entire history of western thought in the form of a developing contest between continuously changing adversaries. He comments that the

> fundamental ambiguity in a battle of changing fronts and of regrouping contestants is in the identity of the opponents, that is, the recognition of the ancients and the moderns, the determination of what is established and what is new. It is not a simple question to be answered by calling classical scholars ancients and contemporary satirists moderns.[14]

He proceeds to generate a dizzying array of histories of the arts and sciences, ones pregnant with possibilities for recreating our understanding of the history of ideas and the problems of philosophy. He shows how at various times moderns have used ancient materials to defend their position, as in the Renaissance's use of Greece to make a new Italy, and how ancients have used modern techniques to defend the past, as in Swift's satiric use of the new philology to defend the distinction between religion and philosophy, faith and reason. A key element in these histories is the character of the central terms used. McKeon holds that

> All the important words, like "discipline," "art," and "science," are ambiguous precisely because what they stand for was in process of growth and transformation. To treat them as if they had a single meaning is to make the discussion a series of absurdities."[15]

He believes that "the battles of the ancients and the moderns mark the major stages in the development of Western Education and (what is the same thing) Western Culture and Learning,"[16] and they teach an important lesson:

> The old and the new, the ancient and the modern, as their names suggest, have no fixed and absolute marks, but are defined by methods used and subjects treated, under conditioning circumstances and facilitating knowledge, in which ambiguous questions relate matters which are unrelated in the unambiguous answers that are given successively to the questions. It is not a question of the relation of <u>the</u> humanities to <u>the</u> sciences but a question of the meanings of "humanities" and "sciences" under which the humanities are conceived and developed as

> sciences, and the sciences are practiced as arts, and sciences and arts are mutually exclusive, in the encyclopedia of learning.[17]

A central problem with the present form of this controversy, as is hinted at the quotations above, is our current conception of progress. We tend to take a positivist, Newtonian view of the growth of knowledge, one which leads to a tyranny of the contemporary and the mindless equation of novelty and goodness. Yet this approach is clearly problematic: one need only reflect on the disturbing consequences of recent discoveries and inventions, whether in physics, chemistry, biology, or the social sciences, for instance, those leading to nuclear reactors, chemical pollution, biological weapons, advertising and subliminal persuasion. Moreover, true novelty exists only in the context of the previously known.

In a short paper given at an international conference, entitled "Has History a Direction? Philosophical Principles and Objective Interpretations," and in extended subsequent comments on that paper,[18] McKeon presented some of his ideas on the nature of history. He distinguishes four kinds of history, only one of which supports the idea of progress in a simple, cumulative sense, one reflected, for instance, in the conventional view of science as progressing in such a fashion that previous experimental results and theoretic formulations have only antiquarian interest because they have been supplanted by newer knowledge. (An amusing, if disastrous, academic corollary of this is the attitude that articles represent work on the "cutting edge" of knowledge--I always wonder, "Who's getting knifed?"--and that books are <u>ipso facto</u> a demonstration of incompetence--they take <u>so</u> long to publish, you know!) McKeon characterizes this conception as growing out of "causal" history and gives an example from the history of philosophy.

> It is the characteristic of causal histories of philosophy to trace the line by which philosophy once constituted the whole body of sciences from which the sciences one by one were separated as they attained

> scientific precision, while philosophy remained at each stage the remnant of problems which were still unsolved or which had not yet been treated by a scientific method. Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy is such a causal history of philosophy. This conception of the subject matter of philosophy and of its relation to the sciences is not shared by any of the other forms of history.[19]

What are these "other forms" of history? He sketches the fourfold distinction among kinds of history in this manner:

> individual actions and social occurrences may evolve their meanings and connections [(1)] against a transcendental background of intelligibility and reality which gives them an organic unity [--this he calls "epochal" history--]; or [(2)] against the background of an underlying material structure--physical nature, human nature, "natural law," relations of economic production--which provide them with "elements" and "laws" [--this is the "causal" history described above--]; or [(3)] in the context of conditioning circumstances--biological, political, social, cultural--which give them circumstantial particularity [--this is "disciplinary" history--]; or [(4)] in an interaction of impulsions and repulsions which give them an operational schema [--what he calls "exemplary" history].[20]

Each of these four kinds reflects a distinct conception of historical change, what in these comments he refers to as "the direction of history." Here are the four, beginning with the epochal.

> The direction of history in epochal histories may follow stages of degradation from a golden age, of advancement to an ultimate utopia, of repeated cycles of initiation, fulfillment and decay, or of emergence of order from chaos under the impulsion of reason and necessity.[21]

Examples of epochal history include the histories of Plato, Augustine, Hegel, and Marx. Second comes causal history.

> Causal history gives prominence to the idea of progress, for some sequences are cumulative or progressive. The direction of history in causal histories may be random or progressive: the causal lines in transfer of political power are necessary, but the direction is random; while the causal lines in the accumulation and application of knowledge yield a direction or progress in knowledge and civilization, but paradoxical problems in the random use of knowledge and civility.[22]

Examples of causal history, besides Russell, include Thucydides, Lucretius, Hume, H. T. Buckle's history of England, Beard's economic history, and J. B. Bury's history of Greece. Third is disciplinary history.

> The direction of history in disciplinary histories opens out like a fan at each juncture, for the solution of a problem is not an end of the historical process but the opening up of new problems some of which will be treated in deliberative and purposive activities, and problems which are ignored or not solved are likewise the source of new problems.[33]

Examples here include Aristotle's histories, Theophrastus, Polybius, St. Thomas, and Dewey. Fourth comes exemplary history.

> The direction of history in exemplary history is determined by random interplays of external forces until they are coordinated by the initiative of a great man, or of a man who follows his examples, or by an institution which brings powers into limitations and balances for productive operation.[34]

Examples here include Isocrates, Machiavelli, and Mill.

To sum up, then, McKeon argues that historical change and the accounts of that change are not to be understood in any simple, univocal fashion.

> The direction of history is discovered neither a priori nor empirically. It is neither an abstract imposition nor an objective observation. It is determined by philosophic principle and empirical fact much as philosophy itself is."[35]

What does this long digression into the philosophy of history have to do with my original question, the place of classics in education in a democracy? My main intent has been to shake us loose from the currently conventional view of progress, one modelled after the "hard sciences" and reflecting viewpoints like Russell's, one which, if adhered to, does indeed necessitate the reduction of "classic" texts to literary, stylistic or antiquarian interest, simply because they represent "the past." If we can move outside that perspective, maybe we can begin to reconsider their fruitful use in our present considerations about future courses of thought and action.

Now my focus on McKeon has been neither adventitious nor the result of mere hero-worship, for he embodies precisely the imaginative use of the classics that I wish to present to you for your consideration. It has long been my suspicion that it was McKeon, as Dean of the Division of Humanities at Chicago from 1937 to 1947, who was the real intellectual architect of the so-

called Hutchins College, not Hutchins or Mortimer Adler, as the case is usually presented.[26] In a tribute to McKeon upon his death in 1985, Alan Gewirth of the Department of Philosophy at Chicago lent some support to my perception by calling him "the chief founder of the undergraduate College's 'core curriculum,'"[27] which in those days constituted virtually the entire undergraduate program. McKeon also was well known for editing The Basic Works of Aristotle[28] as well as for being a member of the "Chicago school" of literary critics whom R. S. Crane published together in Critics and Criticism, Ancient and Modern.[29] McKeon the Aristotelian, the supporter of Hutchins, the defender of the classics, right? Yes. McKeon the opponent of Dewey, right? No! McKeon saw himself as a disciple of Dewey! In his essay on "The Battle of the Books," he reveals,

> In my own contributions I have borrowed more from Dewey than from Aristotle, but the common borrowing may still have been "Aristotelian" since I am convinced that Dewey shares much with Aristotle if account is taken of appropriate neoteric transformations of a common method to changed circumstances.[30]

That unusual word "neoteric," which is opposed to "paleoteric," is a sixteenth- and seventeenth-century term used by the "moderns" of the period who were engaged in broadening the art of rhetoric to include all the arts and sciences. McKeon confesses, "I have always been a neoteric,"[31] and he contends, "The neoteric approach is to discover the new and the stimulating even in the familiar and the forgotten."[32] The lesson we need to learn for our purposes today is, in short, this:

> As in the past, it is not possible to distinguish a neoteric from a traditionalist by determining whether he reads and teaches ancient or modern books.[33]

Why read--and especially for us, why teach--the classics? Let me try three not unrelated arguments that I think differ a little from those normally offered. The first. The classics do not exist in any simple, univocal sense.

They do not carry their meaning on their face. They are a complex of ideas and actions and passions that presents an ambiguous, virtually unlimited opportunity for exploration, interpretation, and understanding. One need only examine in some detail the history of interpretation of any major work to see how true this is. It is a most frustrating, stimulating, and ultimately encouraging exercise. For instance, I have looked at the history of interpretation of Rousseau and found an unimaginably diverse set of views. Peter Gay has a nice summary.[34] He comments that most interpretations have focused on Rousseau's political work, and he distinguishes four types of views. One type of critic views Rousseau as a radical individualist; another sees him as exactly the contrary, an authoritarian collectivist; a third finds him to be an individualist who shifted in mid-career to collectivism; and finally, a fourth despairs of finding any coherence to his work, seeing him as only a confused, self-contradictory enthusiast. In terms of political philosophy, it is difficult to conceive of more widely divergent positions being attributed to one man. A second set of critics, however, Gay adds, have gone beyond the political writings to search for unity in Rousseau; among these he distinguishes <u>seven</u> different approaches used to account for whatever unity is found! Given such wildly divergent set of interpretations of any and every one of Rousseau's works, I have always appreciated the remark by one of our ex-MPES colleagues, Professor Harold Dunkel, who once wittily observed,

> books on Rousseau necessarily resemble the protocols obtained from the Rorschach or other projective tests: they are largely free creations of the author and probably tell us as much about him as about Rousseau.[35]

To return to my line of argument, then, calling someone a Platonist or a Rousseauan actually reveals little or nothing about the interpretation that individual makes of reality or human experience, other than saying he or she exhibits a tendency to look in certain places for interesting questions.

Reading Plato, in short, is not in itself a demonstration of political conservatism.

My point is that, given the richness of meanings in a classic work, it is an environment, a commonplace out of which many interpretations may grow. A true classic, in short, is a nontechnical stimulus to thought, to questioning, to active engagement with ideas, one where individuals of all levels of ability may explore the value of careful thought in the construction of a fruitful future.

My second argument. Classics tend to break the currently conceived bounds of disciplines of knowledge. For instance, where does Plato's Republic belong: in the department of philosophy? in that of political science? of literature? Greek? education? Such works are not easily reducible to unambiguous subject matters, the way in which we currently arrange our intellectual world, given our Newtonian, positivist prejudices. These works force us--and, if we teach them, our students--to rethink our assumptions about the nature and divisions of knowledge, something of no inconsiderable importance.

My third argument flows from the first two. This aspect is especially important for teachers. Classics tend to present a view of the world as a whole. When I mentioned just above that a classic is an environment, I meant it as an intellectual analog, if you will, to the physical environment in Dewey's conception. As such, it is a whole. It is the character of true wisdom to see the world whole, and a classic becomes a classic precisely because so many individuals from so many different periods, cultures, and locations have been able to enter into that environment whole-heartedly. The twentieth century's fragmentation of knowledge has seriously disrupted the individual's ability to see the connections in life, and classics give alternate perspectives on the meaning of human experience. For teachers, that provides a con-

text within which to understand and present their special field, whether it be art or literature or history or physics or math.

In closing, let me emphasize two key points. First, I would argue strenuously against reading only the classics. I know that some of the most finely educated individuals I have ever met have come either from the old U of C's College or from St. Johns. But I would in no way contend that every educational institution should emulate those two models. They should be available for students to choose, if they so desire, but other models are appropriate for other minds and other purposes. Classics are not the answer to education, but they are part of the answer. Second, I think that critical theory, feminist theory, and multicultural theory have rightly emphasized the limitations of what I above called the WEMP factor. As Meiklejohn observed, there is every reason to expect that a teacher would have read widely and deeply in those literatures and recognize the limitations of the particular classics one is reading. I have argued they see the world whole; that does not mean that they see the whole world.

With those two caveats in mind, then, classic texts stimulate reflection about the assumptions, character, and purposes of our thoughts, our actions, and our passions, and they encourage us in the attempt to see the world as a meaningful whole. They are, I believe, an essential part of the formation of a truly free individual who intends to become an active citizen of a democracy. The classics can stimulate progress in the broadest sense and enrich the future. If I may quote from a true classic, Shakespeare's The Tempest, "The past is prologue."

ENDNOTES

[1] Social Frontier, 3 (December 1936): 71-73; (January 1937): 103-4; (February 1937): 137-39; (March 1937): 167-69. Reprinted in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Vol. 11: 1935-1937, 391-407 and 592-97.

[2] John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 11, 398-99.

[3] Ibid., 592.

[4] Ibid., 595.

[5] Dewey's initial article appeared in August, 1944 (pages 155-57, 180-90); Meiklejohn replied in December, 1944 (pages 207-19); and both had letters to the editor in March, 1945 (pages 10 and 14).

[6] Fortune (August 1944): 157.

[7] Ibid., 184.

[8] Ibid., 210.

[9] Ibid., 214-17.

[10] Social Frontier, 3 (January 1937). See John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 11, 400 - Dewey's italics.

[11] Ibid., 219.

[12] Reprinted in The Knowledge Most Worth Having, ed. Wayne C. Booth (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 173-202.

[13] Ibid., 173-74.

[14] Ibid., 176.

[15] Ibid., 174-75.

[16] Ibid., 177.

[17] Ibid., 184 - McKeon's italics.

[18] Reprinted in La comprehension de l'histoire, ed. Nathan Rotenstreich (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1968), 63-101, 159-62.

[19] Ibid., 96.

[20] Ibid., 64.

[21] Ibid., 64. Some of the specific examples of the different kinds of history cited in what follows come also from McKeon's Freedom and History: The

Semantics of Philosophical Controversies and Ideological Conflicts (New York: Noonday Press, 1952).

[32] Ibid., 65.

[33] Ibid., 65-66.

[34] Ibid., 66.

[35] Ibid., 66.

[36] For instance, McKeon does not even appear in Daniel Bell's otherwise excellent history, The Reforming of General Education: The Columbia College Experience in Its National Setting (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1968), and in Adler's autobiography he receives only passing, piecemeal attention.

[37] Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 58, no. 5 (June 1985): 752.

[38] New York: Random House, 1941.

[39] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.

[30] The Knowledge Most Worth Having, 193.

[31] Ibid., 191.

[32] Ibid., 193.

[33] Ibid., 191.

[34] See the critical bibliography, "Reading about Rousseau," in his The Party of Humanity: Essays in the French Enlightenment (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1964), 211-61.

[35] Review of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: His Thought and Its Relevance Today, by C. H. Dobinson. School Review, 79, no. 1 (November 1970): 163-64.

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP LIST

David Annis
Department of Philosophy
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Joan C. Boscia
1100 Oakwood Drive
Westmost, IL 60559

Richard Brosio
Teachers College, 806
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Arthur Brown
College of Education
399 Education Building
Wayne State University
Detroit, MI 48202

Charles E. Bruckerhoff
Dept. of Curriculum and Foundations
College of Education
Cleveland State University
Cleveland, OH 44115

Jacqueline J. Burford
2114 W. 75th Place
Chicago, IL 60620

Joe Burnett
Dept. of Educational Policy Studies
360 Education Building
1310 South 6th Street
University of Illinois
Champaign, IL 61820

James A. Clarke
225 Ramseyer Hall
29 W. Woodruff Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210

Peter Collins
School of Education
Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI 53223

Robert Craig
Sisters of Charity
6400 Lawndale
Houston, TX 70023

George Dalin
Dept. of Research and Evaluation
Chicago Board of Education
1819 W. Pershing
Chicago, IL 60609

Lawrence Dennis
Dept. of Educational Administration
& Higher Education
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, IL 62901

Adrian M. Dupuis
School of Education, SC 154
Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI 53223

Charlesetta Maria Ellis
10351 South Forest
Chicago, IL 60628

Richard Ertenberg
1414 Lake Ariana Blvd.
Auburndale, FL 33823

Seung-Gyuh Gahng
Dept. of Education, Woosuk University
490 Hoojung-Rhee Samnye-ub
Jeonbuk, Seoul
South Korea

Gerald Gutek
School of Education
Loyola University, Water Tower Campus
820 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611

Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon
Department of Education
University of Chicago
5835 Kimbark Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637

Mary Abasca Hildebrand
6107 Orchard Station Road
Sebastopol, CA 95472

Karl Hostetler
Dept. of Elem./Secondary Education
Teachers College, 118 Henzlik Hall
University of Nebraska
Lincoln, NE 68588

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP LIST

Loren Houtman
10 Crestview Drive
Coal Valley, IL 61240

Marie Hungerman
Department of Philosophy
Nazareth College
Kalamazoo, MI 49001

George Kizer
3919 Dawes Drive
Ames, IA 50010

Edward T. Klunk
2855 West 46th Street
Chicago, IL 60632

Fr. Walter P. Krolikowski
School of Education
Loyola University, Water Tower Campus
820 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611

Patricia A. Kurriger
5 S 040 Pebblewood Lane, Apt. W303
Naperville, IL 60540

Charles Litz
College of Education
Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS 66506

Alexander Makedon
1503 West Ardmore
Chicago, IL 60660

Amy McAninch
2 Kensington Circle, #13
Mount Pleasant, MI 48858

James Merritt
419 Garden Road
De Kalb, IL 60115

Wilma Miranda
Dept. of Leadership & Educational
Policy Studies
412 Graham Hall
Northern Illinois University
De Kalb, IL 60115

Richard Moreshead
Division of Education
University of Michigan - Dearborn
4901 Evergreen Road
Dearborn, MI 48128

Van Cleve Morris
College of Education, M/C 147
University of Illinois - Chicago
Circle
Chicago, IL 60680

Diann Musial
Dept. of Leadership & Educational
Policy Studies
406 Graham Hall
Northern Illinois University
De Kalb, IL 60115

Mary Margaret Nee
6311 N. Kirkwood
Chicago, IL 60646

Mary Neely
9039 S. Phillips Avenue
Chicago, IL 60617

Robert B. Nordberg
999 E. Quarles Place
Fox Point, WI 53217

Michael A. Oliker
6119 North Hamilton
Chicago, IL 60659

David B. Owen
1408 28th Street
Ames, IA 50010

Margot Pergantis
1216 Raleigh
Glenview, IL 60025

Richard C. Pipan
223 Crest
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Jerome Popp
1809 Monticello Place
Edwardsville, IL 62025

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP LIST

Robert D. Posegate
Northwestern College
3003 N. Snelling
Roseville, MN 55112

Byron Radebaugh
Dept. of Leadership & Educational Policy Studies
408 Graham Hall
Northern Illinois University
De Kalb, IL 60115

Dwight C. Rinke
2285 Golfview Drive, No. 205
Troy, MI 48084

Michael T. Risku
Box 200
Brule, WI 54820

Carolyn Roberson
10216 S. LaFayette
Chicago, IL 60628

Ronald E. Rutkowski
1429 West Brown Street
Arlington Heights, IL 60004

Carole Ann Ryan
1329 Mound
Jacksonville, IL 62650

Charles Samec
614 South Clarence Avenue
Oak Park, IL 60304

Craig Schley
32955 North River Road
Mount Clemens, MI 48045

William H. Schubert
College of Education
University of Illinois - Chicago Circle
Box 4348
Chicago, IL 60680

Marian M. Schuller
2260 Woodlawn
Crete, IL 60417

David B. Seemann
11823 Trailwood
Plymouth, MI 48170

Guy B. Senese
830 South Second Street
De Kalb, IL 60115

Philip L. Smith
248 Larkins Hall
School of Health, Physical Education & Recreation
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Dale Snauwaert
360 Education Building
1310 South 6th Street
University of Illinois
Champaign, IL 61820

George W. Stickel
Department of Education
Northwestern College
Orange City, IA 51041

Kenneth Sutton
2317 Stoner Drive
West Charleston, IL 61920

Ronald Swartz
School of Education
Oakland University
Rochester, MI 48063

Diane J. Tartol
5340 West Windsor, #2H
Chicago, IL 60630

Ann-Marie Varvodic
3409 South Union Avenue
Chicago, IL 60616

Copeland Whitehead
Department of Educational Foundations
Western Illinois University
Macomb, IL 61455

Jack Williams
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
Milwaukee, WI 53201

Stephen Williams
14530 Rosemont
Detroit, MI 48223

Charles R. Wolf
College of St. Francis
500 Wilcox Street
Joliet, IL 60435

John M. Wozniak
School of Education
Loyola University, Water Tower Campus
820 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611

Joseph Yacoub
1006 West Loyola Avenue, #3
Chicago, IL 60626

Carol Zehren
2110 West Arthur
Chicago, IL 60645